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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States abolished slavery following the
Civil War, the discriminatory attitudes that tolerated, and even
encouraged, the practice of slavery in the antebellum period have
yet to be completely erased. Even up to the 1940's a significant
number of educated Americans professed the opinion that discrim-
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ination was "natural and instinctive" because of the physical dif-
ferences between the races and, therefore, could not be mitigated.1
Such comments echoed the viewpoint of the Supreme Court in
1896 when it proclaimed that "[1]egislation is powerless to eradi-
cate social instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuat-
ing the difficulties of the present situation."2 On June 25, 1941,
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802,3 which created a
Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) in the Office of Pro-
duction and Management and prohibited discrimination in the de-
fense industry and government.4 One commentator suspects that
"[p]robably not even [Roosevelt] believed that his order would
achieve results."5 The President's committee was the creature of a
number of influences: an aroused public opinion,6 changing social
and economic conditions,7 the experience of previous governmental
1. L. RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, AND PoLITIcS: THE STORY OF THE F.E.P.C. 3 (1953).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
3. 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
4. Id. The Order provided in pertinent part,
WHEREAS it is the policy of the United States to encourage full participation in
the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless of race,
creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within
the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups
within its borders...
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and the statutes, and as a prerequisite to the successful conduct of our national defense
production effort, I do hereby reaffirm the policy of the United States that there shall
be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government
because of race, creed, color, or national origin, and I do hereby declare that it is the
duty of employers and of labor organizations, in futherance of said policy and of this
order, to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense in-
dustries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin.
Id.
5. L. RUCHAMES, supra note 1. The Amsterdam News, a black newspaper published in
New York City, called the Executive Order "epochal to say the least .... If President Lin-
coln's proclamation was designed to end physical slavery, it would seem that the recent
order of President Roosevelt is designed to end, or at least curb, economic slavery." Amster-
dam News, July 5, 1941, at 14. Another black newspaper, the Chicago Defender, however,
noted with concern that the order provided no penalties for violations. Chicago Defender,
July 5, 1941, at 1. The white press almost entirely failed to cover the issuance of the order.
L. RuCHMES, supra note 1, at 23.
6. See generally L. RUCHAmsS, supra note 1, at 14-16.
7. Of major importance was the gradual shift in potential black votes from the South,
where they were of almost no importance, to the North, where blacks could exert significant
political pressure. As one commentator of the period noted, "The Negro cast his vote where
it yielded the greatest returns. In several states his vote became the balance in electoral
power. The Negro was no longer a one-party voter." Reid, 12 J. NEGRO EDUC. 465 (1943). In
896
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efforts to eliminate discrimination in employment,8 the exigencies
of war,9 and the unremitting struggle of black, labor, and religious
organizations to achieve equality of opportunity in government
and industry.10 During the 1940's, a number of states followed the
federal example and enacted their own fair employment practice
commission laws.1"
In 1954 the Supreme Court declared in Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation" that segregated schools are inherently unequal and di-
rected the desegregation of the public schools "with all deliberate
speed."13 Following Brown, civil rights activities intensified;
addition to the newly found political power exercised by blacks themselves, help came from
a number of outside sources. For example, the Communications Industry Organization,
which had over four million members in 1940, advocated a strong antidiscrimination plat-
form. Other groups also emerged on the pre-war social and political scene and had signifi-
cant impact in the public arena and in the legislatures. These organizations included the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation for Constitutional Liberties, the
National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress. See generally L. RUCHAMES, supra note 1, at 10-11.
8. See generally L. RucHAMES, supra note 1, at 4-7.
9. While in early 1940 the military's need for soldiers had not yet become critical, the
administration realized that eventually it would have to recruit from every available source
of manpower in order to succeed in the war effort. Accordingly, if discrimination prevented
the most efficient employment of manpower, the government realized that it would soon
have to be mitigated, if not completely eliminated. See generally id. at 11.
10. In the prewar period black pressure groups increased in size and effectiveness. In
1917, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the first
national black organization to use group pressure techniques to obtain minority rights, had
only 9,282 members in 80 branches throughout the country. By the beginning of World War
II, however, the NAACP had grown to a membership of more than 100,000 in 450 branches
nationwide. The National Urban League, created in 1910 to obtain more and better jobs for
blacks, reached a membership of 26,000 just prior to the war. In addition to these organiza-
tional efforts, two key events dramatized the quest for greater economic opportunity for
blacks and the elimination of discrimination in the defense industry. On March 30, 1941, the
National Urban League, with the participation of the Lieutenant Governor of New York,
made a nationwide radio broadcast discussing the plight of blacks in employment and in the
defense industry in particular. At the suggestion of A. Philip Randolph, a prominent black
labor leader and president of the predominantly black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
a March-On-Washington Committee was formed, and a march protesting against discrimi-
nation was officially scheduled for July 1, 1941. Eventually the number of expected march-
ers grew to 100,000. The administration's efforts to have the march cancelled included sev-
eral conferences with Randolph and other black leaders and a letter to Randolph from Mrs.
Roosevelt. These efforts were unsuccessful, however, until Randolph and his aides received a
draft of the proposed executive order. After some modifications in the draft, the march was
called off the day before President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802. See generally id.
at 13-21.
11. The effectiveness of state administrative agencies in dealing with race discrimina-
tion has been questioned. Hill, 20 Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions:
A Critical Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 22 (1964).
12. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
13. Id. at 301.
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marches, sit-ins, boycotts, and freedom rides focused the nation's
attention on the plight of blacks in America. Beginning with Presi-
dent Kennedy's Executive Order 10,92514 issued in 1961, govern-
mental responses to the civil rights movement steadily increased,
at least partially because of the increased social and political activ-
ism of blacks. Prior to the 1963 civil rights march on Washington,
however, congressional bills seeking to create federal regulation of
employment practices met with little success. Indeed, even in the
wake of the Birmingham riots when the Kennedy administration
began to formulate a comprehensive civil rights proposal, its
spokesmen feared that inclusion of strong fair employment pro-
visions would endanger the entire bill.15 After extensive debate,
revision, and compromise,"' however, Congress finally passed the
omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 Part of the Act included Title
VII,1s which was designed to prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment.
In 1968 the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of the
post-Civil War civil rights statutes to encompass private acts of
discrimination. Since the statutes1 ' were based on the fourteenth
amendment, the courts had previously interpreted them restric-
tively and required state action to prohibit discrimination. 0 In
1968, however, the Supreme Court declared in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.2 1 that Congress' authority to enact sections 1981 and
1982 came instead from the thirteenth amendment and, therefore,
the sections are not restricted by the fourteenth amendment state
action requirement. Following Jones, these statutes became appli-
cable to private acts of discrimination based on race and alienage.
14. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961). The Kennedy order contained the affirmative action ob-
ligation that has emerged in the 1970's as the most controversial of the recent civil rights
concepts.
15. See Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. on the Civil Rights Bill of 1963,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 2661 (1963) (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). The
original administrative proposal, introduced in the House on June 20, 1963, contained a
weak employment title that would have given statutory authority to the already established
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
16. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
17. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000d-6 to 2000h-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), amended by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13.
19. These statutes are now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 (1976).
20. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872);
see also Hodge v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1905).
21. 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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Application of these sections to private acts of age and sex discrim-
ination, however, has been uniformly rejected.2 These statutes are
enforced through private litigation; the discriminatory act is con-
sidered a form of economic tort.'3 Although the statutory language
does not specifically authorize back pay as a remedy, the Supreme
Court has found that a successful claimant under section 1981 can
obtain both equitable and legal relief." The Supreme Court has
also noted that despite the comprehensive nature of Title VII, it
did not implicitly repeal section 1981; rather, the remedies under
Title VII and section 1981 coexist and may be concurrently availa-
ble to the discriminatee.2
5
In 1972 Congress significantly amended Title VII and ex-
panded its coverage by including state and local entities, by limit-
ing the available exemptions, including the exemption for certain
small businesses, and by specifically including the federal executive
branches and the administrative agencies within the prohibitions
against employment discrimination.' 6 Thus, in its amended form,
Title VII currently prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed, national origin, and sex by employment agencies, la-
bor organizations, and private and public employers.' The title
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which investigates complaints and seeks to negotiate settlements
when the EEOC makes a finding of discrimination.' If conciliation
fails, either the EEOC or the individual may bring an action in
federal court against private employers, employment agencies, and
22. See, e.g., Kodish v. United Air Lines, Inc., 628 F.2d 1301, 1302 (10th Cir. 1980) (Q
1981 inapplicable to age discrimination in employment); DeGraffenreid v. General Motors
Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 486 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) (Q 1981 inapplicable to sex discrimina-
tion in employment); Lee v. Minnock, 417 F. Supp. 436, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (Q 1982 inap-
plicable to sex discrimination in housing), aff'd, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. See Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimi-
nation in Private Employment, 7 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 56 (1972); see also Note, The
Expanding Scope of § 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative
Action, 90 HARv. L. REV. 412 (1977).
24. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); see infra note 123 and
accompanying text-
25. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1975); see infra notes
120-22 and accompanying text.
26. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Age discrimination is not
prohibited under Title VII, but is proscribed under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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labor organizations."9 If the complaint is against state government
employers, the Attorney General rather than the EEOC brings the
action.30
When Congress drafted Title VII, it included broad language
enabling the courts to authorize a number of remedies for employ-
ment discrimination: "[T]he court may order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate."8 1 In the early years of Title VII litigation, however, both the
courts 2 and commentators33 focused primarily on the liability
stage, or "Stage I," of the proceedings and the establishment of
substantive theories of liability. More recently, several commenta-
tors have thoroughly discussed the procedural problems associated
with Stage I that have remained untouched by the courts." As
originally enacted, Title VII permitted only a modest role for suits
brought by the government, and until the early 1970's few private
suits had reached the recovery stage, 5 or "Stage II," of the pro-
ceedings. With the expanded role for government suits created by
the 1972 amendments, however, the back pay award assumed in-
creased importance; concomitantly, more litigation has progressed
29. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1976).
30. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
32. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523
F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
33. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GnossAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw (1976); C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARs, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION (1980); Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing
Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1981); Belton, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235
(1971); Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications of
the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1976); Developments in the Law-Title VII, 84 HARv.
L. REV. 1109 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Mendez, Presumptions of
Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129
(1980).
35. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (Sth Cir. 1974).
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into Stage II and the size of the monetary awards has created front
page headlines.3 6
With increasing numbers of private actions reaching the recov-
ery stage and more effective government enforcement of Title VII
following the 1972 amendments, courts have confronted back pay
claims much more frequently than in the early years of Title VII
litigation. Since Congress patterned the Title VII remedy section
after a similar provision in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),37 the courts have found some guidance in a long line of
case law under the NLRA. The NLRA case law, however, does not
always provide an appropriate answer to Title VII back pay ques-
tions. In many respects, a discrimination suit requesting back pay
relief under Title VII can be much more complicated than a labor
dispute requesting similar relief under the NLRA. The Title VII
action probably will concern many more employees, will require
the court to examine employment policies and practices in effect
over a much longer period of time, and will concern claimants who
are more likely to be disappointed applicants for jobs or promo-
tions rather than discharged employees. Despite the complexity of
the issues facing the courts in the recovery stage of the litigation,
however, the back pay remedy has received little analysis in judi-
cial opinions. Thus, rarely have the courts articulated any rationale
to accompany their back pay decisions. Consequently, the existing
body of case law concerning back pay awards lacks the unity and
consistency that a carefully articulated rationale could provide.
This Special Project examines the back pay decisions and ana-
lyzes the problems that have confronted the courts dealing with
this remedy for employment discrimination in the context of Title
VII and section 1981. Because of the enormity of the issues that
have arisen in Stage I of the proceedings, however, and the exten-
sive coverage given those problems by the courts and commenta-
tors,3 8 the Special Project will deal only with the recovery stage, or
Stage II, of the litigation.39 Consequently, the reader should as-
36. AT&T's agreement to pay $15 million to settle a government suit received front
page coverage in the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The
government's suit was based on both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No.
88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)). Two years later, in United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), the settlement order
included $30,940,000 in back pay.
37. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
38. See authorities cited supra notes 32-34.
39. The terms "recovery or relief stage" and "Stage II" will be used interchangeably
throughout the Special Project.
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sume that liability for employment discrimination has already
been established in each of the cases discussed below. Before
reaching the various procedural and substantive issues surrounding
back pay awards, however, the Project, in part II, presents an over-
view of the statutory authority for back pay including the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and section 1981. Part II also discusses the
development of the appropriate standard for the exercise of judi-
cial discretion in awarding back pay. Part III examines the parties
liable for the payment of back pay. In part IV the Project explores
presumptive eligibility for back pay and in part V considers possi-
ble grounds on which a defendant may seek to rebut the presump-
tion. Parts VI and VII discuss the proof-of-claim procedure that
must be followed by discriminatees claiming back pay and the pro-
cedure for determining individual awards. Part VIII then identifies
and analyzes the various problems facing courts in allocating the
burdens of proof that plaintiffs and defendants must meet before
the court can determine individual awards. Following the discus-
sion of the order and allocation of the burdens of proof, part IX
outlines the various methods used by the courts to compute indi-
vidual back pay awards and also discusses other issues such as the
elements includable and deductible, the mitigation requirement,
and the limitation periods for back pay. In part X the Special Pro-
ject examines the problems that may arise when the parties agree
to a settlement of back pay claims.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR BACK PAY
A. Title VII
1. Legislative History
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to enact civil rights leg-
islation, the eighty-eighth Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964,40 with Title VII 1 of the Act directed at the problem of em-
ployment discrimination. Representative James Roosevelt intro-
duced H.R. 405,42 the "nominal ancestor" of Title VIIT,43 in the
40. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000d-6 to 2000h-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979), amended by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13. Remedying discrim-
ination in employment was an important part of the Act. One congressional supporter of
Title VII commented, "No civil rights legislation would be complete unless it dealt with this
problem." 110 CONG. REc. 6547 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
42. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). For a detailed discussion of the legislative
history of Title VII, see Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INus. & Com. L. REV.
431 (1966).
43. Vas, supra note 42, at 433.
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House. As reported by the House Committee on Education and
Labor, H.R. 405 provided for enforcement through the creation of
the EEOC, which would have powers and duties comparable to
those of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)."4 The bill
would have provided for an Administrator with the power to inves-
tigate and prosecute violators of the Act, and for a five-member
Board empowered to hear the charges brought by the Administra-
tor and issue cease-and-desist orders upon a finding of discrimina-
tion.45 After significant revisions, including the reduction of part of
the EEOC's enforcement powers, the House Judiciary Committee
incorporated H.R. 405 into its own civil rights bill, H.R. 7152."
The House adopted H.R. 7152, but the Senate further reduced the
enforcement powers of the EEOC before it passed the legislation. 7
The House concurred with the Senate amendments and President
Johnson signed the bill on July 2, 1964.48
The proponents of H.R. 7152 emphasized the corrective nature
of Title VII4 and designed section 706(g) 50 to accomplish this cor-
rective purpose. Section 706(g) provides that upon a finding of em-
ployment discrimination "the court may... order such affirma-
tive action as may be appropriate, which may include ...
44. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
45. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. REV. 62, 64-65 (1964); Vass, supra note 42, at 435.
46. The Judiciary Committee's version, for example, eliminated the EEOC's proposed
enforcement power to issue cease-and-desist orders and instead authorized the EEOC to
bring a civil action in the event attempts at conciliation failed. The Committee reasoned
that settlement of complaints would occur more rapidly and with greater frequency if the
ultimate determination of discrimination rested with the courts rather than the EEOC. The
reasons for the changes in the enforcement powers of the EEOC are set forth in the "Addi-
tional Views on H.R. 7152" of Rep. McCulloch and others, included in the Judiciary Com.
mittee's report, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2515-16.
47. The Senate weakened the EEOC's enforcement power by eliminating the EEOC's
authority to bring a civil action and transferring this power to the plaintiff-discriminatee.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 258-59 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1976)). The Senate passed H.R. 7152 on June 19, 1964. 110 CONG. REc. 14,511 (1964).
48. 110 CONG. REC. 17,783 (1964).
49. The proponents, however, stated, "It must also be stressed that the Commission
must confine its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical
certainty.... Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interfered
with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices."
H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 46, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 2355,
2516.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title V11, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976)).
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reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay."1
The drafters of Title VII specifically patterned the language of the
remedial section after the language of the back pay provision of
the NLRA. The NLRB has consistently interpreted the "discre-
tionary" language of the NLRA 8 to mandate that back pay be the
standard form of relief for victims of unfair labor practices. 4 The
courts, however, have not followed the NLRB's practice of rou-
tinely awarding back pay in Title VII cases.5 Instead, they have
interpreted the same "discretionary" language in Title VII as stat-
utory authorization to award relief "with or without back pay" at
the court's discretion."
Despite the conflicting interpretations of the discretionary lan-
guage contained in both statutes, the NLRA analogy remains a
valid indication of the congressional purpose behind the Title VII
back pay remedy. In view of the drafters' reliance on language
from the NLRA, the "make whole" purpose of the NLRA back pay
provision logically can be extended to the Title VII back pay
award.57 Under the NLRA, "'[m]aking the workers whole for
losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the
vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces.' "58
Moreover, when Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportu-
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7214 (inter-
pretative memorandum of Title VII submitted by Senators Clark and Case). Section 10(c)
of the NLRA authorizes "affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay" upon a finding of an unfair labor practice by the NLRB. 29 U.S.C. §
160(c) (1976). The Supreme Court expressly recognized Title VII's back pay origin in the
NLRA's back pay provision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 & n.11
(1975).
53. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); see supra note 52.
54. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1975). "The finding of an
unfair labor practice and discriminatory discharge is presumptive proof that some back pay
is owed by the employer." Id. at 420 n.12 (quoting NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d
170, 178 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966)); see, e.g., M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 179 (10th Cir. 1977).
55. See Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 742-43 (1973).
56. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-16 (1975); Kaplan v. Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees & Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 525
F.2d 1354, 1363 (9th Cir. 1975). "The discretion to award back pay for violations of Title
VII is statutorily provided .... The district court has the discretion to determine the
amount to be awarded." Id. (citation omitted).
57. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975). "The 'make whole'
purpose of Title VII is made evident by the legislative history. The backpay provision was
expressly modeled on the backpay provision of the National Labor Relations Act." Id.
58. Id. (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941)).
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nity Act of 1972, it re-enacted the back pay provision without any
limitation on the judicial power to award back pay, and thus reaf-
firmed the "make whole" purpose of Title VII.5 9 In Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody 0 the Supreme Court acknowledged the "make
whole" purpose of the Act e1 and further recognized that the back
pay remedy has a deterrent effect on employment discrimina-
tion-it serves as the catalyst for employers and unions to examine
their employment practices and eliminate discrimination.6 2 Thus,
the back pay award has a dual nature-it compensates those who
have suffered from unlawful employment discrimination and de-
ters employers and unions from engaging in or continuing to en-
gage in discrimination."
2. Standard of Discretion
The language of the statute initially defined the scope of the
discretion to award or deny back pay by requiring that the court
find an "intentional" unlawful employment practice. 4 The legisla-
59. Remarks accompanying a Conference Committee report evidence Congress' inten-
tion to retain the "make whole" purpose of the Act:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. In deal-
ing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of relief
under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimina-
tion of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires
that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment
practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were
it not for the unlawful discrimination.
118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, submitted by Sen. Williams) (emphasis added).
60. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
61. Id. at 418. The circuit courts frequently cite Albemarle as support for the "make
whole" purpose of Title VII. See, e.g., Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 867
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc.,
603 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 612 (1981); Comacho v. Colorado
Elec. Technical College, Inc., 590 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Local 638, 532
F.2d 821, 832 (2d Cir. 1976); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 231 (4th Cir.
1975).
62. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417-18.
63. The circuit courts rely on Albemarle when discussing the dual purpose of a back
pay award. See, e.g., Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271, 276 (7th
Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 832 (2d Cir. 1976); Russell v. American To-
bacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); Hairston v.
McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 1975).
64. Section 706(g) states, "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice.., the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
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tive history of section 706(g) provides some guidance concerning
the congressional interpretation of an "intentional" violation."
The original House bill contained no mention of intent, but rather
spoke in terms of "engaging in" an unlawful employment prac-
tice.6 6 One of the proposed Senate amendments would have in-
serted the word "willfully" before "engaging in."'67 According to
Senator Dirksen, the proponent of this amendment, the insertion
of the word "willfully" would indicate a "much clearer legislative
intent" and would add "a greater degree of certainty" to Congress'
position that employers should not be subject to charges under Ti-
tle VII because of accidental, inadvertent, or unintended acts."
The Senate, however, chose not to enact Senator Dirksen's amend-
ment and instead inserted the word "intentionally" in the final
version. 9 Senator Humphrey explained that this change was
"designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or accidental
discriminations will not violate the title or result in entry of court
orders." 70
The courts have accepted the Senate's broad interpretation of
intent in the remedial section.71 For example, in Local 189, United
Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States"2 the Fifth Circuit
construed section 706(g) to require "only that the defendant meant
to do what he did, that is, his employment practice was not acci-
dental."' s Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc.74 concluded that the employer had intentionally en-
such affirmative action as may be appropriate .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) (empha-
sis added).
65. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
66. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
67. 110 CoNG. REc. 8194 (1964) (Amendment No. 507 to H.R. 7152 proposed by Sen.
Dirksen). This amendment was one of 10 proposed by Senator Dirksen.
68. 110 CONG. REc. 8194 (1964). Senator Dirksen submitted a lengthy definition of the
words "willful" and "willfully" obtained from Corpus Juris Secundum to illustrate the ap-
propriateness of the insertion of the word "willfully" into the remedial section. Id.
69. See supra note 64.
70. 110 CONG. REc. 12,723-24 (1964). Senator Humphrey further explained that
"[s]ince the title bars only discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or natural [sic]
origin it would seem already to require intent, and, thus, the proposed change does not
involve any substantive change in the title." Id. at 12,723.
71. See generally Note, Back Pay for Employment Discrimination Under Title
VII-Role of the Judiciary in Exercising Its Discretion, 23 CATH. U.L. Rav. 525, 532-35
(1974).
72. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
73. Id. at 996. In support of its interpretation of § 706(g), the court cited the legisla-
tive history surrounding Senator Dirksen's proposed amendment. Id. at 995-96 n.15.
74. 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
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gaged in an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of
section 706(g), although the employer had not adopted its transfer
policy with the intention of discriminating, but had followed the
practice deliberately and not accidentally.75
After reaching a consensus on the definition of the "intention-
ally engaging in" language, the courts continued to develop the
standard of discretion for awarding back pay. Prior to 1975 the
circuit courts had arrived at no uniform standard" and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
7"
in part to resolve this conflict. 8 The district court in Albemarle
had made a finding of unlawful employment discrimination under
Title VII,7 9 but refused to award back pay because of a lack of
"evidence of bad faith non-compliance with the Act."80 The Fourth
Circuit reversed and held that back pay should ordinarily be
awarded under Title VII "unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust."8 " The Supreme Court rejected the
"special circumstances" standard.82 While recognizing that a cer-
tain amount of discretion must be involved in deciding whether to
award back pay, the Court nevertheless stated that such discretion
must be exercised in accordance with the "large objectives of the
Act."88 The Court articulated the following standard for courts to
75. Id. at 250. Apparently not all courts initially accepted this definition of "intention-
ally." See generally Note, supra note 71, at 532-35; Comment, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity: The Back Pay Remedy Under Title VII; 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 379, 381.
76. For a detailed discussion of the standards that developed among the various cir-
cuits, see Note, supra note 71, at 535-41; 61 CORNELL L. REv. 460, 465-72 (1976); and 12
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 466, 470-74 (1976).
77. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
78. Id. at 413. Justice Stewart stated, "We granted certiorari because of an evident
Circuit conflict as to the standards governing awards of backpay -.. " Id. (footnotes
omitted).
79. 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 561, 570 (E.D.N.C. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 134 (4th
Cir. 1973), vacated & remanded, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
50. Id.
81. 474 F.2d at 142. Several circuits utilized the "special circumstances" rule until the
Supreme Court ruling in Albemarle. See generally 61 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 76, at
468-69.
82. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 415-21. Actually, the Supreme Court
did not expressly reject the "special circumstances" standard. Rather, the Court held that
the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968), a
Title II suit that utilized the "special circumstances" rule for the award of attorney's fees,
was misplaced because Newman was "not directly in point." 422 U.S. at 415. The Court
further stated that "[flor guidance as to the granting and denial of backpay, one must,
therefore, look elsewhere." Id. (emphasis in original).
83. 422 U.S. at 416 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)). The Court
emphasized the two purposes of Title VII, namely to eliminate employment discrimination
and to make persons whole for losses suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimi-
1982]
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utilize in determining whether to award back pay: "[G]iven a find-
ing of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the




Subsequent circuit court decisions have recognized that the
Albemarle standard sharply limits the judge's discretion to deny
back pay. For example, in EEOC v. Local 63885 the Second Circuit
concluded that Albemarle made clear that "back pay is to be the
rule rather than exception under Title VII."' Similarly, the Eighth
Circuit noted in Womack v. Munsone7 that "[a]bsent extraordinary
circumstances, back pay is awarded to fashion the most complete
relief possible for proscribed discrimination.'",
Although Albemarle sharply curtailed the extent to which ju-
dicial discretion may be exercised, the Supreme Court did not
mandate that back pay be awarded automatically upon a finding of
unlawful employment discrimination. That some discretion still
exists became evident in City of Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart,89 in which the Court found that the
Department's pension plan unlawfully discriminated on the basis
of sex under Title VII.90 The Court noted that "[t]he Albemarle
nation. Id. at 417-18; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
84. 422 U.S. at 421. The articulation of this standard ended the conflicts among the
circuits. See, e.g., Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 518 (8th Cir. 1980); Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607
F.2d 1153, 1155 (5th Cir. 1979); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598, 602
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 612 (1981); EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 832 (2d
Cir. 1976); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 231 (4th Cir. 1975).
Although the circuits now follow the Albemarle standard, at least two circuits have not
abandoned entirely "special circumstances" language. See, e.g., Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1391 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); Stew-
art v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919
(1977). In particular, "special circumstances" language appears in a number of Fifth Circuit
opinions. The Fifth Circuit, however, generally discusses the "special circumstances" rule in
conjunction with the Albemarle standard, apparently finding no conflict between them. See,
e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 357 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
85. 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
86. Id. at 832.
87. 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
88. Id. at 1299.
89. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). For a more detailed discussion of the Court's opinion in Man-
hart, see infra notes 319-26.
90. Id. at 717.
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presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom be over-
come, but it does not make meaningless the district courts' duty to
determine that such relief is appropriate.""1 The Court then con-
cluded that in Manhart a retroactive monetary award would be
inappropriate.9 2 Although Manhart concerned whether an em-
ployer should be required to refund pension contributions, the
Court spoke of Title VII "retroactive liability" in general and re-
lied heavily on Albemarle. The principles in Manhart, therefore,
appear equally applicable to cases such as Albemarle in which
back pay is in issue. Thus, with its decision in Manhart, the Court
indicated that some degree of discretion to award or deny back pay
still remains after Albemarle, although limited by the standard
enunciated in that case.
9 3
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
1. Legislative History
The language of section 19811" first appeared in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,' enacted by the post-Civil War Congress to
91. Id. at 719.
92. Id. at 723.
93. See Palmer v. General Mills Inc., 600 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1979). In Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), a case alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), the Supreme Court noted
that although it had held that the discretionary power to deny back pay should only be used
if it met the Albemarle standard, it nonetheless recognized "that under Title VII some dis-
cretion exists." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 584 n.13.
94. Section 1981 provides,
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
95. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
provided,
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, ex-
cluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slav-
ery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added). Congress derived § 1981 from the above italicized language. Section
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protect the rights of freed slaves. The thirty-ninth Congress passed
the Act pursuant to the authority granted by section 2 of the thir-
teenth amendment.98 Members of the thirty-ninth Congress, how-
ever, disagreed about the scope97 of the Civil Rights Act and their
authority to enact such legislation. Because of doubts about the
constitutionality of the Act, Congress proposed the fourteenth
amendment, which incorporated the substantive provisions of the
1866 Act.98
The Enforcement Act of 187011 re-enacted the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and in subsequent years became the source of much
confusion about the origin of section 1981. Even though section
18100 of the 1870 Act re-enacted the entire Civil Rights Act of 1866,
section 16,101 enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, con-
tained language almost identical to that of section 1 of the 1866
Act. Most of the disputed history of section 1981 stems from an
1982 of the same title came from that portion of § 1 of the 1866 Act which deals with
property rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976); infra note 106.
96. The thirteenth amendment provides, "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII.
97. Ambiguity existed concerning whether the 1866 Act reached private discrimination
until the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In
Jones the Court held that Congress intended the statute to reach such private acts. The
legislative history surrounding the passage of the Act, however, contains conflicting notions
of congressional intent. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 33, 50-56 (1980).
98. The Supreme Court in considering the scope of § 1982 in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24 (1948), noted that "one of the primary purposes of many members of Congress in sup-
porting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the guaranties of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of the land." Id. at 32.
99. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
100. Section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 provided,
And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eigh-
teen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and seventeen
hereof shall be enforced according to the provisions of said act.
16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (emphasis in original).
101. Section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 provided in part,
And be it further enacted, That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the United States to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal bene-
fit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (emphasis in original).
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historical note appended to the 1874 recodification of the 1866
Civil Rights Act. The note indicates that section 1981 derives
solely from section 16 of the 1870 Enforcement Act.102 Resolving
this dispute concerning the source of section 1981 is necessary
before the scope of the section can be determined. If the revisers'
note is accurate in its statement that section 16 of the 1870 Act
constitutes the sole source of section 1981, the omission in the 1874
recodification of any reference to section 18 of the 1870 Act im-
pliedly repealed section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Conse-
quently, section 1981 would be limited by its enactment under the
fourteenth amendment to claims involving state action.0 3 If, how-
ever, the 1866 Civil Rights Act remained the source of section
1981, then its coverage would extend to private discriminatory
acts. 10 ' The Supreme Court resolved this controversy in Runyon v.
McCrary0 5 by determining that section 1981 originated from both
section 16 of the 1870 Act and section 1 of the 1866 Act.08 As a
result, section 1981 reaches private as well as public discrimination
based upon Congress' thirteenth amendment powers.07
2. Judicial Development
Despite its enactment over one hundred years ago, section
1981 has only recently been used to prohibit private acts of em-
ployment discrimination. Early in the statute's history the Su-
preme Court circumscribed its potential impact with decisions that
narrowly construed its scope. In Hodges v. United States, °10 a case
102. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976).
103. See id. at 195-212 (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 168 n.8.
105. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
106. Id. at 168 n.8. The majority attributed the revisers' omission of a reference to § 1
of the 1866 Act to either inadvertence or "the assumption that the relevant language in § 1
of the 1866 Act was superfluous in light of the closely parallel language in § 16 of the 1870
Act." Id. The majority claimed that
even assuming. . . the revisers' hypothetical assumption was wrong-there is still no
basis for inferring that Congress did not understand the draft legislation which eventu-
ally became 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to be drawn from both § 16 of the 1870 Act and § 1 of the
1866 Act.
To hold otherwise would be to attribute to Congress an intent to repeal a major
piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of an unexplained omission from the
revisers' marginal notes.
Id. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, wrote a lengthy dissent, advocating the view
that § 18 of the 1870 Act was eliminated in the 1874 codification and, therefore, § 1981
derives solely from § 16 of the 1870 Enforcement Act. Id. at 195-212 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 168 n.8.
108. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
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brought under the 1870 Enforcement Act, the Court held that the
thirteenth amendment and the legislation enacted thereunder pro-
hibited only involuntary servitude and thus sharply curtailed the
use of the 1870 Act and, consequently, section 1981 as civil rights
protection.10 9 In Hurd v. Hodge"10 the Court limited section 1981's
application to situations involving state action when it remarked
that "[tihe action toward which the provisions of the statute under
consideration is directed is governmental action.""'
Section 1981 did not become a practicable vehicle for re-
dressing private employment discrimination until Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,"' in which the Supreme Court dispensed with the
state action requirement. In Jones the Court held that the defen-
dant's refusal to sell the plaintiffs a home because of their race
violated section 1982.113 The Court dismissed as dictum the Hurd
v. Hodge language indicating that section 1982 was directed only
toward "governmental action.' 1 4 On the contrary, Justice Stewart
wrote that Congress intended section 1982 to reach private acts of
discrimination and the thirteenth amendment authorized such leg-
islation."1 5 The Court also expressly overruled Hodges v. United
States, which had, in effect, restricted section 1981 to cases of in-
voluntary servitude. 16 Jones led to a renewed use of section 1981
to attack private acts of employment discrimination. 17 In Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc."8 the Supreme Court endorsed
this post-Jones line of cases and held that section 1981 "affords a
109. Id. at 18-19.
110. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
111. Id. at 31. In Hurd the Court considered the scope of § 1982. Since § 1981 and §
1982 both originated from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, courts have applied § 1982
decisions to § 1981 cases. See supra note 95. In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), the Supreme Court, in considering whether a private club could
be liable under § 1982, noted, "In light of the historical interrelationship between
§ 1981 and § 1982, [there is] no reason to construe these sections differently ... " Id. at
440.
112. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
113. Id. at 413.
114. Id. at 419.
115. Id. at 438-43.
116. Id. at 441 n.78.
117. See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector
Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621
(8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d
757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 911 (1970).
118. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on
the basis of race." '119
The Johnson decision also settled the question whether Con-
gress had impliedly repealed section 1981 when it enacted the com-
prehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court made clear that
"[d]espite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solu-
tion for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment,
the aggrieved clearly is not deprived of other remedies. 1 2 0 The
Court buttressed this proposition with a congressional statement
supporting the availability of remedies under both Title VII and
section 1981 and further noted that "in considering the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Senate rejected an amend-
ment that would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue
under § 1981. ' '1"1 The Court concluded that "the remedies availa-
ble under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and al-
though directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct,
and independent.
1 2 2
Although section 1981 contains no express authorization for an
award of back pay, in Johnson the Supreme Court specifically
stated that "[a]n individual who establishes a cause of action
under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief."12 3 In
addition, the lower courts have acknowledged the availability of
back pay as an appropriate remedy.12' For example, in Campbell v.
Gadsen County District School Board'" the Fifth Circuit held
that the plaintiff should receive back pay "in accordance with prior
cases which expressly consider the availability of such relief under
119. Id. at 460.
120. Id. at 459.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 461.
123. Id. at 460. Back pay is considered an "equitable remedy" under Title VII. See,
e.g., McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate School Dist., 478 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1973).
Under § 1981, however, it is considered a "legal remedy." See Setser v. Novac& Inv. Co., 638
F.2d 1137, 1142, vacated in part & modified on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981).
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), a § 1982 case, the Supreme
Court reiterated its holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. that "although § 1982 is
couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement, a federal
court has power to fashion an effective equitable remedy." Id. at 238. The Court further
noted that "[t]he existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and
appropriate remedies." Id. at 239.
124. See, e.g., Williams v. DeKab County, 577 F.2d 248, 256, modified on other
grounds, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th
Cir. 1973).
125. 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
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section 1981. ' '126 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Machine Co.,127 upon a finding of a violation of
section 1981, declared that the plaintiff had a right to an award of
back pay.
128
3. Standard of Discretion
The rationale behind a back pay award under section 1981 ap-
parently parallels the purposes of the Title VII back pay provi-
sion. 1 29 Thus, as under Title VII,5 0 the award of back pay under
section 1981 has been described as compensatory in nature and a
necessary part of a grant of full relief in employment discrimina-
tion suits.' 1 The standard of discretion governing a back pay
award under section 1981, however, has not been as thoroughly de-
veloped as under Title VII.18 2 No uniform standard apparently ex-
ists among the circuits, and some courts, particularly the Fifth Cir-
cuit, treat the section 1981 standard and the Title VII standard
identically. 33 For example, the Fifth Circuit in Pettway v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co.lu grouped together section 1981 and Title
VII when describing the rationale for a back pay award. The court
then articulated the standard it believed should govern the exer-
cise of an award under both statutes: "Once a court has deter-
mined that a plaintiff or complaining class has sustained economic
loss from a discriminatory employment practice, back pay should
126. Id. at 658; accord Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.
1974). In Pettway the court stated that Congress impliedly authorized courts to grant equi-
table relief under § 1981 and gave them the discretion to award back pay. Id. at 251-52.
127. 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
128. Id. at 1379; see also Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979). In Davis, after noting that Title VII vests the
judiciary with the power to award broad remedial relief, the court stated, "We do not be-
lieve the court lacks equal power under § 1981 to order relief." Id. at 1342.
129. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252 nn.118 & 119 (5th
Cir. 1974).
130. For a discussion of the purposes underlying the Title VII back pay award, see
supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
131. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252 n.119 (5th Cir. 1974).
132. The paucity of case law concerning the standard of discretion under § 1981 may
have resulted because many plaintiffs who bring § 1981 employment discrimination suits
also include a Title VII claim for relief. The courts tend to discuss the Title VII standard of
discretion, but do not give the § 1981 discretionary standard separate treatment. For a dis-
cussion of the standard of discretion under Title VII, see supra notes 64-93 and accompany-
ing text.
133. See, e.g., McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir.
1976); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918, 924-25 & 925 n.11
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
134. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
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normally be awarded unless special circumstances are present." 185
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,""6 however, the Supreme Court
rejected the "special circumstances" test 13 7 as the standard of dis-
cretion for Title VII back pay awards and instead announced a
stricter standard-a back pay award should be denied only for rea-
sons that "would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of
eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making
persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."""
In post-Albemarle decisions the Fifth Circuit has adhered to
its "special circumstances" test enunciated in Pettway as the stan-
dard of discretion for awarding back pay under section 1981.89
Whether the court actually invokes a different standard under sec-
tion 1981 than the one required by the Supreme Court in Title VII
suits can be questioned since the Fifth Circuit has also used "spe-
cial circumstances" language in post-Albemarle Title VII cases.40
The court seems to view the "special circumstances" rule as
equivalent to the Albemarle standard.141 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
apparently applies the Albemarle standard of discretion to claims
based on section 1981.
Other circuits, however, have not enunciated clearly the stan-
dard of discretion to be used for awarding back pay under section
1981. For example, in Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine
Co.1'4 2 the Fourth Circuit, after finding racial discrimination under
section 1981, held the discriminatee "entitled" to back pay without
any discussion of the discretionary standard it had employed in
reaching its decision.143 Several explanations may be offered for a
court's decision to award back pay without discussion of the dis-
cretionary standard. First, the court may be indicating that a find-
ing of discrimination mandates a back pay award. Second, the
court may envision that its role is to make a routine award in the
135. Id. at 252-53 (emphasis added).
136. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
137. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
138. 422 U.S. at 421. For a more detailed discussion of Albemarle, see supra notes 77-
84 and accompanying text.
139. See Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1240 n.7 (5th Cir.
1980); McCormick v. Attala County Rd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1976).
140. See, e.g., Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1391 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979); James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559
F.2d 310, 357 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
141. See supra text accompanying note 84.
142. 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).




manner of the NLRB upon finding a violation of the NLRA."4
Last, the court may have determined that the evidence in these
cases so clearly indicated that the discriminatee should be awarded
back pay that a discussion of the discretionary standard became
unnecessary. The last possibility represents the most plausible ex-
planation for a court's failure to discuss the discretionary standard.
In most cases, courts probably do not discuss the standard simply
because such a discussion would be superfluous, not because the
court has determined that it lacks the discretion to either award or
deny back pay.
Logically, the standard of discretion under section 1981 should
be the Title VII Albemarle standard. This conclusion stems from
the similarity in the application of the substantive law of both
statutes.145 Many courts, however, decline to apply Title VII sub-
stantive law in determining liability for violations of section
1981.4e In these jurisdictions, therefore, Title VII remedial stan-
dards obviously would not be routinely applied to section 1981
suits. Nevertheless, in light of the similar "make whole" purpose of
back pay awards under both Title VII and section 1981,47 no ap-
parent reason exists not to apply the Title VII Albemarle discre-
tionary standard, even when the courts do not utilize Title VII
substantive law to determine section 1981 liability.
1 48
144. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
145. A number of courts have noted this similarity. See, e.g., London v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 1981); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 729 (2d
Cir. 1976); Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F. Supp. 174, 201 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Swicker v. William
Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
146. See, e.g., Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Service, 488 F. Supp.
723 (D.N.J. 1980). In a footnote the Bronze Shields court cited a group of cases that demon-
strates the split among the courts over the proper standard of intent to prove liability under
§ 1981. Id. at 726 n.4. The courts disagree over whether to use the Title VII standard or the
constitutional standard. See Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to
Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN
DEGO L. REV. 207 (1979).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
148. Support for this conclusion can be found in the Fifth Circuit's application of the
constitutional standard of intent for proving liability under § 1981, while it simultaneously
applies the Title VII standard of discretion for awarding back pay in § 1981 suits. See Wil-
liams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978). In Williams the court held that when a
plaintiff seeks to prove liability, "a claim under § 1981 is, for this purpose, to be equated
with a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment dealt with by the Court in Washington [v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)], rather than under Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act." Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d at 2-3 (emphasis added). For examples of
Fifth Circuit cases using the same standard of discretion in awarding back pay under § 1981
as under Title VII, see supra note 139.
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III. PARTIES LIABLE FOR BACK PAY
A. Title VII
Section 706(g) of Title VII expressly provides that back pay
may be "payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful em-
ployment practice. ' 149 Private employers have been held liable
under Title VII since it became effective in 1965.15G Public employ-
ers, however, including federal, state, and local governments, have
been covered by the provisions of Title VII only since the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 expanded the coverage of
Title VII to include these public employers. 511 Although the 1972
amendments clearly extended Title VII coverage to the states, the
question arose whether the state's immunity under the eleventh
amendment 5 barred a federal court from making a back pay
award against a state. This question stemmed from the Supreme
Court decision in Edelman v. Jordan,158 in which the court held
that the eleventh amendment prohibited a retroactive award of
welfare payments from a state's treasury. In Edelman the Court
noted that "[w]hile the [eleventh] Amendment by its terms does
not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, this Court has
consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens
of another State."' The Court distinguished Ex parte Young,155
in which it had permitted suits for injunctions against state offi-
cials, on the ground that Young related only to prospective injunc-
tive relief, while the plaintiff in Edelman sought a retroactive
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
150. Congress enacted Title VII, one of the titles of the comprehensive Civil Rights
Act of 1964, on July 2, 1964, and the statute became effective one year later. Section 701(b)
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 expanded Title VII's coverage by includ-
ing private employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Prior to the
1972 amendment the Act only covered private employers with 25 or more employees. Pub.
L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976)).
151. Section 701(a) expanded the definition of "person" as used in Title VII to include
state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976). Section 717 further expanded Ti-
tle VII's coverage to include the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
152. The eleventh amendment provides, "The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
153. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
154. Id. at 662-63.
155. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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monetary award that would be paid from the state treasury.1" The
Court ultimately resolved the eleventh amendment issue in Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer157 when it decided that the amendment does not
preclude a Title VII back pay award against a state. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that in passing the 1972
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress, acting
within its enforcement power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, had waived the states' immunity to suit under the
Act.158
Since section 717159 of the 1972 amendments expanded the
coverage of Title VII, the federal government has been the object
of numerous employment discrimination suits e° and has been held
liable for back pay."1 In Brown v. General Services Administra-
tion"" the Supreme Court held that section 717 represented the
exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination.
The Court in Brown based its decision first, on an examination of
legislative history indicating that in 1972 Congress intended "to
create an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial
scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination
' 1G
and second, on the "balance, completeness, and structural integrity
of section 717, ' ' 1" which indicated that Congress had not
"designed [the section] merely to supplement other putative judi-
cial relief."165
156. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 664.
157. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
158. Id. at 456. The Court recognized that
the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies..
are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropri-
ate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which them-
selves embody significant limitations on state authority.... Congress may, in
determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976); see supra note 151.
160. See, e.g., Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1978) (suit against
Department of Defense); Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (suit against
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).
161. See, e.g., McMullen v. Warner, 416 F. Supp. 1163 (D.D.C. 1976) (suit against
Department of the Navy).
162. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
163. Id. at 828-29.
164. Id. at 832.
165. Id. For a critical discussion of the Court's reasoning in Brown, see Reiss, Re-
quiem For an "Independent Remedy". The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies
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The courts have shown no reluctance in holding unions"1 6 and
employment agencies1e7 liable for back pay upon a finding of a Ti-
tle VII violation. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Parson v. Kai-
ser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.168 held that a union may be
jointly liable with the employer for discrimination resulting from
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and concluded
that "any monetary liability imposed upon the employer must be
shared by the Union."119 Most of the litigation surrounding em-
ployment agencies, however, has concerned whether the entity in-
volved qualified as an "employment agency" under Title VlI, 7
not whether the agencies could be liable for back pay.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Private employers have been held liable for back pay under
section 1981, as previously discussed in part H of the Special Pro-
ject.11 1 Public employers, however, may be able to avoid liability
under section 1981. Since Brown v. General Services Administra-
For Employment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 961, 977-82 (1977).
166. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Barnes v. Rourke, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1113, 1115-16 (M.D.
Tenn. 1973) (employment agency violated Title VII and held liable for back pay because it
classified applicants according to sex and either failed or refused to refer female applicants
to employers expressing a preference for males in situation in which sex did not constitute a
bona fide occupational qualification).
168. 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979).
169. Id. at 1389. Other circuits have also held unions liable for back pay. See, e.g.,
Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated & remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. G.C. Murphy Co., 451 U.S. 935
(1981) (employer and union jointly liable); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d
257, 270-71 (4th Cir.) (local and international union held liable), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976); Evans v. Sheraton Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (union and employer
jointly liable).
170. One of the central issues in several of the employment agency cases concerned
whether a newspaper publisher qualified as an "employment agency" under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(b), which prohibits sex-segregated help wanted advertisements to be placed by em-
ployment agencies except when sex constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification for the
job. The courts have almost uniformly held that a newspaper publisher does not qualify as
an employment agency under the Act in this situation. Compare Brush v. San Francisco
Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (newspaper publisher not an
"employment agency" under Title VII), affl'd, 469 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 943 (1973) with Morrow v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
287 (S.D. Miss. 1972) (question of fact exists whether newspaper publisher qualifies as an
employment agency under the Act).
For other cases concerning the question whether the entity qualified as an "employ-
ment agency" under the Act, see, e.g., Bonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Congress Inc.,
469 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1979); Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D.
Ga. 1979).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07 & 112-19.
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tion172 held that section 717 of Title VII contained the exclusive
judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination,m such dis-
crimination may be remedied only by a Title VII suit.17' While
states may be subject to suit for a violation of section 1981, the
overwhelming weight of authority holds that absent a waiver of im-
munity from the state, eleventh amendment sovereign immunity
precludes liability for back pay.175 Although the Supreme Court
held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer1 76 that Title VII constituted a con-
gressional override of the states' eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity, in Quern v. Jordan1 7 7 the Court concluded that the en-
actment of section 1983178 did not waive the states' immunity. The
Court stated in Quern that "neither the language of the statute nor
the legislative history discloses an intent to overturn the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity by imposing liability directly
upon them. ' 179 In light of Quern, the Court is unlikely to find that
the enactment of section 1981 constituted an override of the elev-
172. 425 U.S. 821 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
173. 425 U.S. at 835.
174. See Weakhee v. Perry, 587 F.2d 1256, 1262 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (District of Co-
lumbia Circuit noted that the trial court dismissed the § 1981 claim against the EEOC,
citing Brown); Lee v. Bolger, 454 F. Supp. 226, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (§ 1981 claim dismissed
against the United States Postal Service in light of Brown).
175. See, e.g., Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Q 1981 does not waive states' sovereign immunity). But see Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193,
1205 n.10 (8th Cir. 1981) (possible that § 1981 did waive states' sovereign immunity).
The district courts have uniformly held that the eleventh amendment bars a monetary
claim against the states under § 1981. See, e.g., Jones v. Local 520, International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 524 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. IMI. 1981); McNeil v. McDonough, 515 F. Supp. 113
(D.N.J. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 648 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1981); Vaughn v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 504 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
176. 427 U.S. 445 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 157-158.
177. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
178. Section 1983 provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
179. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 345 n.16. In its search for evidence of legislative
intent to override the eleventh amendment immunity, the Court examined the legislative
history surrounding § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor to § 1983. Because of
the lack of any lengthy debate on § 1 of the 1871 Act and no direct mention of the eleventh
amendment or the direct financial consequences on the states, the Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to waive the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1. Id. at
343.
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enth amendment. ' °
At least three circuits have dealt with the issue of states' im-
munity from monetary damages in section 1981 suits. In Sessions
v. Rusk State Hospital,181 a racial discrimination suit brought
under section 1981 and Title VII, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
section 1981 claim because, as an entity of the state, the defendant
had immunity under the eleventh amendment from an award of
monetary damages.82 The court emphasized that "[u]nlike Title
VII, Section 1981 contains no congressional waiver of the state's
eleventh amendment immunity."183 In Rucker v. Higher Educa-
tional Aids Board8' the Seventh Circuit found the defendant as a
state agency immune from federal damages liability by virtue of
the eleventh amendment. The Seventh Circuit cited Quern as sup-
port for its conclusion that the defendant's state immunity pro-
tected it from damage claims under sections 1981, 1983, and
1985.15
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Taylor v. Jones,18 6 another
racial discrimination suit based on both Title VII and section 1981,
remanded the question of back pay to the district court to deter-
mine whether an award of retroactive monetary damages against
the state violated the eleventh amendment. The circuit court ques-
tioned whether the Quern decision based on section 1983 con-
trolled a suit based on section 1981187 and noted that "[tihe lan-
guage, purpose and legislative history of section 1981 are not
entirely comparable to section 1983; thus, its effect and scope must
be separately examined."1 s Despite the differences between the
180. See, e.g., Weisbord v. Michigan State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mich.
1980). The court in Weisbord dismissed the § 1981 claim for retrospective relief against the
state of Michigan because of the state's eleventh amendment immunity and held, "Such an
express [congressional] abrogation has been found under Title VI ... but found wanting
in the legislative history of section 1983 .... Nor does it appear that section 1981 was
intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id. at 1355-56.
181. 648 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981).
182. Id. at 1069.
183. Id.
184. 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982).
185. Id. at 1184.
186. 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
187. Id. at 1205 n.10. For a discussion of the Quern decision, see supra notes 177-79
and accompanying text.
188. 653 F.2d at 1205 n.10. Other than in the context of damages, the Fifth Circuit has
recognized differences between § 1981 and § 1983. Garner v. Giarusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1340
(5th Cir. 1978) (scope of § 1981 much narrower than that of § 1983); see also Boyd v. Shaw-
nee Mission Pub. Schools, 522 F. Supp. 1115, 1117 (D. Kan. 1981) (§ 1983 enacted as part of
different civil rights act and pursuant to different amendment). The Supreme Court also has
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two statutes, the district courts have uniformly followed Quern in
holding that the eleventh amendment bars a section 1981 award of
monetary damages against a state.18 9 The only exception to the
generally accepted Quern rule may be in cases in which the court
finds that the state has waived its sovereign immunity. '90
When municipal and local governments are sued for employ-
ment discrimination, no reason currently exists to exempt these
entities from liability for back pay under section 1981. Prior to
1979, however, a minority of courts 91 had found municipalities im-
mune from section 1981 monetary awards. These courts relied on
Monroe v. Pape,19 2 in which the Supreme Court held that munici-
pal corporations could not be liable under section 1983 because
they did not fall within the ambit of the statute.195 Despite
Monroe, the majority view maintained that municipal and local
governments had no immunity from liability under section 1981.1"
Courts supporting this view emphasized the differences between
sections 1981 and 1983 and, therefore, refused to extend the sec-
pointed out that" '[d]ifferent problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enact-
ments deriving from different constitutional sources."' District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418, 423 (1973) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 205-06 (1961)). The Supreme
Court noted that while § 1983 derives from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, passed
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, § 1982 derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
enacted under the thirteenth amendment. Id. Similarly, § 1983 and § 1981 derive from dif-
ferent statutes. See supra notes 95 & 111.
189. See, e.g., NAACP v. California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Cal. 1981) ("the bar
against suit imposed by the Eleventh Amendment applies with equal vigor in the context of
actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in the context of actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981");
Wong v. Calvin, 87 F.R.D. 145, 147 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (court did not distinguish between §
1981 and § 1983 in denying retrospective monetary relief against the state as barred by the
eleventh amendment). See also district court cases cited supra notes 175 & 180.
190. Courts have found a waiver of the states' eleventh amendment immunity in some
§ 1983 suits. See, e.g., Hodges v. Tomberlin, 510 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Mar-
rapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1222 (D.R.I. 1980). One court described such a
waiver as occurring only in "rare cases." NAACP v. California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1250
(E.D. Cal. 1981).
191. See, e.g., Arunga v. Weldon, 469 F.2d 675, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1972); Black Bros.
Combined v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1974).
192. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
193. Id. at 187. The Supreme Court based its holding on the legislative history sur-
rounding the 1871 Act, the precursor of § 1983. The legislative history indicated clearly that
Congress rejected an amendment to the Act which would have specifically provided for mu-
nicipal liability. Id. at 189-90. The Court inferred that the rejection of such an amendment
indicated that Congress did not intend municipalities to be considered a "person" under the
Act. Id. at 191.
194. See, e.g., Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1030-31 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 904 (1978); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (9th Cir.
1976).
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tion 1983 Monroe decision to section 1981 suits.1e5 Subsequently,
in Monell v. Department of Social Services, e19 the Supreme Court
overruled Monroe insofar as it held local governments wholly im-
mune from section 1983 suits.1 7 Since Monell removed the only
grounds offered by lower courts for finding municipal immunity
from suit under section 1981, municipalities are now undoubtedly
subject to liability under that section. At least two courts have ex-
amined the issue of municipal immunity after Monell, and both
have concluded that municipal and local governments are now in-
disputably not entitled to immunity from section 1981 liability. "
Unions have also been held to be subject to liability under sec-
tion 1981. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit in Mack-
lin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc." ' found section 1981 applica-
ble to cases concerning racial discrimination by unions and
employers. 00 Unions may also be held liable for back pay under
section 1981.201e In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Interna-
tional Harvester Co.2 02 the Seventh Circuit refused to uphold the
union's contention that insufficient evidence existed to support a
claim against the union under section 1981.208 The court reasoned
that "[ilt is enough, however, that the union was an integral party
to the [collective bargaining] agreement which discriminated
against [the plaintiff]"' 2" and thus concluded that the union shared
195. See cases cited supra note 194.
196. 436 U.S. 658 (1979).
197. Id. at 663. The Court reexamined the legislative history surrounding the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and concluded that "Congress did intend municipalities and other local
government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Id. at 690
(emphasis in original). For a discussion of the Court's earlier, and contrary, examination of
the legislative history, see supra note 193.
198. See Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1979) ("after
the decision in Monell, it is incontrovertible that a water district does not enjoy an absolute
immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1981"); Moore v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 21 Fair
Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 147, 148 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) ("[t]hese decisions [holding municipali-
ties subject to liability under § 1981] seem even more compelling following the decision in
Monell").
199. 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
200. Id. at 993; accord Henry v. Radio Station KSAN, 374 F. Supp. 260, 267 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (§ 1981 "applies to private act of racial discrimination by unions as well as by
employers.")
201. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309,
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jointly in the liability of the employer. 05
IV. PRESUMPTIVE ENTITLEMENT TO BACK PAY
In class action proceedings alleging some form of employment
discrimination, the trial generally takes a bifurcated form206 In the
initial, or Stage I,207 portion of the proceedings the class must pre-
sent proof of the employer's discriminatory employment practices
and demonstrate that these practices have resulted in economic
harm to the class.208 If the class can thus present a prima facie case
of discrimination,209 and the employer cannot rebut the prima facie
case with an affirmative defense,210 the trial court may find the em-
ployer liable to the class. A finding of liability in Stage I leads to a
presumption of entitlement to back pay 11 as part of each class
member's relief awarded in Stage 11212 of the proceedings. This
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 853-54 (5th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450-53 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 103 (5th
Cir. 1976); Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 817 (1976); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443-44 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 497 F. Supp. 800, 803-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1981); English v. Seaboard
Coastline R.R., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90, 91 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Bifurcation of the
trial is authorized by Fm. R. Civ. P. 42(b), which states that the court "may order a sepa-
rate trial ... of any separate issue."
207. The Fifth Circuit has taken the lead in the development of the bifurcated ap-
proach. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437,
443-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491
F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. 1974). Building on an approach detailed in Baxter, 495 F.2d at
443-44, the court first used the terms "Stage I" (the liability phase of the proceedings) and
"Stage II" (the relief phase of the proceedings) in United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d at
1053-54.
208. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437,
443-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Edwards, The Back Pay Remedy in
Title VII Class Actions: Problems of Procedure, 8 GA. L. Rav. 781, 797 (1974); Smalls, Class
Actions Under Title VII: Some Current Procedural Problems, 25 Am. U.L. REV. 821, 849
(1976).
209. See infra notes 532-42 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 543-45 and accompanying text.
211. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211, 259 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th
Cir. 1974).
212. See generally supra note 207.
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part of the Special Project examines the plaintiff class member's
presumptive entitlement to back pay and the scope of the pre-
sumption2 13 and traces its development through a series of cases.2 1
A discussion of the useful purpose served by the presumption
within the framework the federal courts have developed for dealing
with cases seeking back pay as a remedy is presented later in this
Special Project.
2 15
A series of cases decided by the Fifth Circuit has defined the
scope of the presumption of entitlement to back pay. In Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.21 the defendant was charged with
discriminating against blacks in its workforce through the use of
discriminatory diploma requirements and transfer policies, and un-
validated tests.21 1 Reversing in part the decision of the trial court,
the Fifth Circuit considered as a matter of first impression whether
a trial court should be permitted to award class-wide back pay af-
ter the class has demonstrated a prima facie case of employment
discrimination.2 8 The Fifth Circuit correctly anticipated the ap-
proach later taken by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody2'1 and ruled that victims of discrimination should be
compensated if economic loss can be shown.22 0 Although Judge
Gewin discussed a procedure in which individual plaintiffs would
need to prove entitlement to back pay, rather than automatically
recovering based on the prima facie case established by the class,221
213. See infra notes 216-58 and accompanying text.
214. See id. To best demonstrate the development of the presumption, the focus of
this part of the Special Project will be on a series of cases decided by a single court, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
215. See infra notes 457-60 and accompanying text.
216. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
217. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promulgated
guidelines for validating standardized tests used in employment settings. See 29 C.F.R. §§
1607.5, .14, .15 (1981). The use of any type of selection procedure that has any adverse
impact on members of any employee group will be considered discriminatory unless the test
has been validated. Id. § 1607.3A. For a general discussion of scored tests and validation
procedures, see B. ScHim & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 33, at 65-131 (1976).
218. 491 F.2d at 1375.
219. 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1975); see supra text accompanying note 84. The Johnson
court specifically focused on the need to read Title VII as remedying the effects of discrimi-
nation incurred by the plaintiffs: "The relief herein ordered is intended to restore those
wronged to their rightful economic status absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination.
As to monetary relief nothing more is required; nothing less is acceptable." 491 F.2d at 1375.
220. 491 F.2d at 1375.
221. Id. This procedure had been mentioned, although in far less detail, in several
earlier cases: United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1973) (Title
VII); Jinks v. Mays, 464 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1972) (fourteenth amendment); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 n.14 (4th Cir.) (Title VII), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
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the court ultimately ruled that unless evidence showed that indi-
vidual plaintiffs had not been harmed by defendant's discrimina-
tory practices, the members of the class were "presumptively enti-
tled" to back pay.222
Johnson built the basic framework for the two-stage or bifur-
cated procedure 2 8 used in practically all class actions alleging em-
ployment discrimination.224 Although not specifically recognizing a
bifurcated approach, the Johnson court referred to two distinct
stages. In the first stage responsibility for establishing a prima fa-
cie case of employment discrimination on behalf of the class rests
with the class representative. If the defendant cannot rebut the
charges of the class, the trial shifts from the liability stage to the
remedy stage. The shift also includes a change from a class-wide
approach to an individual-by-individual approach2 25 Thus, in the
second stage, each individual claimant must show class member-
ship and economic loss incurred as a result of the defendant's
discrimination.
Only one month after Johnson, the Fifth Circuit again con-
fronted similar issues in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co. 22 '6 The plaintiffs in Pettway appealed from a decision denying
them relief from claims of discrimination in hiring, promotion and
transfer, and testing and educational requirements.2 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court ruling and remanded the case for
further consideration based on the thorough analysis in its opin-
ion.228 The court began its analysis of the back pay issue with a
1006 (1973).
222. 491 F.2d at 1374.
223. See supra note 207.
224. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir.
1980); Williams v. DeKalb County, 577 F.2d 248, 256 (5th Cir. 1978); Parson v. Kaiser Alu-
minum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1390-91 & 1391 n.36 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 968 (1979); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 913 (1978); Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 853-54 (5th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 450-53 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 103 (5th
Cir. 1976); Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1976); United
Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1975).
225. Although damages may sometimes be calculated on a class-wide basis, see infra
notes 706-50 and accompanying text, each class member's eligibility to receive the award
must always be determined individually.
226. 494 F.2d 211 (1974).
227. Id. at 216.
228. Id. at 267.
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detailed review of the discretion of the trial court" and a discus-
sion of the congressional intent of both Title VI 30 and section
1981" 13-to restore the injured employees to the economic status
they would have occupied but for the discrimination. According to
the court the intent of the statutes evidenced the narrow scope of
the trial court's discretion to award back pay. The court there-
fore viewed back pay as compensatory in nature and ruled that it
should be awarded unless the evidence indicated the presence of
"special circumstances."''8 Because the court could not find such
special circumstances in the instant case,'" it perceived the trial
court's discretion to be severely limited in deciding whether to
award back pay.3 5
The Fifth Circuit in Pettway continued with a presentation of
the two-stage procedure used in Johnson. The court countered the
defendant's argument that the award of back pay would be differ-
ent for each class member when applying the two-step procedure.
According to the court, a class-wide showing of entitlement to back
pay could be made without first determining the amount that each
class member would be eligible to recover.23 This class-wide show-
ing would create a presumption in favor of back pay for the
class. 2 7 Quoting extensively from Johnson, the court commented
that the earlier decision had placed a restriction on the unfettered
presumption: 38 the individual claimants were required to prove
229. Id. at 251-56.
230. For a discussion of the legislative history of Title VII, see supra notes 40-63 and
accompanying text.
231. For a discussion of the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see supra notes 94-
107 and accompanying text.
One year following Pettway the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454 (1975), joined a number of circuit courts that had interpreted § 1981 to grant a
federal remedy against racial discrimination in employment. See id. at 459-60 & n.6. "An
individual who establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and
legal relief, including compensatory... damages." Id. at 460.
232. See generally Pettway, 494 F.2d at 251-56.
233. Id. at 253. The court cited Head v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th
Cir. 1973), and Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422
U.S. 405 (1975), as having adopted the special circumstances approach. 494 F.2d at 211
n.121; see 61 CortNnL L. Rzv., supra note 76, at 469-73; supra notes 135-37 and accompany-
ing text.
234. The court found that the defendant's good faith, and the defendant's willingness
to comply in the future even without a back pay award did not constitute "special circum-
stances" justifying the denial of back pay. 494 F.2d at 253.
235. See id. at 252-53.
236. Id. at 257.
237. Id. at 259.
238. Id. Although both Johnson and Pettway were Fifth Circuit cases, none of the
1982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that they were indeed class members and that they had suffered
economic loss. 23 9 Although the presumptive entitlement still ex-
isted, the presumption did not amount to "per se" eligibility for
back pay.240 Rather, the presumption would shift the trial from
Stage I to Stage II and would permit both sides to argue the ap-
propriate amount of back pay for each of the claimants.2 41
Only one month elapsed before another case presented the
Fifth Circuit with an opportunity to develop further its analysis of
both the presumption of entitlement to back pay and the two-stage
procedure. In Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp.,242 a class
action brought under Title VII, the court scrutinized defendant's
discriminatory policies that affected the advancement, both in sal-
ary and position, of all black employees. The district court 243 held
for plaintiff but refused to grant class-wide back pay. The district
court considered defendant's good faith and plaintiff's failure to
prove the necessity of back pay for making the class whole valid
reasons for denying back pay.24 The court of appeals, relying on
Johnson, rejected both of these reasons.24 5 The court discussed the
bifurcated proceedings found in Title VII class action suits and
concluded that if the class can show that it has been injured by the
employer's discriminatory practices, then the court should deter-
mine whether individual class members have suffered a loss and
are therefore entitled to back pay relief. 246 The Fifth Circuit spe-
cifically found that individual members of the class need not prove
class membership or economic loss at the liability stage.2  Rather,
judges deciding Johnson heard the Pettway case. Circuit Judges Gewin, Ainsworth, and
Morgan decided Johnson and Circuit Judges Tuttle, Bell, and Goldberg decided Pettway.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921-22 (5th Cir.
1973)) (emphasis in original).
241. Id. (citing Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379, 1380
(5th Cir. 1974)).
242. 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
243. 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1033 (1974).
244. Id. at 146.
245. 495 F.2d at 442-43. In Baxter Chief Judge Brown joined Judge Gewin, who had
sat on the Johnson bench, and Judge Goldberg, who had sat on the Pettway bench.
246. Id. at 443-44. Although the Baxter court did not mention the term "presump-
tion," it did state that after a finding of discriminatory treatment, "the court should...
proceed to resolve whether a particular employee is in fact a member of the covered class,
has suffered financial loss, and [is] thus entitled to back pay.. . ." Id. at 444 (emphasis
added). The use of the word "should" indicates both the restriction of the court's discretion
and the presumption in favor of back pay.
247. Id. at 443.
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personal economic loss would be considered once the class has
proved discriminatory conduct and the defendant has been found
liable.2"" Since the district court had found liability, the court of
appeals remanded the case for individual determinations of appro-
priate back pay awards.2 4
United States v. United States Steel Corp.250 is the final case
in the Fifth Circuit's development of the bifurcated claims proce-
dure. Similar to the findings of the Baxter trial court, the trial
court in United States Steel found the defendant liable for various
discriminatory practices under Title VII,251 but denied back pay to
some of the class members. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit once again
rejected absence of bad faith as a complete defense to a back pay
remedy.252 The court also declined to accept the notions that the
defendant had not been unjustly enriched as a result of its discrim-
inatory employment practices and that other types of affirmative
relief were available to the plaintiffs.2 5
The court provided a detailed discussion of the back pay issue,
focusing on the two-stage approach developed in the earlier
cases.15 At Stage I in the proceedings attention is focused on the
class itself. According to the court's analysis, the class would be
required to demonstrate that the defendant's discriminatory prac-
tices had affected class members in a broad sense, but the individ-
ual members would not be required to present their claims.
Rather, once the class has made a prima facie showing of discrimi-
natory conduct on the part of the defendant, "[the class] is pre-
sumptively entitled to move into Stage II with the presentation of
individual back pay claims."' 55 The court then explained the pur-
pose of the presumption: "This presumptive entitlement serves the
248. Id. at 444.
249. Id. at 444-45.
250. 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
251. The seniority system used by defendant locked blacks into "lower paying and less
desirable jobs" and thereby perpetuated the racial discrimination actively practiced by de-
fendant prior to Title VII's effective date. Id. at 1047.
252. Id. at 1052-53.
253. Id. at 1053.
254. See supra notes 223-49 and accompanying text. The United States Steel court
was the first to use the terms Stage I and Stage II to refer to the class/liability stage and the
individual/recovery stage. See 520 F.2d at 1053-54; see also supra note 207. The court also
explained the reasons for the two-stage approach: "[Iln an effort to relieve tension between
management difficulties with numerous, sometimes diverse claimants and Title Vii's policy
of compensation for discrimination-caused economic injuries, this court has established a
bifurcated approach in class actions seeking back pay." 520 F.2d at 1053.
255. 520 F.2d at 1054 (emphasis in original).
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important function of filling the logical hiatus between large-scale
practices and statistically significant effects, which were shown at
Stage I, and individual members' claims for sums of money due,
which have not yet been demonstrated."' 2" According to the court,
in certain limited circumstances the presumption may be predi-
cated upon a threshold showing by the class that it had incurred
economic loss and that the defendant caused this 1088.257 The court
concluded that requiring the class to make such a showing would
not be inconsistent with the "make whole" purpose of Title VII as
long as the burden placed on the class was "minimal in weight"
and "general in scope."
2"
Once a plaintiff class has met its Stage I burden of proving
discrimination and the presumption of eligibility for back pay has
arisen, the employer may seek to rebut this presumption. The fol-
lowing part of the Special Project discusses possible methods by
which an employer may rebut the presumption that back pay is an
appropriate class-wide remedy. If the court determines that back
pay is the proper remedy for the class, the employer may seek to
prove that the individual plaintiff-class member is not entitled to
back pay in Stage II. The procedure for determining whether an
individual claimant is eligible for back pay is discussed in part VII.
V. REBUTTALS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF CLASS-WInE
ENTITLEMENT TO BACK PAY
In recent years, defendant employers have had little success in
their attempts to defeat liability for back pay once a trial court has
found them guilty of employment discrimination.' In Albemarle
256. Id.
257. Id. The court restricted these circumstances to situations in which the defendant
can seriously question the class' entitlement to back pay. The court stated that the defen-
dant would rarely be able to bring forth proof that the class, or one of its subclasses, actu-
ally outearned or was overpromoted as compared to a similar group of white employees.
Even this type of proof, however, would not prevent the proceedings from moving into Stage
II if the class representative could show that the defendant's evidence was misleading or
that the defendant's discriminatory practices prevented other members of the class from
outearning their white counterparts. Id. at 1054-55.
258. Id. at 1054.
259. A defendant stands a much better chance of defeating back pay before a trial
court finds him liable for employment discrimination. Any defense that succeeds in defeat-
ing a finding of discrimination naturally forecloses the possibility of liability for back pay.
Title VII cases often parallel decisions in cases brought under the NLRA and the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Among the purposes of these two acts was to ensure that the wrong-
doer, rather than the innocent victim, suffer the economic loss ensuing from employment
discrimination. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969) (granting
relief under the NLRA); Schultz v. Mistletoe Express Serv., Inc., 434 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir.
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Paper Co. v. Moody2 60 the Supreme Court ruled that back pay
should be denied to a class only for reasons that will not frustrate
the twin statutory purposes of Title VII-making plaintiffs whole
and deterring discrimination."' When courts give this discretion-
ary standard a literal reading, the employer may be barred from
asserting a successful defense to a claim for back pay since it
would necessarily frustrate the twin purposes of Title VII. The Al-
bemarle standard, therefore, presents a formidable burden for em-
ployers who seek to prove that back pay i1 not an appropriate rem-
edy once a court has found discrimination under Title VII.
Two types of defenses are potentially available against claims
for back pay. The first type, aimed at individual claimants, simply
consists of a rebuttal of the prima facie showing of entitlement to
an award of back pay made by individual claimants in a class ac-
tion.162 This rebuttal usually contains proof that the individual
claimant never applied for a job, that he did not qualify for the
job, or that no job was ever available.6 3 This first type of defense
should not be tested against the strict Albemarle discretionary
standard. The Albemarle Court crafted the discretionary standard
to aid courts in deciding whether back pay is the appropriate rem-
edy for a proven act of discrimination. The Court, however, did not
intend for trial courts to apply the Albemarle standard to rebuttals
against individual claims made after the courts had already found
back pay to be the appropriate remedy.2
The second group of defenses is aimed at defeating a class-
wide award of back pay rather than individual claims.255 These de-
fenses must be tested against the Albemarle discretionary stan-
1970) (granting relief under the FLSA); see also supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
260. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). For a full discussion of the discretionary standard used by
courts when awarding back pay under Title VII, see supra notes 64-93 and accompanying
text.
261. 422 U.S. at 421-22; see supra text accompanying note 84.
262. The individual claimants must make a showing of entitlement to back pay. This
showing generally comprises two elements: (1) proof that the claimant is a member of the
class against which the employer discriminated, and (2) proof that the claimant was injured
by the discrimination. For a full discussion of the necessary elements of the individual
claimant's prima facie case, see infra notes 638-64 and accompanying text.
263. For a discussion of the defense to individual claims, see infra notes 593-619 and
accompanying text.
264. The Court stated that "[w]hether a particular member of the plaintiff class
should have been awarded any backpay, and, if so, how much, are questions not involved in
this review." 422 U.S. at 413.
265. This second type of defense often consists of an affirmative defense and, there-
fore, must be pleaded in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). For a full discussion of the
burdens of pleading and proof in discrimination cases, see Belton, supra note 34.
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dard 2 6 and, thus, examined in light of the twin statutory purposes
of Title VII. If the defense frustrates either of these purposes, it
will fail under this standard.217 This part of the Special Project
examines this second group of defenses and outlines the elements a
defendant employer must include in his case to overcome a claim
for back pay. This part then suggests the analytical approach
courts should adopt when deciding back pay cases and discusses
the viable defenses available for use against claims for back pay.
A. The Good Faith Requirement
The intent requirement for a violation of Title VII is similar
to that commonly used in tort law-to be liable, the defendant em-
ployer need not have intended the effects of his act; he need only
have intended the act that brought about those effects.2 8 Defen-
dants, nevertheless, have asserted their lack of intent, or "good
faith," as a factor courts should consider when deciding to award
or deny back pay relief.26'
The Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody2 0 elim-
inated good faith or lack of bad faith as a complete defense against
back pay.2 1 In Albemarle the district court determined that the
employer had not intentionally violated Title VII and that instead
he made a good faith attempt to halt any apparent discrimina-
tion. 72 Relying on the "make whole" purpose of Title VII,27 8 the
Court responded that "[i]f back pay were awardable only upon a
showing of bad faith, the remedy would become a punishment for
266. Courts generally apply this same test to defenses used against back pay actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See, e.g., McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ.,
541 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc.,
482 F. Supp. 918, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
267. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421.
268. Courts have universally accepted this definition of intent for violations of Title
VII. See 2 A. LARSON & L. LARsoN, EmPLoYmENT DSCRIMINTXON § 55.36(a) (1981). The
intent requirement for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 differs from that of Title VII in some
circuits. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 311 (8th Cir.
1972) (court denied back pay, justified in part by the employer's lack of bad faith), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973). For a general discussion of good faith as a defense to back
pay, see Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Calif. 1970) (good faith no
defense to backpay), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). See also
Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 472, 511-26 (1974); 2 A. LARsON & L. LAR ON, supra note 268, §
55.36; Note, supra note 71, at 537-41.
270. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
271. Id. at 422-23.
272. Id. at 410 (citing the unreported district court opinion).
273. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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moral turpitude, rather than a compensation for workers' inju-
ries."'274 The Albemarle Court reasoned that denying back pay be-
cause a defendant has shown good faith would frustrate the pur-
poses of Title VII and specifically noted that Congress directed
Title VII at the consequences of discrimination, not simply at its
motivations.2 75 Thus, the Court ruled that an award of back pay
need not be conditioned upon a showing of bad faith.
2 78
Although the Albemarle Court limited the applicability of the
good faith defense, it did not render the defense entirely useless.
Evidence of the defense's continuing utility can be found in the
Court's statement that "where an employer has shown bad
faith-by maintaining a practice which he knew to be illegal or of
highly questionable legality-he can make no claims whatsoever on
the chancellor's conscience. 2 77 Thus, the Albemarle standard re-
quires the employer to assert good faith as a threshold defense to
defeat a claim for back pay.2
78
The facts that comprise the threshold defense of good faith or
lack of bad faith2 79 arise under many different settings. The factual
settings can be grouped into two categories: (1) reliance on an ac-
cepted practice and (2) reliance on external authority. Examples of
an employer's reliance on accepted practice as a defense to claims
for back pay arise when an employer relies on insurance tables,280
or on a practice widely accepted throughout an industry.2 81 The
second category of good faith defenses, reliance on external author-
274. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 422. The Court further noted that "a worker's injury is no
less real simply because his employer did not inflict it in 'bad faith."' Id. The Court sup-
ported its reasoning by relying on decisions under the NLRA, the Act from which Congress
designed the Title VII remedy for backpay. Id. at 422 n.16 (citing NLRB v. Rex-Rutter
Mfg., Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969); American Machinery Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1970); and, Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969)); see supra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
275. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 422-23.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 422.
278. Id. The majority stated, "[U]nder Title VII, the mere absence of bad faith simply
opens the door to equity; it does not depress the scales in the employer's favor." Id. Justice
Rehnquist asserted in his concurring opinion that "[g]ood faith is a necessary condition for
obtaining equitable consideration." Id. at 444 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
279. No special significance is assigned to the difference between "good faith" and
"lack of bad faith." The two terms are used synonymously to describe an employer's lack of
intent to effect discrimination.
280. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704-07
(1978).
281. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (testing procedure must
be "a reasonable measure of job performance").
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ity, is. often asserted by the employer when he has relied on an
opinion of the EEOC22 or on a state protective law.
2 88
Although the Court in Albemarle rejected the first category of
good faith defenses-reliance on an accepted practice-as a com-
plete defense to back pay,"' it did not foreclose other good faith
defenses. Some types of good faith, specifically those based upon
reliance on external authority, may be sufficient to defeat a claim
for back pay.
1. Reliance on EEOC Opinions
Title VII specifically recognizes that employers who engage in
a discriminatory employment practice "in good faith, in conformity
with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of
the EEOC"2 85 have a complete defense to violations of its provi-
sions. The EEOC, however, significantly limited this defense by
narrowly defining "written interpretation or opinion." Accordingly,
an employer may only rely upon the following:
(a) A letter entitled "opinion letter" and signed by the General Counsel on
behalf of the Commission, or
(b) Matter published and specifically designated as such in the Federal Regis-
ter. . ., or
(c) A Commission determination of no reasonable cause ... when such de-
termination contains a statement that it is a "written interpretation or opin-
ion of the Commission.'"
Thus, courts may disallow use of this defense if the facts in a par-
ticular case do not fit precisely within these definitions. For exam-
ple, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.287 the Seventh Circuit re-
fused to allow an employer to assert this defense because the
memorandum upon which the employer relied lacked sufficient in-
dicia to designate it an "opinion letter" issued by the EEOC.S"
282. See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 290-316 and accompanying text. An employer may also assert the
defense of good faith reliance on external authority if it relies on collective bargaining agree-
ments. Courts, however, have uniformly rejected this claim of good faith reliance as a de-
fense against back pay. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1068, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 235
(4th Cir. 1975); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974). In most
cases, the labor union's role as a party to a collective bargaining agreement that results in
discrimination will be legally sufficient to impose back pay liability on the union. See, e.g.,
Carey, 500 F.2d at 1379.
284. See supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text.
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1976).
286. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.33 (1981).
287. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
288. Id. at 1200.
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The Supreme Court in Albemarle recognized the continued vitality
of this narrow statutory defense and stated that courts should not
undermine the legislative choice to allow a complete but narrowly
defined good faith defense. 8'"
2. Reliance on State Protective Statutes
Before Title VII, many states had passed laws to protect wo-
men from working excessively long hours and from doing work that
required any heavy lifting or strenuous physical labor.290 Many em-
ployers were confronted with a dilemma when Congress enacted
Title VII: they could either comply with the state protective laws
and violate the Title VII mandate against sex discrimination, or
change their employment practices in response to Title VII and
violate the state protective laws. The courts have uniformly re-
jected an employer's good faith compliance with state protective
laws as a defense against liability for discrimination under Title
VIE[. 1 When considering claims for back pay, however, some
courts have accepted good faith compliance with state protective
laws as a defense.1 The circuits recognizing this defense against
back pay have accorded a presumption of validity to the state pro-
tective statutes: until the courts have considered and resolved the
question whether Title VII supersedes a state protective statute,
the state law should be presumed valid, and the employer cannot
289. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 n.17 (1975). The Court stated,
"It is not for the courts to upset this legislative choice to recognize only a narrowly defined
'good faith' defense." Id.
290. See generally 2 A. LAESON & L. LARsoN, supra note 268, at § 55.36(b).
291. See, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Man-
ning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973);
Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); LeBlanc v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972).
292. See cases cited supra note 291. The courts have also accepted the defense when
asserted by unions charged with violations of Title VII. See Wernet v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, Local 17, 484 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1973).
In addition to compliance with state protective laws, employers have asserted other
defenses based on the unsettled nature of the law. These defenses have met with only lim-
ited success. The Eighth Circuit in United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir.
1973), denied back pay because the prevailing confusion of the law concerning whether back
pay is an appropriate relief did not provide employers with notice that they would be liable
for the economic loss that ensued from discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 380.
Most other circuits, however, have rejected the defense. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375-77 (5th Cir. 1974) (courts reject employer's defense of
reliance on unsettled nature of the law); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th
Cir.) (Title VII entitles plaintiffs to compensation for loss regardless of good faith motives of
employer), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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be expected to predict otherwise. 9
The Supreme Court in Albemarle did not decide whether em-
ployers may still assert good faith compliance with state protective
laws and avoid frustrating the twin statutory purposes of Title VII.
Rather, it distinguished ordinary good faith from good faith com-
pliance with state protective laws and carefully reserved determi-
nation on whether the latter would justify denial of back pay with-
out frustrating the purposes of Title VII.29 Since Albemarle, at
least one circuit has addressed this question. In Palmer v. General
Mills, Inc. 9 5 the Sixth Circuit recognized that good faith compli-
ance with state protective laws must be viewed as something more
than ordinary good faith. 9' The Palmer court explained that the
decision by an employer to obey the plain obligations of a pre-
sumptively valid law could not be equated with the personal moti-
vations that might prompt an employer to engage in discrimina-
tion.9 If other circuits follow the reasoning in Palmer, good faith
compliance with protective laws may still be an effective and com-
plete defense against back pay.
This defense, however, has been limited by the courts both
before and after the Albemarle decision. Typically, when a defen-
dant employer has notice that Title VII has invalidated the state
protective law, it can no longer claim good faith reliance on the
statute.2 98 For example, in Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs,
Inc.,2 a pre-Albemarle case, the defendant employer relied upon
a California law that limited women's work hours.300 The Ninth
Circuit allowed the employer to assert good faith compliance with
the protective statute as a defense to back pay only up to the time
when it had notice that the California law was invalid.0 1
The continuing utility of good faith compliance with state pro-
tective laws as a defense to back pay depends upon how much in-
293. See, e.g., Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1098-99 (S.D.
Ohio 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972).
294. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 n.18 (1975). The Court noted,
"[S]ome courts have denied backpay, and limited their judgments to declaratory relief, in
cases where the employer discriminated on sexual grounds in reliance on state 'female pro-
tective' statutes that were inconsistent with Title VII.... There is no occasion in this case
to decide whether these decisions were correct." Id.
295. 600 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1979).
296. Id. at 598-99.
297. Id. at 599.
298. See infra notes 301-16 and accompanying text.
299. 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972).
300. Id. at 1006.
301. Id. at 1007.
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formation an employer must have before the courts will hold that
he had notice of the state protective law's invalidity. The courts
addressing this issue have reached varying conclusions. The
Schaeffer court refused to "[draw] any hard and fast rule," believ-
ing instead "that in each case the merits of the plaintiff's claim
and the public policy behind it must be balanced against the hard-
ship on a good-faith employer. 3 0 2 The Ninth Circuit ruled that
since the employer had notice both of an EEOC guideline declar-
ing the state law invalid and of a decision by a district court s in
the same circuit which ruled that Title VII had superseded the
state law, the employer would be liable for back pay for its failure
to comply with Title VII.3 04 In Kober v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.3 05 the Third Circuit suggested in dictum that it would allow
the employer to assert the good faith reliance defense against back
pay liability for the period prior to the time when he had notice of
either a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of the protective
law's invalidity. 0 6
In a post-Albemarle decision, the District Court for the West-
ern District of Michigan in Kreitner v. Bendix Corp.3 0 7 ruled that
a defendant employer could be held to have notice even though it
possessed even less information than was required by the Third
Circuit in Kober. The amount of information required was so slight
that, in effect, the Kreitner court's ruling disallows the use of good
faith compliance as a defense.08 In Kreitner the employer violated
302. Id. The court was unable to articulate a concrete standard. Rather, it said, "[A]
court must balance the various equities between the parties and decide upon a result which
is consistent with the purpose of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, and the funda-
mental principles of fairness." Id. at 1006.
303. The court rejected the employer's argument that it should not be held liable for
claims of back pay until a circuit court renders a "final" decision declaring a protective
statute invalid. Id. at 1007.
304. Id.
305. 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
306. Id. at 248-49. The court stated,
No basis has been presented on which this court could come to a determination that
the trial judge abused his discretion in denying back pay in a situation where he finds
that an employer followed the applicable provisions of state law prior to a judicial de-
termination of its invalidity.... [S]tate statutes, like federal ones, are entitled to a
presumption of constitutionality until their invalidity is judicially determined. ...
[Defendant] Westinghouse did not have the benefit of any judicial or even quasi-judi-
cial determination of the validity of the Pennsylvania statutes until the opinion of the
Attorney General on November 19, 1969 and the lower court opinion in this case on
March 29, 1971.
Id. at 248.
307. 501 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
308. The court distinguished Palmer v. General Mills Inc., 600 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.
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Title VII by complying with a Michigan protective law that re-
stricted the number of hours women were allowed to work.309 The
court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's claim for back pay, ruling that the employer should have
known of the invalidity of the Michigan protective law as soon as it
discovered a conflict between the Michigan law and Title VII.3
10
The court pointed to a number of circumstances that should have
indicated the invalidity of the protective law to the employer: an
EEOC Guideline announcing that Title VII superseded the Michi-
gan law, federal court decisions striking down similar laws in other
states, and Title VII itself."' 1 The Kreitner court also cited equita-
ble considerations favoring the plaintiff: that the penalty for vio-
lating the protective laws was minimal when compared to the in-
jury done to the plaintiff; that Michigan had not followed a
vigorous policy of enforcing its protective law; and that even if the
employer had violated the Michigan law and been prosecuted by
the state, it could have asserted good faith compliance with Title
VII as a complete defense.3 12 Thus, according to the Kreitner
court, the defendant employer was never in a true dilemma: when
confronted with a fine as small as ten dollars for violating the
Michigan law, and the much more severe sanction of potential lia-
bility for back pay under Title VII, the employer should have had
sufficient incentive to follow the federal law.3 18 The Kreitner court,
therefore, concluded that the employer had complied with the
1979), which had allowed an employer to assert good faith compliance with state protective
laws as a valid defense against back pay, stating that the Palmer court denied back pay
because of the plaintiff's failure to show economic loss. Kreitner, 501 F. Supp. at 419.
309. Kreitner, 501 F. Supp. at 421.
310. Id. The court noted that the manager of the plant stated in an affidavit "that he
knew of the existence of and relied on the guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission regarding the conflict between Title VII and the state statute." Id. at 416 (foot-
note omitted). The manager did not remember when he learned of the EEOC's guideline
that announced its view that state protective statutes conflicted with Title VII. Id. at 417.
The court examined the various sources upon which the defendant asserted that it relied to
continue compliance with the state protective law and determined that it had proved "ac-
tual reliance." Id. at 419.
311. Id. at 421.
312. Id.
313. Id. The court's conclusion implies that the employer never exercised any good
faith. The outcome of this decision might have been different had the employer demon-
strated that he had made a good faith effort to ascertain the validity of the state law, see,
e.g., Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971) rev'd on other
grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972), to seek a declaratory judgment that the state protec-
tive law is invalid, see, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill.
1970), or to begin compliance with Title VII once its supremacy over the state law had been
clearly established, see, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Michigan protective law not under threat of prosecution, but as a
corporate policy in total disregard of Title VII.3 1'
Thus, the court in Kreitner did not allow the employer to rely
on the presumption of validity that usually attaches to state pro-
tective laws. 15 Instead the court lowered the threshold of required
information to give a defendant employer notice of the state law's
invalidity to the extent that it actually imposed a duty on the em-
ployer to discover the Michigan law's invalidity. The employer's
knowledge of a conflict between Title VII and the protective law
triggered this duty.3 1 Failure to fulfill that duty and comply with
Title VII foreclosed the employer's defense against back pay. If
other courts follow the reasoning in Kreitner, good faith compli-
ance with state protective laws will cease to be even a limited de-
fense against back pay unless the employer can somehow prove
that he could not have discovered that Title VII had superseded
the state law. Rather, such compliance will be only one factor that
courts will consider when weighing the equities involved in claims
for back pay.
B. The Trial Court's Analytical Approach
Back pay under Title VII constitutes equitable relief. Accord-
ingly, the courts should consider the equities claimed by both par-
ties.3 117 Once a defendant employer has established a threshold de-
fense of good faith, he must then assert other defenses to convince
the court to exercise its discretion in favor of a denial of back pay.
The Albemarle Court implicitly recognized that a court may assess
the employer's defenses cumulatively and deny back pay when the
equitable balance favors the employer.31 8 This approach permits
314. Kreitner, 501 F. Supp. at 421.
315. See supra text accompanying note 293.
316. Kreitner, 501 F. Supp. at 421.
317. In Albemarle the Court recognized this balance of equities when it stated that
"under Title VII, the mere absence of bad faith simply opens the door to equity, it does not
depress the scales in the employer's favor." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
422 (1975).
318. Id. at 425 n.20. The Court noted, "The District Court's stated grounds for deny-
ing backpay were, apparently, cumulative rather than independent. The District Court may,
of course, reconsider its backpay determination in light of our ruling on the 'good faith'
question." Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist also recognized that courts
should weigh the combined effect of an employer's defenses against backpay. Id. at 444-45
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). He stated,
I do not read the Court's opinion to say, however, that the facts upon which the Dis-
trict Court based its conclusion. . . would not have supported a finding that the con-
duct of Albemarle was reasonable under the circumstances as well as being simply in
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the employer to assert successfully several defenses that, if consid-
ered separately, would be insufficient to justify denial of a claim
for back pay.
In Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart 19
the Supreme Court demonstrated the analytical approach it ex-
pected trial courts to follow when considering an employer's de-
fenses to a claim for back pay. In Manhart the defendant employer
relied on insurance mortality tables and its own experience evi-
dencing that female employees live longer than male employees to
justify withholding a greater amount of money for a pension fund
from the women's paychecks than from the men's.320 The employer
contended that because it had to make more pension payments to
the women, it could rightfully withhold more money from their
take-home pay. 21 The Supreme Court found that the practice vio-
lated Title VII; yet, it refused to grant the women back pay to
cover the differential in their take-home pay.322 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens observed that until this decision, the ad-
ministrators of the pension fund could justifiably have assumed
that the pension program was lawful.32 3 Furthermore, the Court
noted that prior to Manhart the courts had not addressed the sub-
ject, and the administrative agencies had split on the question
whether the employer's practice violated Title VII.32 ' Once it
found that the employer had acted in good faith, the Court
weighed the cumulative effect of the employer's other defenses.325
good faith. Nor do I read the Court's opinion to say that such a combination of factors
might not, in appropriate circumstances, be an adequate basis for denial of back pay.
Id. (citation omitted).
319. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
320. Id. at 704-10.
321. Id. at 706.
322. Id. at 723. The Court vacated the district and appellate court decisions that had
awarded back pay.
323. Id. at 719-20.
324. Id. at 720.
325. The Manhart Court examined several circumstances that it considered compel-
ling in its decision to deny back pay. Initially, the Court found no reason to believe that an
award of back pay was necessary to deter other employers from discriminating. Id. at 720-
21. Thus, the Court allowed the defendant to clear one of the hurdles presented by the twin
statutory purposes of Title VI--deterring discrimination. The Court provided a test other
courts may employ to guide them in future actions for back pay: when no reason exists to
believe that a threat of liability for back pay is necessary to cause other employees to con-
form their practices with the Court's interpretation of Title VII, then the statutory purpose
of deterring discrimination will not be frustrated. i
For a discussion of the other criteria upon which the Court relied, see infra notes 341-
49 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's decision to deny back pay thus demonstrates
the continued utility of the good faith defense when supported by
other defenses .326 These other defenses that an employer may as-
sert along with a good faith defense in his effort to convince the
court to deny a class-wide claim for back pay, however, have been
steadily narrowed.
32 7
1. Eccentric Litigation Behavior
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody32 8 the Supreme Court held
that a district court may exercise its equitable discretion to deny
back pay if a plaintiff's litigation behavior improperly and substan-
tially prejudiced a defendant employer.2 9 The Albemarle Court
ruled that "to deny back pay because a particular case has been
prosecuted in an eccentric fashion, prejudicial to the other party,
does not offend the broad purposes of Title VII. '3 s0 The Court,
however, did not explain what kind of "eccentric" litigation behav-
ior might improperly and substantially prejudice a defendant em-
326. The defendant employer in Manhart was able to demonstrate exceptional good
faith. The plaintiff in Manhart admitted that the basis for the defendant's discrimina-
tion-the defendant's reliance on statistics showing that women live longer than men-was
indeed true. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
327. For example, the courts have rejected difficulty in determining the amount of an
award as a defense. Difficulty or impossibility in determining the amount of a back pay
award was at one time an effective defense against back pay in at least one circuit. In
United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 311 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1116 (1973), the Eighth Circuit ruled that an incalculable back pay award would
support a court's decision to deny back pay. Most of the other circuits, however, have re-
jected this defense to back pay. The Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 n.53 (5th Cir. 1974), cited holdings in NLRB cases and concluded
that any doubts about back pay awards should be resolved against the employers. Less than
a year later the Fifth Circuit refined its ruling in Johnson by adding that "[u]nrealistic
exactitude" is not required in determining "what an employee would have earned but for
discrimination." Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260 (5th Cir. 1974);
see also Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1973) (when an objec-
tive test for determining back pay is inadequate, "the court can devise a method for making
a fair and reasonable approximation of the money loss for each individual, with a founda-
tion as adequate as the law requires for an award of damages"). The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), eliminated any hope that the
defense of difficulty or impossibility in determining the amount of back pay could still be
successfully raised. According to the Court, a defense based on the difficulty in figuring the
amount of an admittedly required award of back pay would almost certainly frustrate the
statutory purpose of making injured plaintiffs whole. Id. at 298-99.
328. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
329. Id. at 424.
330. Id. The Court, however, made no attempt to explain how a denial of back pay
under these circumstances would fail to offend or frustrate the broad purposes of Title VII.
The Court later made the eccentric litigation defense available to defendants in actions
brought by the EEOC. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 335, 373 (1975).
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ployer. Rather, the Court delegated these determinations to the
district and appellate courts.331 Conceivably, then, eccentric litiga-
tion behavior can include several different kinds of acts. In Al-
bemarle, for example, the plaintiffs initially expressed no interest
in back pay and, thus, filed a complaint for injunctive relief only.
Five years later, however, the plaintiffs filed a claim for back
pay.33 2 The district court held that although the plaintiffs had not
been deliberately dilatory in filing their claim, a grant of back pay
under the circumstances would have substantially prejudiced the
defendant. 3 3 The Supreme Court, however, did not decide whether
the delay in filing for back pay had actually prejudiced the defen-
dant. Instead, the Court left the issue open as a question of fact for
the district court to resolve on remand.
33 4
Prejudicial delay constitutes the most common type of eccen-
tric litigation behavior asserted as a defense to back pay. This de-
fense has met with success before the determination of liability,335
but the same argument would probably fail after a court has found
a defendant liable for discrimination under Title VII. For example,
under facts similar to those in Albemarle,336 an employer would
have extreme difficulty proving that the plaintiff's delay had sub-
331. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 424. The determination whether the plaintiff's eccentric
behavior substantially prejudiced the employer's defense involves a factual question. Ac-
cordingly, the Albermarle Court stated,
Whether the petitioners were in fact prejudiced, and whether the respondents' trial
conduct was excusable, are questions that will be open to review by the Court of Ap-
peals, if the District Court, on remand, decides again to decline to make any award of
backpay. But the standard of review will be the familiar one of whether the District
Court was "clearly erroneous" in its factual findings and whether it "abused" its tradi-
tional discretion to locate "a just result" in light of the circumstances peculiar to the
case ....
Id. at 424 (footnote omitted).
332. Id. at 409-10.
333. Id. at 410.
334. Id. at 424.
335. See EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980). The court
found a delay of four years and nine months unreasonable. Labeling the defense "laches,"
the court required the defendant to meet the following criteria before it would allow the use
of the defense: (1) The delay must have been unexcused, unreasonable, or inordinate; and
(2) the delay must have " 'substantially,' 'materially,' or 'seriously' prejudiced the defen-
dant's ability to conduct his defense." Id. at 275-76.
In EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1978), the Eighth Circuit de-
fined the defendant's burden when attempting to prove prejudice. The court held that a
defendant must establish "with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy" that the
plaintiff's behavior substantially prejudiced the employer's ability to defend his case in or-
der to obtain a summary judgment. Id. at 857.
336. In Albemarle the plaintiffs initially filed an action for injunctive relief and later
added a claim for back pay. See supra text accompanying notes 332-33.
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stantially prejudiced its defense against back pay; the employer
had to defend against injunctive relief from the outset, and most of
the defenses and evidence it would assert against back pay are the
same as those used against injunctive relief.3 37 The defendant's
only remaining argument would be that if he had known that the
action was one for back pay, a much more severe and costly rem-
edy than injunctive relief, then a prompt trial on the merits would
have been in his best interest and he would have proceeded with
his defense accordingly. 38 In addition to prejudicial delay, other
acts of eccentric litigation behavior might improperly and substan-
tially prejudice an employer's defense. These acts might include
failure to comply with discovery orders, threats made to witnesses
or the defendant, or any other act that somehow jeopardizes an
employer's defense.
2. Extreme Cost
Courts have never considered the potential harm that an
award of back pay might have on a defendant employer when de-
ciding whether to award or deny back pay.33 Any defense based on
the employer's inability to pay could certainly frustrate the statu-
tory purposes of Title VII.8 In Los Angeles Department of Water
& Power v. Manhart,"1 however, the Supreme Court ruled that the
courts should consider the harmful effects that an award of back
pay will have on other persons besides the defendant. In Manhart
the defendant employer violated Title VII by withholding more
money for an employee pension fund from the paychecks of female
employees than from the paychecks of male employees.34 After
337. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971). The court in Robinson supported its conclusion that the plaintiff's late
filing for back pay relief had not prejudiced the defendant by recognizing that any defenses
relating solely to the computation of back pay could be asserted when the court assessed
individual claims. Id. at 803.
338. The employer in Albemarle successfully used this argument at the district court
level. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 413.
339. Nevertheless, some courts will consider the defendant's ability to pay when figur-
ing the amount of an award. For example, in Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local
638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that "[t]he record lacks any evidence
showing that the [defendant] union faces imminent financial distress should backpay be
awarded; any evidence on this issue the district court may consider prior to its entry of a
final backpay order." Id. at 586.
340. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
341. 435 U.S. 702 (1979).
342. Id. at 704-06.
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finding that the employer withheld the money in good faith,4 3 the
Court concluded that a grant of back pay to the female employees
would be inappropriate in the present case. 4 The Manhart Court
determined that to grant back pay to these plaintiffs would have
precipitated countless similar claims by other women who had par-
ticipated in the same kind of discriminatory pension fund3 5 The
Court reasoned, "The occurrence of major unforeseen contingen-
cies . . . jeopardizes the insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the in-
sureds' benefits. Drastic changes in the legal rules governing pen-
sion and insurance funds, like other unforeseen events, can have
this effect.
'3 4 6
After noting the harmful effect that back pay awards might
have on pension plans and pension plan participants throughout
the economy, the Manhart Court then considered the harm that a
grant of back pay would have on other employees participating in
the particular pension fund in issue.3 47 The Court recognized that
if the back pay relief were awarded from the existing pension fund
"the administrator of the fund will be forced to meet unchanged
obligations with diminished assets."34 8 Thus, according to the
Court, "If the reserve proves inadequate, either the expectations of
all retired employees will be disappointed or current employees
will be forced to pay not only for their own future but also for the
unanticipated reduction in the contributions of past employees."34 9
Although the Manhart Court considered the harmful eco-
nomic effects of a back pay award on a pension fund, the same
considerations might be made in other employment contexts as
well. In order to trigger a court's consideration of these effects, the
employer must prove good faith: the employer must prove that
neither he nor the appropriate administrative agencies knew that
the contested employment practice constituted illegal discrimina-
343. Id. at 719-20.
344. Id. at 723.
345. Id. at 721.
346. Id. The Court stated that "we [cannot] ignore the potential impact which changes
in rules affecting insurance and pension plans may have on the economy." Id. The Court
further noted that back pay was an inappropriate remedy because "the rules that apply to
these funds should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly com-
manded that result." Id. (footnote omitted).
347. Id. at 722-23. The Court stated that "retroactive liability could be devastating for
a pension fund. The harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties." Id. (footnote
omitted).




tion.350 Once the defendant makes this initial threshold showing of
good faith, he must then prove that two other conditions have
been met. First, the employer must demonstrate the pervasive
character of the contested discriminatory employment practice. If
only a small number of employers engaged in the same form of
discrimination, the defendant can hardly claim that a back pay
award would create countless similar claims which would have an
adverse effect on the economy. On the other hand, if the employ-
ment practice in question is widely followed by other employers,
the employer stands a much better chance of convincing a court
that an award of back pay might harm the economy. Second, the
employer must convince the court that his financial resources, like
the pension fund in Manhart, constitute a limited resource upon
which many innocent employees rely. The analogy to the Manhart
pension fund is not difficult to draw; many small businesses with
little capital or large businesses in financial straits do not have un-
limited financial resources from which to make awards of back pay.
A large award of back pay may severely diminish an employer's
limited financial resources and force him to take measures that
would almost certainly affect innocent employees. Thus, making
the victims of discrimination whole may cause many other employ-
ees to be laid off and others to receive cuts in pay. Harm to inno-
cent employees looms even more certain when courts threaten to
make large back pay awards during periods of local or national
economic downturn. If a defendant employer can make this show-
ing, courts should carefully consider the effect an award of back
pay will have on the economy and on innocent employees in decid-
ing whether to grant back pay.
The courts have gradually stripped employers of most of the
defenses they once had against class-wide claims for back pay. Al-
though the Supreme Court in Albemarle noted that back pay did
not constitute an automatic remedy once liability had been deter-
mined, very few courts in subsequent actions have declined to
award back pay relief. Furthermore, very few employers have
found a way to circumvent the strict Albemarle discretionary stan-
dard for awarding back pay. In effect, then, an award of back pay
has become an almost automatic remedy for victims of discrimina-
tion. Yet, the Supreme Court's decision in Manhart demonstrates
that the Albemarle discretionary standard is not an insurmounta-
350. In Manhart the Court emphasized that this case was "the first litigation challeng-
ing contribution differences based on valid actuarial tables." Id. at 722.
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ble barrier to defenses against back pay, and employers may still
successfully assert defenses that do not frustrate the dual statutory
purposes of Title VII. Accordingly, a defense does not frustrate the
first prong of the dual purposes-deterring discrimination-when
the court discovers no reason for believing that an award of back
pay is needed to deter similar forms of discrimination. Moreover, a
defense does not frustrate the second prong-making plaintiffs
whole-once the employer has shown good faith and demonstrated
that the court should strike the balance of equities in his favor.
The equities that the courts should consider include not only the
conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant, but also the conse-
quences an award of back pay will have on innocent employees and
on the economy.
VI. PROOF-OF-CLAIM PROCEDURE
If, after a finding that the employer engaged in discriminatory
employment practices, the court determines that back pay is the
proper remedy for the class, it must initiate some form of proceed-
ing to determine whether and to what extent each claimant may
participate in the back pay award. If the court were to hold full-
scale trials on the merits of each class member's claim, problems of
economy would arise for both the judiciary and the individual class
member.3 51 Yet, if the court were to hold only one trial on the back
pay issue, a judgment for the class would bind the employer even
though it had no opportunity to challenge the validity of each class
member's claim.3 52 An adequate balance of the interests of the in-
dividual class member, the employer, and the judiciary necessitates
the implementation of a proof-of-claim procedure3 53 that is both
easy to administer and fair to all parties. The Special Project dis-
cusses at length the nature of these interests and what value or
weight the court should assign to them. This part of the Special
Project highlights the mechanics of the proof-of-claim procedure
and explores the legal and practical problems that arise when
351. See infra notes 461-63 & 494 and accompanying text.
352. See infra notes 464-69 and accompanying text.
353. Appellate courts have approved the use of a proof-of-claim procedure as a valid
exercise of the district court's discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(2) in
both (b)(3) class actions, see, e.g., Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1260-61
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977), and (b)(2) class actions, see, e.g., Kyriazi v.
Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 392-95 (3d Cir. 1981); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585
F.2d 625, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Bing v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1973).
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courts use notice, proof-of-claim forms, and gag orders in employ-
ment discrimination class actions.3"
A. Mechanics of the Proof-of-Claim Procedure
Although the mechanics of the proof-of-claim procedure de-
pend on the particular circumstances of each case, the procedure
has several customary characteristics. Initially, the court decides
whether to administer the Stage II proceedings itself or to grant a
special master s " the authority to supervise the proceedings and
determine individual awards. The parties then agree to and the
court or master approves the content of the notice35  and proof-of-
354. Although this part of the Special Project, analyzing the proof-of-claim procedure,
relies in large part on Title VII precedents, it is equally applicable to employment discrimi-
nation class suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This analysis focuses on class actions be-
cause courts do not employ the proof-of-claim procedure in private, nonclass suits.
355. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) authorizes the district courts to refer to
special masters only issues especially complicated (in jury trials) or exceptional (in nonjury
trials) in nature. To illustrate, if the case contains a small number of claims and the award
can be easily determined, the court will retain control of the Stage H proceedings. See, e.g.,
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 259-63 (5th Cir. 1974); Bing v. Road-
way Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 452-55 (5th Cir. 1973); Local 186, Int'l Pulp, Sulphite &
Paper Mill Workers v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284, 1294-95 (N.D. Ind.
1969); Edwards, supra note 208, at 795-96 (1974). On the other hand, if the determination of
each award requires an investigation into circumstances such as promotions, vacancies, and
layoffs, the court will refer the matter to a special master. See, e.g., Pettway, 494 F.2d at
263; United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1385,
1387 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Local 186, 304 F. Supp. at 1294-95.
356. Courts and attorneys face both practical and legal problems when deciding the
proper form and content of the notice. One problem concerns the type of notice they should
approve. If one of the parties knows the addresses of the absent class members, courts typi-
cally will require that notice issue by personal service, see Matthews v. Alexander, 20 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,268, at 12,419 (M.D. Ala. 1979), or by mail, see, e.g., Kyriazi v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 1981); Matthews, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at
12,419; Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 71 (D.D.C. 1972). On the other hand, if the
parties do not know the addresses of absent class members, or if the court decides for
whatever reason that notice by mail is not necessary, the court will order notice by publica-
tion. See, e.g., Kyriazi, 647 F.2d at 391; Matthews, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 12,419;
Arey, 55 F.R.D. at 71. The court may order publication through local newspapers, at plant
meetings, and on plant bulletin boards. See, e.g., Kyriazi, 647 F.2d at 391.
The actual content of the notice constitutes another concern. See Kyriazi, 647 F.2d at
395. Ideally, the notice should inform absent class members (1) of the pendency of a con-
tested class action in federal court, (2) that the court has found the employer liable for
specific discriminatory practices, (3) that the determination of individual awards will soon
begin, (4) that if they desire to participate in these proceedings they must return the proof-
of-claim form, and (5) that if they have any questions they should contact counsel for the
class. Id.; accord Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 673-75 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
The question whether the notice meets constitutional requirements parallels the practi-
cal concerns of the type and the content of the notice. See infra notes 424-29 and accompa-
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claim form3 57 that absent class members will receive. The notice
and proof-of-claim form usually state that the individual class
member must file the form with the clerk of the court within a
certain time period. 58 After the court or class counsel 5  compiles
these claims and sends them to the employer, the employer usually
has thirty days to decide which claims it will challenge.3 60 If the
employer chooses not to contest a claim, the court or master will
make an immediate award.3 61 An employer's decision to challenge a
claim, however, necessitates a determination of the merits of the
claim. 62 When making this determination, the court-ordered pro-
cedure typically establishes the burden of proof that each party
must meet in order to prevail. 6 If the claimant successfully estab-
lishes entitlement to back pay, then the court or master will com-
pute the amount of the individual's award. 6
nying text. To satisfy due process the notice, like any other notice affecting substantive
rights, must sufficiently inform the recipient of his rights and give him an opportunity to
respond. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
Thus, "[i]f the court fashions a notice which makes the request insufficiently specific for lay
comprehension, or which otherwise imposes undue burdens of response on individual class
members, an abuse of discretion may be found." Kyriazi, 647 F.2d at 395; see Robinson v.
Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 822 (1977). The employer also has an interest in ensuring the adequacy of the
notice so that it will not be forced to relitigate the claims of class members who did not
receive the minimal guarantees of due process. Edwards, supra note 208, at 797.
Problems concerning the notice requirement also arise because of the procedural differ-
ences between (b)(2) and (b)(3) actions. In (b)(2) actions notice to absent class members is
not mandatory, but notice is mandatory in (b)(3) actions. Professor Edwards concludes that
to avoid a due process challenge and claim preclusion problems, courts should establish a
special procedure when the class members in a (b)(2) action seek monetary relief. He advo-
cates conversion of the class from (b)(2) to (b)(3) after a determination of liability. Id. at
797-803.
The question of who pays the costs of notice also merits consideration. After a determi-
nation of liability, courts are willing to impose the costs of notification on the employer. See,
e.g., Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,251, at 5782 (E.D.N.C.
1976), a/I'd in part, rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979).
357. For a discussion examining the contents of and rationale behind the proof-of-
claim form, see infra notes 365-429 and accompanying text.
358. See infra notes 383-89 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., English v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90,
94 (S.D. Ga. 1975).
360. See, e.g., Ivey v. Western Elec. Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1028, 1033
(N.D. Ga. 1978).
361. See, e.g., id.
362. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'I Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 669-73 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
363. See infra part VIII.




Because of the important role that the proof-of-claim form
plays in the determination of individual back pay awards, the form
has become the object of both criticism s 5 and praise.3 66 Four cate-
gories of issues are at the center of this controversy: the determina-
tion of class membership, the contents of the proof-of-claim form,
the timeliness of return, and the policy behind the proof-of-claim
form. This section of the Special Project examines the issues in
each of these categories.
1. Class Membership
Courts agree that the parties should draft the proof-of-claim
form so that the responses will evidence whether the individual
claimant is a member in the class seeking relief38 The claimant's
membership in the class, however, depends on the applicability of
certain characterizations and limitations that vary from case to
case. If the Stage I proceedings determined that the employer had
engaged in discriminatory firing practices, any person discharged
from the company for discriminatory reasons is clearly a member
of the class. 6 8 Similarly, if the court holds the employer liable for
discriminatory conduct relating to promotion or seniority policies,
the incumbent employee who applied for promotion or seniority is
a member of the protected class.3 69 The nonapplicant incumbent,
on the other hand, has the burden of proving that he would have
applied for promotion but for the discriminatory practices of the
employer,3 70 and the proof of claim form should be worded to elicit
the different information required to evaluate the nonapplicant's
membership status. If the court determines that the employer's
hiring practices violate either Title VII or section 1981, any appli-
cant for employment obtains membership in the class eligible for
365. See Seymour, The Use of "Proof of Claim" Forms and Gag Orders in Employ-
ment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 CONN. L. REv. 920 (1978).
366. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1318, 1441-43
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
367. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 675-76 (N.D. Tex.
1981). See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362,
368 & n.52 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); C. SuLLvAN, M. ZAimME & R. RxcHARns,
supra note 33, § 6.5, at 425.
368. See B. ScHmLz & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 33, at 522-24.
369. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62
(1977).
370. Id. at 368 & n.52; see infra notes 657-64 and accompanying text.
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back pay.71 Although arguably in a position similar to that of the
incumbent who did not apply for promotion, the claimant who had
not applied for employment probably will fall outside the pro-
tected class.37  Even if the claimant has some characteristic that
puts him in the class, time limitations on the filing of charges with
the EEOC may prevent his participation in Stage II.s17 While the
individual claimant may recover back pay without filing charges,
3 74
if the time for filing passed before the named plaintiff instituted
suit then the courts will exclude him from the award determina-
tion stage.37 5 Thus, the proof-of-claim form should reflect these
concerns in its questions covering class membership, and the
claimants who satisfy these standards should file the proof-of-
claim form.
2. Contents of the Proof-of-Claim Form
In addition to inquiries designed to determine eligibility for
back pay, the proof-of-claim form should ask for information that
will assist in computing the claimant's award. The claimant could
easily challenge the usefulness and purpose37 6 of the form if it
sought information already available to the litigants; 77 thus, the
371. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976). The claimant in a
private, nonclass action challenging discriminatory hiring practices has a different burden. A
showing that a qualified applicant unsuccessfully sought a job for which a vacancy existed
and for which the employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications raises a
rebuttable presumption of a violation of Title VII. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973); see supra part IV. In a class action, however, the employer has the burden
to prove the claimant's lack of qualifications and the lack of vacancies, although, in some
instances, the employee may rely on other considerations. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73.
372. The Supreme Court has not addressed this question, but it did note in Teamsters
that the claim of a nonapplicant incumbent "would certainly be more superficially plausible
than a similar claim by a member of the general public." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 368 n.52 (1977); see 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TrCE AND PROCEDURE § 1760, at 581-82 (1972).
373. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, at 409; see infra note 898
and accompanying text.
374. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Bowe v. Colgate,
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-21 (7th Cir. 1969).
375. Lafey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); see Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
376. See infra notes 390-429 and accompanying text.
377. Employers and unions must keep records of any employment practices relevant
to possible Title VII violations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1976). These records should include
information concerning past applicants, employees, and union members, and the "em-
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form should request only information that is indispensable378 to
the determination of a fair award for the claimant. The definition
of "indispensable" will vary depending on the facts of each case. In
many cases the employer cannot ascertain from its records the race
or sex of the potential class member. 79 In addition, the employer's
files will not provide evidence of discriminatory practices occurring
outside the areas of hiring, firing, or promotion.3 80 Similarly,
neither the employer nor the class representative will know
whether the class member had interim earnings from other jobs 81
or unemployment compensation.8 2 Since this information is, by its
very nature, available only to the claimant, and since the claimant
likely desires some compensation for his economic loss, a require-
ment that he supply this information is not unreasonable. Thus,
the proof-of-claim form places the burden of disclosure on the
party in the best position to have access to the necessary informa-
tion and on the party most likely to benefit from full and fair
disclosure.
3. Timeliness of Return
In addition to the concerns of who should file the proof-of-
claim form and what the form should contain, use of the form
raises the issue of when the individual class member must fie. A
district court may require the class member to fie his proof-of-
claim form before the court will make a determination of liabil-
ity.8 2 More often, however, "the courts await the adjudication of
ployer's records, as well as the employer's aid" should be made available to the individual
claimant. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260 (5th Cir. 1974). For a
further discussion of the proof-of-claim form's relevance to discovery, see infra notes 390-
413 and accompanying text.
378. Courts should not consider data contained in the employer's files relating to dates
of employment, jobs held, and pay rates as indispensable, because such data can be readily
obtained through discovery. See Seymour, supra note 365, at 920.
379. Id. at 920 n.2. See generally Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656,
675 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (D.N.J. 1979),
aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
380. See Seymour, supra note 365, at 921. See generally Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 676 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
381. See infra notes 840-83 and accompanying text.
382. See infra notes 795-818 and accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1018-19 (W.D. Va.
1979); Seymour, supra note 365, at 920. When requiring fling of claims prior to a determi-
nation of liability, courts generally rely on the broad discretion granted them under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 reads,
"In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any
manner not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
1982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the liability issue before adopting procedures to notify class mem-
bers to come forward and assert their claims. "384 This latter ap-
proach probably results in a better balance of the conflicting
policies.38 5
If a class member fails to file his claim within the prescribed
time, he may risk a determination that his right to recover is for-
ever barred. Many district courts include language of bar in the
notices and proof-of-claim forms that they send to absent class
members.8 " The Third Circuit, however, has recognized that a
late-filing claimant may still participate in the distribution of the
fund upon demonstration of "good cause. ' 87 The court noted that
various facts could evidence good cause, including the claimant's
poor health and his fear of retaliation by the employer.3 88 In addi-
tion to good cause, the claimant could assert that the timely filing
requirement unduly limits the employer's liability. Yet, if the court
accepts either of these arguments, the employer justifiably may ar-
gue that the court has denied it the benefit of res judicata.3 " Thus,
when questions of timing arise the court should carefully balance
the competing interests.
4. Policies Supporting the Use of Proof-of-Claim Forms
The proper use of a proof-of-claim form significantly benefits
the interests of the court, the class representative, the absent class
member, and the employer. The proof-of-claim form aids the court
in determining class membership if it has not yet decided whether
to certify the class.390 The efficient management of a complex class
384. Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions, 54 F.R.D.
501, 505 (1972); see Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1981); Robinson
v. Union Carbide Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION § 1.45, at 51 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL];
Developments, supra note 366, at 1445.
385. See infra notes 390-429 and accompanying text.
386. E.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 674 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 grants sufficiently broad discretion to the court to re-
quire timely filing of proof of claim. MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.45, at 50.
387. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 396 (3d Cir. 1981); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (court has discretion to extend filing requirement deadlines if failure to act
resulted from excusable neglect).
388. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 396 (3d Cir. 1981).
389. See id. at 394. By accepting the claimant's argument of good cause or of undue
limitation on employer's liability, the court effectively reopens an already adjudicated case
in which it decided that the claimant should not recover because of his failure to assert his
claim. Such a practice, the employer would argue, conflicts with goals of judicial economy: to
encourage settlement and to combine and resolve duplicative issues in one action.
390. See, e.g., Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 67-70 (D.D.C. 1972); Develop-
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action suit also depends heavily on the proper use of the form.391
Likewise, the form benefits the class representative to the extent
that it relieves the burden of independently investigating the claim
of each class member. 2 Moreover, the form concisely presents to
the court the absent class member's reasons for his entitlement to
back pay.3A Consequently, the court will be better able to deter-
mine the value of each class member's award when it has this sum-
mary of the individual's claim.3" The form also protects the inter-
ests of the absentee since it provides the court with information
concerning the adequacy of representation.'"
Furthermore, the proof-of-claim form yields benefits to the
employer that parallel the policies supporting the discovery
rules-to eliminate unfair surprise at trial, to narrow the issues in
dispute, and to allow parties to have complete knowledge of all
facts and issues.3 96 The right to discovery of absentees, however,
hinges on some showing of need." Therefore, when applying the
appropriate standard to the employer's discovery request, courts
ask whether the employer's defense depends upon the receipt of
the desired information or whether the request for information
merely constitutes a ploy to harass the absent class member and
thereby reduce potential liability.3 98 If the employer requests dis-
ments, supra note 366, at 1439-44. Limiting the inquiry to matters relevant to class certifi-
cation will lessen the harassing effect that interrogatories which explore the merits of the
absentee's claim have on the absentee. See generally id. at 1441.
391. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1981); Sledge v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 637 n.25 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979);
Seymour, supra note 365, at 932-33.
392. Davidson, supra note 55, at 751. This burden will indeed be significant if the
class representative does not know the identity of all potential claimants, if the potential
claimants hesitate to involve themselves in litigation because of fear of employer retaliation,
and if the employer fails to cooperate with the class representative. Id.
393. See supra notes 376-82 and accompanying text; Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441,
448 (5th Cir. 1973); Edwards, supra note 208, at 751.
394. See supra notes 376-82 and accompanying text. The proof-of-claim form also aids
in determining the value of individual settlement awards. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec.
Co., 647 F.2d 388, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1981); Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993-
95 (5th Cir. 1981); see also infra part X and accompanying text.
395. Davidson, supra note 55, at 751.
396. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947). See generally Developments,
supra note 366, at 1444-48.
397. The courts in the Seventh Circuit rely on a standard that requires the party seek-
ing discovery to show that the information is necessary for trial preparation. Clark v. Uni-
versal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Bren-
nan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 921 (1972).
398. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
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covery of absentees prior to a determination of liability, the court
"should determine whether the information sought is relevant to
the question of liability. 3 99 One commentator, however, has noted
that courts should not allow discovery of absent class members in
employment discrimination cases until after a determination of lia-
bility.400 In addition to requiring that the information be essential
to the employer's defense, courts expect the employer to demon-
strate that he has no other means for obtaining the requested in-
formation.0 1 Concomitant to the benefits paralleling the policies of
discovery, the proof-of-claim form significantly reduces the em-
ployer's litigation costs.40 2 Moreover, the form gives the employer
an opportunity to ascertain its ultimate liability and to assess the
merits of settlement.403 Finally, the use of the proof-of-claim form
protects the employer from frequent relitigation of individual back
pay claims because it provides notice to the absentees of an action
affecting their rights.40'
5. Arguments for Limiting the Use of Proof-of-Claim Forms
(a) Frustration of the Policies Behind Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23
Although the underlying policies of the discovery rules40 5 offer
strong support for the use of a proof-of-claim form, a court should
not approve the form's use without first considering its potentially
adverse effects on the class members. Both courts and commenta-
tors have expressed concern that the proof-of-claim procedure, a
U.S. 1070 (1974); see Smalls, supra note 208, at 870-71 (1976).
399. Smalls, supra note 208, at 872.
400. This commentator reasons that the class representative, who has the responsibil-
ity of demonstrating liability, possesses all the information the employer might need; conse-
quently, the employer should request this information from the class representative. Yet,
once the court makes a finding of liability, "fairness to the defendant-who bears the bur-
den of rebutting the prima facie case [entitlement presumption]-requires that he be able
to obtain all necessary information relating to his defense." Edwards, supra note 208, at
804.
401. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Smalls, supra note 208, at 873; Developments,
supra note 366, at 1445-46.
402. The use of oral depositions, FED. R. Civ. P. 30, or written depositions, FED. R.
Civ. P. 31, can often be cost prohibitive and impractical in large class actions. See Edwards,
supra note 208, at 803.
403. Meyers, Title VII Class Actions: Promises and Pitfalls, 8 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 767,
787 (1977); Comment, The Class Action and Title VII-An Overview, 10 U. RICH. L. REV.
325, 337 (1976). See generally infra part X.
404. Meyers, supra note 403, at 787; Comment, supra note 403, at 337.
405. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
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practice which often excludes claimants, violates the policy found
in rule 23 of aggregating small claims." 6 Moreover, the 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules indicate a policy decision to pre-
sume class membership in actions for relief of substantive
wrongs.407 Employers, however, may circumvent this presumption
by using the proof-of-claim form to reduce their liability. 08 To il-
lustrate, some class members may fail to respond because they
cannot afford to hire an attorney to help them answer or interpret
these forms.4 09 Others may fear retaliation by the employer if they
respond.4 10 Whatever their reasons, the form's "forever bar"411 lan-
guage may operate to bind their claims "by res judicata with re-
spect to future actions" and to bar them "from recovery in the pre-
sent. 4 1 2 Even if the form does not contain such language, the
employer may rely on the sanctions of exclusion or dismissal for
the class members' failure to reply.413 If the court unwittingly al-
lows the employer to use the proof-of-claim form as a device to
reduce its ultimate liability, that decision clearly frustrates the pol-
icies behind rule 23.
(b) Frustration of the Policies Behind Title VII
When deciding whether to use the proof-of-claim form, courts
should balance the concerns of the discovery and class action rules
with the underlying policies of Title VII. The Supreme Court in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody414 stated that Congress had two
406. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 1981); see MANUAL, supra
note 384, § 1.45, at 50; Seymour, supra note 365, at 933-34; Smalls, supra note 208, at 871;
Developments, supra note 366, at 1443-45; Comment, Requests for Information in Class
Actions, 83 YALE L.J. 602, 610 (1974).
407. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 397-98 (1967); Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
34 F.R.D. 325, 383, 393 (1964).
408. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Seymour, supra note 365, at 933-34; Smalls, supra
note 208, at 871; Developments, supra note 366, at 1444.
409. See Developments, supra note 366, at 1445 & n.268 (quoting Wainwright v.
Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972)).
410. Developments, supra note 366, at 1443 n.262.
411. See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
412. Comment, supra note 406, at 610.
413. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 37. In a rule 23(b)(3) action the class member will suffer
exclusion from the suit and in a (b)(2) action he will face dismissal of his claim with
prejudice. Id. Contempt provides another available sanction for failure to comply with a
court order. Id. 37(a)(2), (b)(2)(D).
414. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
1982] 955
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
objectives when drafting the relief provisions of Title
VII--"eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimi-
nation. '415 Arguably, any proof-of-claim procedure to which poten-
tial class members do not reply' 16 contravenes the statute's twin
objectives. As noted above, the absent class member may fail to
respond because he fears retaliation by his employer,417 because he
is unaware of the discrimination,418 or because he does not want to
invest time and money in legal assistance.419 Despite these disin-
centives to respond, the countervailing concerns of the court,420 the
class representative,'421 the employer,'422 and, to some extent, the
absent class member 42 3 may operate to require the use of a proof-
of-claim form.
(c) Due Process Concerns
Even if the implementation of a proof-of-claim procedure
withstands challenges based on the policies of rule 23 and Title
VII, the proof-of-claim form, along with the accompanying notice,
may be constitutionally inadequate. Since each class member must
demonstrate individual entitlement, due process requires that all
class members receive notice and an opportunity to prove their en-
titlement.'2 ' Nevertheless, a deprivation of due process occurs if a
class member receives notice, but does not have the factual knowl-
415. Id. at 421; see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
416. One commentator notes that over 60% of the class in White v. Carolina Paper
Board Corp., 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977), failed to file proof-of-claim forms, Seymour,
supra note 365, at 926 n.11, and that only 70 out of a class of 3000 returned claim forms in
Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 380 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ala. 1974), modified, 544 F.2d
1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977). Seymour, supra note 365, at 926 n.10.
417. Professor Seymour argues that "passive reliance on the various statutory prohibi-
tions against retaliation" cannot ameliorate this danger; rather, it "can only be met by ac-
tively taking steps to prevent the fear of retaliation from resulting in the effective loss of
statutory rights." Seymour, supra note 365, at 945.
418. The House Committee on Education and Labor stated that employment discrimi-
nation is not just "a series of isolated and distinguishable events," but is "a far more com-
plex and pervasive phenomenon." The Committee concluded, "Particularly to the untrained
observer, [the] discriminatory nature [of employment practices] may not appear obvious at
a glance." H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 8 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2143-44.
419. See supra note 409 and accompanying text.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 390-91.
421. See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying text.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 393-95.
424. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-74 (1974); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
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edge or legal sophistication to understand the merit of his claim.4'2
Thus, the court should be sure not only that the absent class mem-
ber receives notice but also that the notice and proof-of-claim form
accurately and intelligibly apprise the recipient of his rights.426
Even though the notice is itself adequate, the interests of absent
parties remain unprotected unless they have an opportunity to be
heard.'27 Courts, therefore, should be aware of potential "procedu-
ral booby traps" that prevent the litigant from having a hearing on
the merits of his claim. 25 Moreover, the employer has an interest
in ensuring the constitutional adequacy of the procedure so that
the judgment will have res judicata effect.'
2'
C. Bans on Counsel-Initiated Communications with Class
Members
In conjunction with the implementation of proof-of-claim pro-
cedures, courts often issue orders banning counsel-initiated contact
with absent class members.2 0 These "gag orders" typically prevent
class counsel from informing absent class members of their rights
and from assisting them in completing the forms.4'31 Both courts
and commentators have supported bans on communication be-
cause these orders limit certain abuses of the class action device.32
425. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974); United States
v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Union Carbide
Corp., 544 F.2d 1258, 1260 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
426. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 647 F.2d
388, 395 (3d Cir. 1981).
427. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950). See
generally id. at 313-14; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
428. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966). Although Surowitz
discussed rule 23 in the context of a shareholder derivative action, the principle seems
equally applicable to employment discrimination cases.
429. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
430. See MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.45, at 48; Seymour, supra note 365, at 922.
431. Seymour, supra note 365, at 922.
432. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 94-95 & n.5 (1981); Williams v.
United States Dist. Court, 658 F.2d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 1981); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D.
80, 94-101 (C.D. Cal. 1980); MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.41, at 27 n.43. The Manual for
Complex Litigation notes that these abuses include the following: (1) solicitation of legal
representation of potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class
action; (2) solicitation of fees and expenses and agreements to pay fees and expenses from
potential and actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (3) solici-
tation by formal parties to the class action of requests by class members to opt out in class
actions maintained under rule 23(b)(3); and, (4) communications from counsel or parties
that may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes, and effects of the class action or of
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This section of the Special Project examines the pros and cons of
gag orders from two perspectives-their consistency with the poli-
cies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their ability to
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Because of the effect gag orders had on the substantive rights
of claimants in employment discrimination litigation, appellate
courts began to scrutinize the use of these orders in light of the
policies underlying the Rules Enabling Act "' and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.43" Recently, the Supreme Court con-
ducted a similar examination in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard."3 In that
case Gulf Oil filed a motion seeking a gag order to limit communi-
cations between the named plaintiffs or their counsel and unnamed
class members.436 The district court, over plaintiffs' objections, en-
tered an order prohibiting parties and their counsel from commu-
nicating with potential class members without prior court ap-
proval.5 7 The district court, however, issued no findings or
conclusions to support the order, but relied on the rationale in the
Manual for Complex Litigation.3 8 The Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed, holding the district court's order unconstitutional
because it was a prior restraint on expression that merited first
amendment protection.'39 The Supreme Court affirmed and held
court orders, and that may reflect adversely on the parties involved. Id.
433. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
434. See, e.g., Williams v. United States Dist. Court, 658 F.2d 430, 435-36 (6th Cir.
1981); Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 187-89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977);
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 163-66 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
832 (1975).
435. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
436. Gulf Oil and the EEOC entered into a conciliation agreement to resolve alleged
discrimination against black and female employees at one of Gulf's refineries. Gulf agreed to
offer back pay to the discriminatees. Gulf then sent notices to the employees eligible for
back pay, stating the amount available in return for execution of a full release of all relevant
discrimination claims. Approximately one month later plaintiffs filed a class action suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of all present
and former black employees and rejected black applicants alleging racial discrimination in
employment. Id. at 91-92.
437. Id. at 94-95. The order exempted (1) "attorney-client communications initiated
by the client, and communications in the regular course of business;" (2) communications
for which a constitutional right to communicate without prior restraint existed so long as
the atiorney filed a copy or summary of the communication with the court; and (3) commu-
nications from Gulf regarding "the conciliation agreement and its settlement process." Id. at
95. Thus, in this instance the gag order had the effect of preventing potential class members
from learning of the suit and of forcing them to make a decision about Gulf's offer-which
required them to release their right to sue-without knowledge of the suit.
438. Id. at 96; see supra note 432.




that the district court exceeded its authority under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by imposing a gag order without first
making findings that indicated the need for the order.440
Noting the importance of the class action procedure and the
potential for abuse,441 the Court acknowledged the discretion that
district courts have to control the conduct of class actions, but
stated that the exercise of this discretion is subject to review.44'
The Supreme Court began its review by recognizing the need to
balance the potential abuses of the class action with the rights of
the claimants.'" In the Court's opinion, the gag order interfered
with the absent class member's right to make an informed decision
about participation in the litigation and with the class representa-
tive's right to discover information relevant to the merits of the
case. 444 Accordingly, the Court stated,
Because of these potential problems, an order limiting communications
between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear re-
cord and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation
and the potential interference with the rights of the parties. Only such a de-
termination can ensure that the court is furthering, rather than hindering,
the policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule
23.445
Applying this standard, the Court found that the district court
failed to weigh the competing interests, did not preserve an ade-
quate record for review, and made no findings or conclusions in
support of the order. 446 Thus, the Court concluded that the "impo-
sition of the order was an abuse of discretion." 7447 The effect of this
decision then, is to require that district courts develop a record
containing findings and conclusions which indicate a balancing of
the potential abuses of the class action device with the interference
to the rights of the parties.
Even if the district court maintains a record that reflects a
weighing of the various interests of the parties, an appellate court
440. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. at 91, 103.
441. Id. at 99-100.
442. Id. at 100-02.
443. Id. at 99-101.
444. Id. at 101; see Williams v. United States Dist. Court, 658 F.2d 430, 436 (6th Cir.
1981); see also Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 162 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 93 (C.D. Cal. 1980); 3B J.
MooRE, FsEmu.n PRACvcE 1 23.02(1), at 42 (2d ed. 1982); Comment, Restrictions on Com-
munication by Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DuKE L.J. 360, 368-69.
445. 452 U.S. at 101-02.
446. Id. at 102-03.
447. Id. at 103.
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may find that the-gag order imposes too great a restraint on com-
munications among the parties to the controversy. 448 When decid-
ing whether the order violates the first amendment, the appellate
court probably will apply a multi-step analysis. Initially, the court
will find that the order constitutes a prior restraint because it de-
nies class counsel and the parties they represent the opportunity to
confer with absent class members unless they first request and re-
ceive permission from the court.449 This finding will raise a pre-
sumption against the validity of the restraint.450 The court also will
conclude that communications with absent class members fall
within the scope of constitutional protection, but nonetheless are
subject to a court's authority to regulate communications con-
nected with the litigation.451 This conclusion will require the re-
viewing court to determine whether the harm posed by dissemina-
tion justifies restrictions on the protected activity.452 Finally, if
448. Although many courts have acknowledged that gag orders raise serious first
amendment issues, see, e.g., id. at 101 n.15; Williams v. United States Dist. Court, 658 F.2d
430, 434-35 (6th Cir. 1981); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 162-63 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), only a few courts have applied constitutional princi-
ples to vacate or deny these orders, see Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.
1980), afl'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80 (C.D.
Cal. 1980). But see Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1101 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
449. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 467-71 (5th Cir. 1980), afl'd on other
grounds, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). The threat of criminal contempt sanctions for violating the
order also has a "chilling" effect on free speech. Id. at 470-71.
450. See, e.g., Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1968); Ban-
tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
451. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698-99 (1974); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553,
555 (1972); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383-93 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
371-78 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 343-49 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 259-67 (1941).
452. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 473-77 (5th Cir. 1980), aflfd on other
grounds, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). Although the justifications for gag orders seem meritorious, see
supra note 432, that appearance is often deceiving in the context of employment discrinina-
tion litigation. For example, the fear that attorneys will solicit clients to participate in the
action should be diminished since such conduct may expose them to disciplinary action. See
MODE. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrry DR 2-104(A)(5) (1979). Such solicitation,
however, will not receive constitutional protection. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 457-68 (1978). The class representative, on the other hand, probably has a consti-
tutional right to solicit other parties to participate in the action under one of two theories:
advancement of political goals, see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 421-26 (1978); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-45 (1963), or "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful
access to the courts," United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
The fear that attorneys will solicit fees from absentees lacks merit because statutes govern
the award of attorneys' fees in employment discrimination cases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988,
2000e-5(k) (1976). Moreover, if the court allows the suit to proceed as a rule 23(b)(2) class
action, the absentee class member has no right to opt out. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). Finally,
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unrestricted communication with absent class members presents a
real threat to the fairness of judicial administration,4 53 the court
will insist that the order specifically denominate the type of com-
munication which presents the threat.4" Therefore, even though
an order passes scrutiny under the standard announced in Gulf Oil
Co. v. Bernard,'55 a court still may refuse to enter it because of
constitutional infirmities. 58
VII. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL AWARDS
Once the individual claimants have complied with the proof-
of-claim procedures, the court must then determine whether each
individual is entitled to a back pay award. As the group of Fifth
Circuit cases discussed in part IV demonstrates, the presumption
of entitlement to back pay is a strong one, but this presumption,
without more, is not a sufficient basis upon which to grant a back
pay award. The individual claimants must still prove class mem-
bership and economic loss at the outset of Stage II.457 As the Fifth
Circuit indicated in United States v. United States Steel Corp.,458
the presumption serves most importantly as a bridge between the
broad class-wide approach and analysis utilized in Stage I and the
although misleading statements merit no first amendment protection, see Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-75 (1964), the court must find some "direct, immediate, irreparable
harm" before imposing the gag order. Bernard, 619 F.2d at 476.
453. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 476 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 985 (1977); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 103 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
454. An order violates the first amendment if it includes vague language like "may
tend to misrepresent," or if it forbids speech that "does not pose any serious and imminent
threat of interference with fair administration of justice." Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80,
103 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
455. 452 U.S. 89 (1981); see supra text accompanying note 445.
456. Although a first amendment free speech analysis offers the most logical approach
when testing gag orders, freedom of association and due process issues also arise. Bernard v.
Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 478 n.34 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 89
(1981). If the gag order passes the scrutiny of a free speech analysis, it also will pass the less
stringent test applied in freedom of association cases. Important considerations in the due
process inquiry include the protection of the class representative, the absent class member,
and the defendant. For both the class representative and the defendant, a gag order hinders
discovery on the merits of the case and thereby impinges on the right to a fair hearing of the
claim. For the absent class member, the adequacy of the notice determines whether he re-
ceives the minimal guarantees of due process. See supra note 356. A gag order in combina-
tion with adequate notice does not violate due process, but if the notice does not meet
constitutional standards, the due process harm becomes even more egregious. A court, how-
ever, can correct inadequate notice by issuing better notice or by allowing absentee class
members the assistance of class counsel.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 238-40.
458. 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
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individual-by-individual procedures utilized in Stage II. By "filling
the logical hiatus" between the two stages, the presumption en-
ables the court to apply the finding of liability in Stage I to indi-
vidual circumstances in Stage II.4 '9 In so doing, the presumption
sets the tone for Stage II in terms of evidence, burdens of proof,
and ultimate monetary awards. Courts in other circuits have also
recognized the importance of the presumption and the two-stage
trial, and have frequently cited the Fifth Circuit back pay deci-
sions for both their framework and their analysis.460
The first major issue the court must resolve in Stage II is the
proper format for the determination of individual awards. The
court may use one of two methods. The method generally favored
by plaintiffs is a single class-wide procedure, in which the court
considers testimony from the various parties, grants a lump sum
award to the class, and then requires the application of a mechani-
cal or mathematical formula to calculate the awards for each of the
individual claimants.' 1 Under this first approach the individual
claimant would still need to prove that he is entitled to class mem-
bership and the defendant would still be permitted to rebut the
individual's claim with a showing that the claimant is not eligible
for the recovery now being sought because of reasons independent
of the discriminatory conduct proved in Stage 1.462 Plaintiffs prefer
this procedure because it is less costly, less time-consuming, and
more readily presented to the court."3
Defendants, however, strongly oppose this method and prefer
459. See supra text accompanying note 256.
460. See, e.g., Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 638 F.2d 496, 502 (2d Cir.
1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 & n.14, 1240 n.16 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 451-53 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Kyriazi v. Western
Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1145-47 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
461. See Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452-54 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977). For a discussion of the computation of back pay awards on a
class-wide basis, see infra notes 706-50 and accompanying text.
462. Id. at 453.
463. The costs and time involved in a trial replete with attorneys, special masters, and
court reporters will become substantially magnified if each individual plaintiff must present
a claim for an award of back pay. Furthermore, when the defendant is a large corporation it
might benefit from being able to outspend the plaintiff class in a series of individual-by-
individual procedures. The class-wide procedure will not allow either party to take unfair
advantage of its superior financial resources. For a complete discussion of the apparent find-
ing of one court that judicial economy and manageability may dictate the use of the class-
wide approach, see infra notes 492-94 and accompanying text. Contra Kyriazi v. Western
Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
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a series of individual-by-individual procedures.4" Perceiving the
class-wide procedure as a short-cut around the proper resolution of
individual claims, the defendants interpret the back pay provisions
of Title VII as designed to provide an additional form of equitable
relief to employees injured by the discriminatory conduct of their
employers. 46 5 The defendants, however, charge that a class-wide
award permits individual claimants to benefit from the class' abil-
ity to prove economic loss even though not all of the class members
are individually entitled to relief. In support of their position, de-
fendant employers rely on the Supreme Court's statement in Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody46  that "where a legal injury is of an
economic character . . . 'the compensation shall be equal to the
injury.' ,,467 According to the employers, the compensation does not
equal the injury if individual claimants are permitted to recover a
windfall6 8 because of the inexact nature of the class-wide recovery
process. Thus, the defendants assert that individual defenses may
well be available as responses to the claims of individual plaintiffs,
and that if employers are denied the opportunity to disprove each
individual claim, their due process rights will be eroded.6 9
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. 47 0 provides a useful
basis from which to analyze the competing interests at stake in de-
termining the proper method to use in calculating a back pay
award. In Pettway the Fifth Circuit summarized the two proce-
dures as follows:
The method of computation will be a function of the complexity of the
case. If the class is small, or the time period short, or the effect of discrimina-
464. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1055 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.N.J.
1979), afl'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
465. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
466. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
467. Id. at 418 (quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)).
468. See infra note 471.
469. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 267 (5th Cir. 1974)
(Bell, J., concurring); see also United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043,
1056 (5th Cir. 1975), (class-wide alternatives should only be used when alternative methods
are exhausted; Judge Bell's Pettway opinion cited) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Kyriazi
v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.N.J. 1979) (due process considerations may
require that each award be based on the merits of the individual plaintiff's claims; Judge
Bell's Pettway opinion cited), aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally Ralston v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427, 433 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (due process not expressly dis-
cussed; court found that increased manageability at the expense of the presentation of indi-
vidualized evidence was not an acceptable justification for class-wide approach).
470. 494 F.2d 211 (1974).
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tion straightforward, a fairly precise determination of what each claimant's
position would have been, but for the discrimination, is possible. This type of
individual-by-individual determination was utilized in Bing v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., [485 F.2d 441, 452-55 (5th Cir. 1973)]. . . . Since there was only
one type of job involved, the class was small, and the variables, back pay
period and pay rate, readily definable; the court was able to make an individ-
ual-by-individual approach ....
However, when the class size or the ambiguity of promotion or hiring
practices or the multiple effects of discriminatory practices or the illegal
practices continued over an extended period of time calls forth the quagmire
of hypothetical judgment ... a class-wide approach to the measure of back
pay is necessitated.
47 1
Only infrequently will the decision concerning the proper com-
putation method be clear-cut. This part of the Special Project
discusses and analyzes the court decisions that have addressed this
issue. This part considers the arguments for and against each of
the approaches and attempts to resolve the apparent incon-
sistencies.
A. The Class-Wide Approach to Back Pay Awards
A variety of circumstances can arise in which individual-by-
individual claim procedures usually defer to a more simplistic and
efficient class-wide procedure.4 7 2 For example, the Pettway court
confronted a class of plaintiffs that had been subjected not only to
discriminatory testing and hiring, but also to discriminatory se-
niority systems and training programs. 47  Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit recognized the usefulness of individualized claim procedures
in certain circumstances, 47 4 in this particular case the court found
that a determination of which jobs the individual plaintiffs would
have applied for and obtained absent the discriminatory conduct
would be virtually impossible. In reaching this conclusion the court
considered a number of circumstances: the size of the class ex-
ceeded the number of vacant positions; the individual positions
were not in the same pay range; the jobs became vacant over a
period of years rather than at the same time; and, the qualifica-
tions of the class members, both in terms of ability and seniority,
varied substantially." 5 Since the court would need to consider all
471. Id. at 261. The court further commented that "[t]he key is to avoid both granting
a windfall to the class at the employer's expense and the unfair exclusion of claimants by
defining the class or the determinants of the amount too narrowly." Id. at 262 n.152.
472. See id. at 263 n.154.
473. See id. at 218-22.
474. See supra text accompanying note 471.
475. 494 F.2d at 260.
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of these circumstances in determining each of the individual
awards, the Fifth Circuit concluded that individual-by-individual
calculations would create "a quagmire of hypothetical judg-
ments."""8
The Fifth Circuit made clear the principles it used to design
procedures for making back pay awards: "(1) unrealistic exactitude
is not required, [and] (2) uncertainties in determining what an em-
ployee would have earned but for the discrimination, should be re-
solved against the discriminating employer.'147 With these princi-
ples guiding the court through its examination of the facts of the
case, the Fifth Circuit recommended 47 8 a class-wide approach as
having "more basis in reality" than an individual-by-individual ap-
proach. 7 9 In light of the complexities involved in Pettway, the
class-wide procedure serves to prevent the court from falling into
the "quagmire of hypothetical judgments." 80 Although this proce-
dure may be inexact, it is far more practical than an individual-by-
individual approach in cases such as Pettway dealing with complex
facts.
48 1
476. Id.; see also Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1088, 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (reconstruction of past hiring absent discrimination found
impossible; individual calculations of damages seen as hopeless); Thompson v. Boyle, 22
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1500, 1504 (D.D.C. 1980) (impossible to determine which em-
ployees would have been promoted absent discrimination). See generally 61 CORNELL L.
REv., supra note 76, at 476.
477. 494 F.2d at 260-61 (footnotes omitted).
478. Id. at 263. The court specifically stated that it had not limited the district court
to any particular award method on remand. Id. Indeed, despite the court's analysis of the
available class-wide procedures, id. at 262-63, it also discussed the burdens that could be
placed on the individual claimants, id. at 259-60. The Fifth Circuit resolved this apparent
inconsistency when the court once again encountered the Pettway case four years later.
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979). In this later opinion, the Fifth Circuit discussed the class-wide ap-
proaches which had been previously recommended, but did not order the district court to
use a class-wide approach. Rather, the court of appeals stated that the district court could
choose an individual approach. Id. at 1213 n.67.
479. 494 F.2d at 263.
480. Id. at 260; see also Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 76 F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Women's Committee court was
asked by the plaintiffs to approve a proposed settlement to an employment discrimination
suit. Confronted with a large class and incomplete personnel records, the court ruled that
the determination of individual damages would be a "speculative" process and the class-
wide approach would be more appropriate. Id. at 178.,
481. Because of the complex nature of the case, the Pettway court believed any
method would require "conjecture." 494 F.2d at 261. Thus, in a complicated case also bur-
dened with a large class, see Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1166 &
n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979), the class-wide approach appears to be




Stewart v. General Motors Corp.45 2 presented the Seventh
Circuit with allegations of discrimination in the defendant's pro-
motion practices. The district court granted the plaintiff class in-
junctive relief but did not award back pay.483 Unable to find spe-
cial circumstances that would support the failure to grant back
pay, the Seventh Circuit found the class entitled to such an
award.484 The court then outlined the mechanics of the award pro-
cedure. The court supplemented Pettway's basic principles4 85 by
stating that the district court would have wide-discretion to resolve
ambiguities no matter which method it used.486 According to the
court, however, the individual-by-individual approach represented
the superior procedure for dealing with a group of plaintiffs whose
seniority could be used satisfactorily as a benchmark for their
award 487 because this method would not reward the plaintiffs with
a windfall but rather would fully compensate them for their
losses.
48
The court, however, rejected the individualized approach for
dealing with those plaintiffs seeking promotions to salaried jobs
because the defendant had not set objective standards for deter-
mining which employees deserved promotion to this job class.
4"'
The court reasoned that to apply the individualized approach
without access to objective standards would lead to unnecessary
speculation and, consequently, great inaccuracy.490 Even though
the class-wide procedure would result in a windfall for some em-
ployees and would, therefore, penalize the employer by not al-
lowing it to rebut individual claims of entitlement, the court con-
sidered it the better of the two methods. Although the Seventh
Circuit did not consider class-wide relief to be a perfect alterna-
482. 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977).
483. Id. at 451.
484. Id. at 452.
485. See supra text accompanying note 477.
486. 542 F.2d at 452.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 452-53.
490. Id.; see also Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 520 (8th Cir. 1980) (computations of individualized
awards would be complex and uncertain); Love v. Pullman Co., 569 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th
Cir. 1978) (circumstances rendered it impossible to reconstruct past with accuracy); Bowe v.
Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 901, 902 (7th Cir. 1973) (district court given great
discretion in selection of proper form for remedy procedure; individual determinations
would be speculative). The Stewart court referred to the possibility of a "quagmire of hypo-
thetical judgments" if the individualized approach were employed. 542 F.2d at 452-53 (quot-
ing Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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tive, the court preferred an imperfect award to the denial of recov-
ery.49 1 Thus, the Stewart court carved out a second instance in
which a class-wide approach to back pay is more appropriate than
an individualized approach-those situations in which no objective
standards monitored the questioned employment practices.
The Fifth Circuit apparently has also recognized another in-
stance in which the class-wide approach is superior to the individ-
ualized method. The court again confronted Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway IV) 49 2 in 1978. In remanding the case
to the district court, the Fifth Circuit stated that the district court
may consider a class-wide award in order to avoid the "quagmire"
associated with the individualized process that it had discussed in
the earlier Pettway decision (Pettway 1I).493 The circuit court,
however, reminded the district court that although "the physical
and fiscal limitations of the court in granting and supervising relief
make the task a difficult one, they must not be allowed to preclude
an award of back pay to each and every aggrieved employee."'' 4  By
making this statement, the court clearly recognized that the true
goal of the back pay remedy is to grant relief to the injured parties.
The court also implicitly recognized that the class-wide approach
presents a more efficient and economical method which may be
utilized provided that each individual employee is given the oppor-
tunity to receive back pay. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, asserted
that the cost of the proceedings and the size of the class are factors
which may make the class-wide approach a more manageable and
appropriate procedure than the individual-by-individual method.
491. 542 F.2d at 452-53; see also Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 706 (8th
Cir. 1980) (class-wide back pay with individuals required to prove entitlement; district court
required to follow Stewart); Wells v. Meyers Bakery, 561 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1977)
(district court given great flexibility in designing award procedure consistent with Stewart).
492. 576 F.2d 1157 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). The Pettway case has
proved a long and arduous undertaking for the judicial system. By the time of the 1978
decision, the case had come before the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama on four different occasions. This decision was also the fourth Pettway opinion
written by the Fifth Circuit. The most notable Pettway decisions are Pettway III, 494 F.2d
211 (5th Cir. 1974), and Pettway IV, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978). Since Pettway IV, the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979), the case has been remanded to
the district court, which has in turn referred it to a special master, No. 66-315 (N.D. Ala.
July 20, 1981) (Order of Reference), and a petition for writ of mandamus and certiorari has
been filed with the Fifth Circuit, No. 81-7647 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 1981). This case has since
been transferred to the newly created Eleventh Circuit. For a detailed discussion of the
history of Pettway at the time of the Fifth Circuit's 1978 decision, see Pettway IV, 576 F.2d
1157, 1165-67 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
493. See supra text accompanying note 477.
494. 576 F.2d at 1213.
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If the interests of the individual plaintiffs are adequately pro-
tected, the court may appropriately implement the class-wide
method when confronted with a large class or unmanageable award
criteria.
Three situations, therefore, can arise in which courts will
award back pay through a class-wide procedure rather than on an
individualized basis: first, when the complexities of the case would
force the court into a "quagmire of hypothetical judgments"; sec-
ond, when the lack of objective data would cause the court to rely
extensively on speculation; and, last, when judicial economy and
manageability dictate the use of the simpler class-wide ap-
proach.49 5 Although other occasions may arise in which the courts
would utilize class-wide relief, the majority of cases using this ap-
proach will include one of the situations discussed above. The fol-
lowing section of the Special Project discusses back pay cases
utilizing the individualized approach.
B. The Individual-by-Individual Approach to Back Pay
Awards
The United States Supreme Court indicated its preference for
individual determinations of Title VII awards in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,49' a pattern or prac-
tice action497 brought against the union and a trucking company
for discriminatory hiring practices. The Court vacated the court of
appeals decision and made various recommendations for the dis-
trict court to consider on remand. Although the case only con-
cerned seniority relief from a discriminatory hiring system, several
of the Court's statements indicate that it would probably support
an individualized approach to back pay awards. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, commented that the burden of proof re-
quired of the Government in the Stage II proceedings must be met
495. The District Court for the District of New Jersey has stated that due process
requires each individual award be based on the merits of the individual's claim. This court,
therefore, would reject the "quagmire of hypothetical judgments" and judicial economy as
reasons justifying the use of a class-wide procedure; the court might allow a class-wide pro-
cedure under the lack of objective standards argument. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F.
Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally infra notes
752-58 and accompanying text.
496. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
497. The Attorney General has the power under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976) to bring
a civil action against those "engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoy-




"with respect to each specific individual. '498 Justice Stewart ex-
plained that the district court's deliberations would require it "to
make a substantial number of individual determinations"499 in de-
ciding which of the claimants had been injured by the discrimina-
tory practices of the defendant. This language clearly expresses the
Supreme Court's preference for the individual approach in this
particular case. The Court, however, did not make clear whether it
intended its statements to be applied to all Stage II proceedings.
In addition to the Supreme Court's language in Teamsters,
the judiciary has advanced several reasons in support of the indi-
vidualized back pay procedure. The first of these reasons focuses
on the compensatory nature of the back pay award. 00 Because the
Title VII back pay remedy is intended to make the injured party
whole, the remedy comes in the form of affirmative relief granted
to the plaintiff rather than punitive damages assessed against the
defendant.50 1 Since the plaintiffs receive compensatory damages,
the individual claimants must show their entitlement to damages
and must show that without the defendant's wrongful conduct
they would not have been economically injured.502 Without the re-
quirement that each individual show entitlement, the defendant
could be victimized by undeserving plaintiffs who would earn a
windfall through the use of the class-wide method.503
Second, in developing the bifurcated trial,50' the Fifth Circuit
has endorsed the individualized approach as the Stage II method
that best complements the Stage I liability proceedings. In John-
son v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.505 the Fifth Circuit stated that
a finding of liability in Stage I did not mean that back pay would
be awarded to all class members. Rather, the court found separate
hearings "on an individual basis" necessary to determine not only
which plaintiffs were eligible for back pay awards, but also the size
498. 431 U.S. at 371.
499. Id.
500. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-20 (1975).
501. See Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 232 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921
(5th Cir. 1971).
502. See generally supra notes 464-69 and accompanying text.
503. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 262 n.152 (5th Cir.
1974); see also United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1055 (5th Cir.
1975) (recovery should be distributed to those most likely to be entitled to it), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 817 (1979).
504. See supra notes 207 & 216-58 and accompanying text.
505. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
1982] 969
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:893
of the individual awards.50 1 In Pettway IIP0 7 the Fifth Circuit ap-
peared to support a class-wide approach.508 The court, however,
also outlined the framework for using the individual-by-individual
method in Stage 11509 and held that the presumption in favor of a
back pay award in Stage II does not entitle an individual claimant
to recover without proof of loss.5 10 In United States v. United
States Steel Corp.51 the court held that Stage II should include a
hypothetical reconstruction of each claimant's work history in or-
der to protect the defendant and to ensure that the back pay is
properly distributed to those who are most entitled to it.512
Just as other courts have followed the Fifth Circuit on the is-
sue of the presumption of entitlement to back pay and the bifur-
cated trial procedure, 5 3 many courts also have fallen in step be-
hind the Fifth Circuit and have favored the individualized
approach.514 Like the Fifth Circuit, those courts that have adopted
the bifurcated procedure have found the individualized approach a
better complement to the Stage I proceedings than the class-wide
506. Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).
507. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
508. See supra notes 472-81 and accompanying text.
509. 494 F.2d at 261.
510. Id. at 259. The Fifth Circuit reiterated this conclusion in Baxter v. Savannah
Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). The Baxter
court held that if the class can prove discrimination in Stage I, the court should "resolve
whether a particular employee is in fact a member of the covered class, has suffered
financial loss, and thus [is] entitled to back pay or other appropriate relief." Id. at 444. Each
individual employee would be required to show that he was both qualified and available for
promotion. Id. at 444-45; see Pettway, 494 F.2d at 259-60 (setting maximum burden that
could be placed on individual claimants).
511. 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
512. Id. at 1055. The United States Steel court emphasized its preference for the indi-
vidual-by-individual procedure by stating that all forms of this procedure should be utilized
before resorting to the less certain class-wide approaches. Id. at 1056.
513. See cases cited supra note 460.
514. See, e.g., Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 1978) (individ-
ual plaintiffs must show class membership and economic injury in order to be entitled to
back pay award), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542
F.2d 445, 453 (7th Cir. 1976) (permitting defendant to rebut the claims of individual plain-
tiffs prior to beginning of class-wide award procedure; plaintiffs should introduce history of
employment, effects of discriminatory conduct, and qualifications for jobs; defendant per-
mitted to respond to claims of individual plaintiffs), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977);
United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975)
(individual plaintiffs must show class membership and job status during period of discrimi-
natory conduct in order to be entitled to back pay award), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976);
English v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1975)
(Stage II requires claimants to show class membership and economic losses caused by defen-
dant's discriminatory conduct). See generally Western Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196,
1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (individual proof presented at class stage (Stage I) of trial).
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approach.5 15
A final argument in favor of the individualized approach as
opposed to the class-wide method concerns the due process rights
of all parties to the litigation. In a concurring opinion in Pettway
IIPle Judge Bell expressed the view that "[d]amage awards must
be individualized to avoid constitutional problems which would
arise in taking the property of one for another without a showing
of loss to the particular recipient."51 Due process seems to require
that the individual seeking a back pay award must present individ-
ual proof of personal damages. The defendant should then be per-
mitted to offer defenses necessary to rebut each individual's claim
of loss. Individual-by-individual proceedings appropriately allow
for the presentation of such defenses, an opportunity not inherent
in the class-wide approach. Most courts, however, have not often
reached the due process issue, and those that have touched on the
subject generally make reference to Judge Bell's concurring opin-
ion in Pettway.1 8
Thus, the arguments in favor of the individualized approach
to the award of back pay fall into three categories: the compensa-
tory nature of the award requires that it equal the amount of the
damages suffered and, therefore, the class-wide approach is not ap-
propriate; the individual method is the better method to be used in
the bifurcated trial because it provides an entire stage of the trial
for the determination of the back pay award; and due process dic-
tates that the individual plaintiffs state their claims and the defen-
dant be permitted to rebut each of the claims. Following these ar-
guments, the judiciary tends to employ the individualized method,
if it is feasible under the circumstances.
When proceedings shift from Stage I into Stage II, the court
faces a choice of two very different approaches for determining
back pay awards. The individualized approach is more precise than
the class-wide approach and thereby satisfies the compensatory
515. See generally cases cited supra note 514.
516. 494 F.2d 211, 267 (5th Cir. 1974) (Bell, J., concurring).
517. Id. (Bell, J., concurring).
518. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1057 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141,
1146 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally City of Philadelphia v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 73 (D.N.J. 1971) (due process requires individual claims
backed by evidence); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) (class-
wide method is "an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law"),
vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
519. See supra notes 496-518 and accompanying text.
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damages argument, 520 provided sufficient data is available.5 21 The
individualized approach also allays the due process concerns over
the rights of the parties. 22 The individualized approach is defi-
cient, and the class-wide approach noticeably more appropriate,
however, when dealing with cases lacking objective criteria with
which to calculate the back pay award, having very complex
facts,523 or involving unmanageably large classes. 24
Although the courts lack objective standards to apply in
choosing the proper approach, this deficiency is not a problem if
the two methods are seen as complementary rather than antagonis-
tic. The Supreme Court's statements in Albemarle 52  and Team-
sters526 indicate that an analysis of the individualized process at
the beginning of Stage II will not be improper. If the analysis
shows the approach to be reasonably precise, efficient, and eco-
nomical, this method should be chosen. If, however, the individual-
ized approach is so speculative that it will lead to the "quagmire of
hypothetical judgments" or if it is not judicially manageable, the
court should turn to the class-wide approach.2  By following this
simple analysis, the court will guard the rights of all parties, ensure
the best possible remedy, and protect the judicial interests with a
manageable procedure.
VIII. BURDENS OF PROOF IN THE DETERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL
AWARDS
Intertwined with the bifurcated trial, the presumptive entitle-
ment to back pay, and the method for awarding back pay is a pro-
cedural issue-burdens of proof. The burdens of proof affect the
factfinding during the trial as well as the verdict reached at the
520. See supra text accompanying notes 500-03.
521. See supra notes 490-91 and accompanying text.
522. See supra text accompanying notes 516-18.
523. See supra notes 473-81 and accompanying text.
524. See supra notes 492-94 and accompanying text.
525. "The injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would
have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975) (quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)).
526. "Initially, the court will have to make a substantial number of individual deter-
minations in deciding which of the minority employees were actual victims of the company's
discriminatory practices." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
371-72 (1977).
527. Contra Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.N.J. 1979), aft'd,
647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981). The Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey
seemed to indicate in Kyriazi that these reasons would not justify the use of a class-wide
procedure. See generally infra notes 752-58 and accompanying text.
972 [Vol. 35:893
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
close of the proceedings.5 28 The burdens of proof, therefore, play
an important role in every employment discrimination trial: they
influence the proceedings from the class' attempt to present a
prima facie case of discrimination at the beginning of Stage I until
the award of back pay at the conclusion of Stage II.
This part of the Special Project discusses the proper order and
allocation of burdens of proof in employment discrimination cases.
The first section examines the burdens of proof in Stage I of the
bifurcated trial.52 9 This issue has been heavily litigated and pro-
vides a good framework within which to analyze Stage II of the
trial. The second section defines the burdens placed on the parties
in Stage II and discusses the order and allocation of these bur-
dens.53 0 The second section looks specifically at the individual
members of the plaintiff class and discusses what must be shown
by each class member to establish a prima facie case of entitlement
to back pay.
531
A. Stage I: Order and Allocation of Burdens of Proof
Despite the usefulness of Title VII as a tool for the elimina-
tion of discrimination, Congress did not clearly define what is nec-
essary to prove a case of discrimination. 2 As a result, the judici-
ary has been called upon to interpret Title VII and has
pronounced two separate substantive approaches to discrimination.
The Supreme Court announced the first approach, the disparate
impact theory, in the landmark decision of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.533 This approach makes the assumption that Congress sought
to eliminate the effects of discrimination regardless of the intent of
the party engaging in the discriminatory practices.5 34 The Griggs
Court read Title VII as directed at the "consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation."535 Read in this man-
ner, Title VII prohibits any practice that has an adverse impact on
any member of a protected minority group. If the defendant's con-
duct "operates as the functional equivalent of intentional discrimi-
528. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1207.
529. See infra notes 532-67 and accompanying text.
530. See infra notes 568-664 and accompanying text.
531. See infra notes 638-64 and accompanying text.
532. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
533. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
534. Id. at 432. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for mi-
nority groups. . . ." Id.
535. Id. (emphasis in original).
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nation"53 it will be held unlawful under Title VII.53 7 Thus, the dis-
parate impact theory does not require the plaintiff to show any
intent on the part of the defendant to discriminate.538
In 1973 the Supreme Court described an alternative ap-
proach-the disparate treatment theory-in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green s.5 9 The disparate treatment theory differs dramati-
cally from the Griggs formula because it requires proof of a specific
intent to discriminate. In order to prove a prima facie case of dis-
crimination under this theory the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant's conduct was "more likely than not" based in discrimina-
tion." ° The plaintiff may meet the prima facie case by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications."
Although McDonnell Douglas presented a new theory of discrimi-
nation, the Supreme Court did not eliminate the right to bring a
Title VII action alleging disparate impact. Rather, the Court dis-
tinguished Griggs from the instant case but did not overrule it."
2
Griggs and the disparate impact cases provide that the defendant
may rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination by showing that
the challenged conduct was job related or was justified by some
business necessity." 3 McDonnell Douglas and the disparate treat-
ment cases require the defendant to "articulate some legitimate,
536. Belton, supra note 34, at 1227; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977) ("employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another"); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
537. The defendant will have the opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case
of discrimination by showing that the employment practice is required by a business neces-
sity or is job related. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see also Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (job related); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (business purpose), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
538. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 942 (10th Cir. 1979).
539. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
540. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978); see International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). "The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be in-
ferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id.
541. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802 (1973).
542. Id. at 806.
543. See supra note 537; Belton, supra note 34, at 1232.
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nondiscriminatory reason" for its conduct. 544 The reasons for these
different defenses are not clear, especially since they originate from
the same statute.545
1. Disparate Impact Cases
The disparate impact cases are ambiguous about the number
of steps in the burden of proof process. The prima facie case, as
outlined in Griggs, does not place a heavy burden on the plaintiff
class. Because this theory does not require proof of intent, the
plaintiff class need only prove a statistically significant difference
in the effects of the process on whites and on minorities.5 ' The
burden then shifts to the defendant who must show that the em-
ployment practice either is job related or is required because of a
business necessity.5 47 The Griggs Court set out only this two-step
approach to the burden of proof. In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,548 however, the Court added a third step to the procedure.
Albemarle stated that if the defendant can meet its job related/
business necessity burden, the class will be permitted to show the
availability to the defendant of the other less discriminatory means
to achieve the same end. 49 Currently, the Supreme Court's intent
in the disparate impact cases is unclear. Griggs stands for the pro-
position that the defendant must prove business necessity by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to meet its burden. 50 After
544. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
545. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1232-33 & nn. 114-15.
546. In Griggs, for example, the plaintiffs were able to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that the Duke Power Company's diploma and testing require-
ments eliminated more minorities than whites. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 & n.6; Blum-
rosen, supra note 536, at 80; see also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015
(2d Cir. 1980) (prima facie case may be established by "showing that an employer's facially
neutral practice has a disparate impact on the plaintiff's racial group").
547. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job per-
formance, the practice is prohibited." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; see Grant v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980).
548. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
549. Id. at 425; see Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir.
1980). This third step resembles the pretext stage of disparate treatment cases. See infra
text accompanying note 555. The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, the leading dispa-
rate treatment case, appeared to indicate that it was not intending its approach to apply to
disparate impact cases, 411 U.S. at 802 n.14; yet the Court followed the McDonnell Douglas
approach in Albemarle. 422 U.S. at 425; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252 & n.5 (1981).
550. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see Belton, supra note 34, at 1243 & n.167.
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Albemarle, however, the burdens of proof apparently include the
third, or "pretext," stage.5 51 The courts have not yet reached a con-
sensus on the nature of the burden of proof placed on the plaintiff
to show the existence of a less discriminatory alternative.
5 52
2. Disparate Treatment Cases
After a period of uncertainty and development, the order and
allocation of the burdens of proof in disparate treatment cases
have become fixed. In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court an-
nounced four elements the plaintiff must prove to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. 5 3 After the plaintiff establishes
his case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions.5 If the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff is then provided the op-
portunity to prove that the defendant's legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason is merely a pretext for discriminatory activity.555
The uncertainty arising out of the McDonnell Douglas opinion
concerns the meaning of the term "articulate" as it is used in
describing the defendant's burden. Whether the use of the term
"articulate" by the Court merely shifts a burden of production to
the defendant or whether the burden of persuasion shifts as well is
unclear. 5  The Supreme Court sought to clarify this issue in
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,557 but the Court's opinion
only confused matters further. In Furnco the Court stated that the
burden which shifts to the defendant "is merely that of proving
that he based his employment decision on a legitimate considera-
551. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; see infra text accompanying note 555.
552. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1244-46.
553. See supra text accompanying note 541.
554. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
555. Id. at 804.
556. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1237. Professor Belton defines the burden of per-
suasion as containing "the dual elements of location and weight: the location specifies the
party who will lose if the burden is not met, and the weight specifies how persuasive the
evidence must be to sustain this burden." Id. at 1207. The burden of production sets "the
timing of the presentation of the evidence and . . . 'like ... the burden of persuasion, it
provides that when the evidence is inadequate, the party with the burden loses."' Id. at
1207-08 (quoting Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 n.3 (1977)). As Professor Belton discusses, the
question remaining after McDonnell Douglas is whether the defendant need only produce
evidence on the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct or whether it must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it truly was motivated by a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason. Id. at 1237.
557. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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tion." 558 In the same paragraph, however, the Court concluded that
the defendant "need only 'articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the employee's rejection.' "9 By using both
"prove" and "articulate" in the same context the Court may have
intended these terms to be synonymous, but the failure of the
Court to define the terms makes its intentions unclear.
Not long after Furnco, in Board of Trustees v. Sweeney,'" the
Court again sought to clarify the extent of the defendant's burden
when it held that a difference does exist between "articulation"
and "proof." The Court, in a per curiam opinion, returned to its
McDonnell Douglas analysis and stated that "articulating" a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejection "will suffice to meet
the employee's prima facie case. 56 1 By simply relying on the un-
clear term "articulate" as it was used in McDonnell Douglas, how-
ever, the Supreme Court failed to provide litigants and lower
courts with a definition for the ambiguous term. 62
The Supreme Court finally resolved the confusion in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 3 The Court first
clarified the burdens placed on the plaintiff: when proving a prima
facie case and when proving pretext, the plaintiff must meet its
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 5" The Court
also discussed in detail the nature of the burden placed on the de-
fendant. The plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination creates a
presumption that the employer engaged in discriminatory employ-
ment practices. The burden of rebutting this presumption shifts to
the defendant who can meet the burden by articulating a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection.5 6 5 The defendant
confronts a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion.
Thus, the employer must raise a question about whether it dis-
criminated against the plaintiff, but the employer need not per-
suade the court that the legitimate reasons presented actually mo-
558. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
559. Id. at 578 (emphasis added) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
560. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
561. Id. at 25.
562. See supra note 556 and accompanying text.
563. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
564. Id. at 252-53. The requirement that the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence is an expansion of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
doctrine. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1240. For a thorough discussion of Burdine, see id. at
1240-43.
565. 450 U.S. at 254.
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tivated his actions.586 All that the employer must produce is
"admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally
to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated
by discriminatory animus. "567 The plaintiff, of course, retains the
opportunity to demonstrate pretext.
B. Stage II: Order and Allocation of Burdens of Proof
1. Plaintiff's Burden
Having found liability in Stage I of the bifurcated trial and
having found back pay to be an appropriate remedy, 65 the court
must then make determinations of the back pay awards for indi-
vidual plaintiffs. 69 Emphasis must be placed on the bifurcated na-
ture of the trial. The questions of fact and of law that were re-
solved in Stage I need not be reconsidered in Stage II. For
example, defendant-employers will be unable to claim in Stage H
that individual employment decisions were not discriminatory be-
cause Stage I will have already established the employer's liability
to the class. In Stage II, determinations of individual relief replace
those of the defendant's liability.
570
At the outset of Stage H the burden of proof rests with the
individual plaintiffs. Although the finding of liability in Stage I has
led to a presumption of entitlement to back pay,571 courts have tra-
ditionally placed some burden of proving entitlement on the class
members. 572 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the
plaintiff's burden of proof in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co. (Pettway II). 573 The court ruled that the presumption was
"tempered by an initial burden on the individual employee to
566. Id. at 254-55.
567. Id. at 257.
568. Part IV of the Special Project discusses the presumption of class-wide entitle-
ment to back pay and part V examines possible rebuttals to this presumption.
569. This section of the Special Project applies to cases in which the court utilizes
either a class-wide method to award back pay, supra notes 472-95 and accompanying text,
or an individualized approach, supra notes 496-519 and accompanying text. Under either
approach individual plaintiffs will need to prove membership in the class and economic loss.
The individualized approach will then calculate individual awards for each class member,
while the class-wide approach will calculate a single award for the class and design a
formula for allocating the award to individual class members. The burdens of proof, how-
ever, are the same under each method.
570. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62
(1977).
571. See supra notes 211-58 and accompanying text.
572. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
573. 494 F.2d 211, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1974).
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bring himself within the class and to describe the harmful effect of
the discrimination on his individual employment position.1 7' 4 In
addition, the court held that the presumption did not "per se enti-
tle" individual class members to back pay without some individual
proof.575 According to the court, the burden of proof placed on the
individual class members was not designed to be as onerous as the
burden placed upon them in the liability stage; rather, the court
reasoned that the defendant ought to bear the heavy burden of
rebutting the presumption of the plaintiff's entitlement to back
pay. 57 Thus, the court limited the burden that could be placed on
an individual class member to the following:
[A] statement of his current position and pay rate, the jobs he was denied
because of discrimination and their pay rates, a record of his employment
history with the company and other evidence that qualified or would have
qualified him for the denied positions, and an estimation of the amount of
requested back pay.6
77
Consistent with the placement of this light burden on the individ-
ual plaintiff, the court stated that all uncertainties arising out of
back pay award calculations would be resolved in the plaintiff's
favor.
57 8
Many courts have followed the Pettway approach and have
placed a lightened burden on the individual plaintiffs in Stage
HI. T Two Supreme Court cases, however, appear to indicate that
574. Id. at 259.
575. Id. (citing United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921-22 (5th Cir.
1973)); see supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
576. 494 F.2d at 259. Although the Fifth Circuit did not elaborate on this issue, plac-
ing the heavy burden of proof on the employer reflects the court's recognition that a finding
of liability has already been made and that a presumption in favor of back pay operates for
the benefit of the individual claimants.
577. Id. at 259-60.
578. See supra text accompanying note 477.
579. See, e.g., Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 854 (5th Cir.) (Pettway
approach), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff must establish membership in class,
income during years of discrimination, and nature of job held), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976); Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff must establish member-
ship in class and "deleterious economic consequences" of discrimination); Baxter v. Savan-
nah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 445 (5th Cir.) (plaintiff must show availability for pro-
motion and possession of general qualifications for job), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974);
Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.N.J. 1979) (plaintiff must show
membership in class), aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981); Stevenson v. International Paper
Co., 432 F. Supp. 390, 413 (W.D. La. 1977) (plaintiff must show membership in class and
"deleterious economic consequences" of discrimination); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe &
Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 770 (W.D. Va. 1976) (plaintiff must show economic loss),
vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977).
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even the lightened burden in Pettway may be still too burdensome
on the plaintiffs. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,580 a class
action brought under Title VII alleging discriminatory hiring and
discharging of truck drivers,"8 1 reached the Supreme Court not on
the issue of back pay but on the issue of whether seniority status
should be awarded to alleged victims of discrimination. 582 Neither
the district court nor the court of appeals had granted seniority
relief.583 The Franks Court held that seniority relief was within the
scope of Title VII's remedial provisions 58 and then discussed the
awards to be granted to the individual claimants. The Court
treated seniority in a manner similar to back pay: a finding of lia-
bility raised a presumption of entitlement to remedial relief and
individual evidence was not required until the individual claimants
sought to recover s. 5 5 The Court, however, deviated from the light-
ened burden of proof placed on the plaintiffs in Pettway by stating
that "the burden will be upon the [defendants] to prove that indi-
viduals who [seek relief] were not in fact victims of previous hiring
discrimination." 518 Thus, in this situation, which closely resembles
back pay cases, the Supreme Court, rather than placing any sub-
stantial burden on the plaintiffs in Stage II, placed the burden on
the defendant to show that the individual plaintiff had not been a
victim of discrimination.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,58 7 a
"pattern or practice"5 88 suit brought by the Government alleging
discrimination in hiring and assigning truck drivers, again
presented the Supreme Court with the question of seniority relief.
Finding such relief appropriate, the Court stated that in the reme-
dial stage of the proceedings the Government only needed to show
class membership of the individual claimants by establishing that
each claimant had applied unsuccessfully for another position and
was, therefore, a "potential victim of the proved discrimination."5 8'
580. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
581. Id. at 750-51.
582. See id. at 762-70; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
583. 424 U.S. at 751-52.
584. See generally id. at 762-70; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
585. 424 U.S. at 772.
586. Id.
587. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
588. See supra note 497. The Court's description of the "pattern or practice" trial
was substantially similar to that of the traditional bifurcated class action proceedings. 431
U.S. at 360-62.
589. 431 U.S. at 362.
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Thus, as in Franks, the Supreme Court in Teamsters appears to
have put a lesser burden on the plaintiffs than the Fifth Circuit
did in Pettway.
In light of the Supreme Court's analysis of plaintiffs' Stage II
burden of proof in Franks and Teamsters, Pettway's burden of
proof approach appears to be invalid. The resulting burden of
proof requires only that each plaintiff demonstrate class member-
ship, a standard part of all proof-of-claim procedures,590 and a
truly minimal burden. Pettway's requirement that the individual
plaintiff describe the effects of discrimination,59 1 although not spe-
cifically overruled, does not appear able to withstand the lesser





The holdings of the Supreme Court in Franks and Teamsters
make clear that the ultimate burden in Stage II falls on the defen-
dant. Because the plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to back pay
and have proved their membership in the class, the defendant's
burden is to show good cause for what appears to have been dis-
criminatory conduct. As in the cases dealing with the plaintiff's
burden," the nature of the burden placed on the defendant has
varied from case to case.59 The Supreme Court in Franks59 5 held
that once the class has shown the existence of a discriminatory
590. See supra text accompanying note 367.
591. See supra text accompanying note 574.
592. See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 & n.4 (D.N.J. 1979),
aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981). The Kyriazi court stated that "individual employees
should not be put to the almost impossible task of delving into the corporate consciousness
to demonstrate how an already proven policy of discrimination exactly impacted each one of
them." Id. Kyriazi also cited as "noteworthy" the fact that Pettway, with its greater burden
on the individual plaintiffs, was decided before Franks and Teamsters. Id. at 1144 n.4. This
opinion seems to indicate a belief that Pettway is no longer good law and should not be
followed by other courts.
593. See cases cited supra note 579.
594. See, e.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 453 (7th Cir. 1976) (de-
fendant must show factors unrelated to discrimination), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977);
United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975)
(defendant has opportunity to present proof that individual plaintiff was not qualified or
had voluntarily foregone opportunity for advancement, or that there were no vacancies),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 259
(5th Cir. 1974) (defendant must show factors unrelated to discrimination).
595. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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practice, the burden falls on the defendant to prove that the plain-
tiffs were not victims of the discrimination. 9 6 The Court stressed
that only when the defendant meets this burden can he avoid lia-
bility to individual class members.5 97 In Teamsters5 8 the Supreme
Court applied the Franks burden of proof approach and ruled that
the defendant must prove that the individual applicant was denied
the employment opportunity for nondiscriminatory reasons.599
Cases touching on the issue of the ultimate burden reveal that
the courts are doing little more than applying the same approach
used in Stage I of the disparate treatment cases: 00 once an individ-
ual plaintiff proves a prima facie case of entitlement to back pay,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for his action.60 1 To meet this burden, the
courts have required the defendant to challenge the plaintiff's enti-
tlement to back pay by showing that it had no vacancies, that the
plaintiff was not qualified for existing vacancies, or that the plain-
tiff was not interested in the vacancies.602 In Stage II, however, the
courts apparently have deviated from the Stage I disparate treat-
ment approach in terms of the degree of persuasion required of the
defendant. The next subsection of the Special Project treats this
issue.
(b) Degree of Persuasion
Although no absolute rule governs the weight of the defen-
dant's burden in Stage II, the burden is clearly more substantial
than the defendant's burden in Stage I. While the burden of per-
suasion remains with the plaintiff class in Stage 1,603 the Supreme
Court cases dealing with this issue do not indicate that the burden
of persuasion is to remain with the plaintiffs in Stage l.6 4 Even
596. Id. at 772; see supra text accompanying note 586.
597. 424 U.S. at 773. One way for the defendant to meet this burden of proof is by
showing that no vacancies existed or that the individual was not qualified for the available
positions, the defendant needs to utilize those standards "actually applied" to successful
applicants. Id. at 773 n.32.
598. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
599. Id. at 362.
600. See supra notes 553-67 and accompanying text.
601. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
602. See supra note 597 and accompanying text.
603. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). See
generally 9 J. WIOMORE, EVmENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the burden of persuasion never
shifts). The Burdine case, the latest Supreme Court pronouncement in this area, provides a
very useful discussion of Stage I burdens of proof.
604. In 1976, the Court stated in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976),
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though no authority specifically states that the burden of persua-
sion is the burden which has shifted to the defendant, many courts
have used the terms "clear and convincing evidence" or "prepon-
derance of the evidence" to refer to this burden, and courts usually
reserve these terms for the burden of persuasion.60,5
Courts have invoked the "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard to refer to the heavy burden placed on the defendant to show
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. In Baxter v. Savannah
Sugar Refining Corp.6O the Fifth Circuit stated that proof offered
by the defendant that a particular plaintiff was unqualified for a
job or that there were "other good and sufficient reasons such em-
that in the class-wide stage the plaintiffs had carried the burden of proving discriminatory
conduct and, "therefore, the burden will be upon respondents to prove that individuals who
reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination." Id. at 772. The Court
ruled that defendants could attempt to prove that individual claimants were not entitled to
relief, but found no reason "why the victim rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act
should bear the burden of proof on this issue." Id. at 773 n.32.
During the following year, the Court decided International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters, a pattern or practice suit, the Court discussed the
burdens of proof during the relief stage of the trial. The defendant argued that since the
Government had not presented evidence with regard to each individual claimant during the
liability stage (Stage I), the Government should be required to carry this burden in the
remedial stage (Stage H). Id. at 361. The Court rejected this argument and stated that the
Government's proof in the liability stage "does not dissipate" but rather "supports an infer-
ence that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discrimina-
tory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Id. at 361-62. If the Govern-
ment can show that a claimant was a potential victim of the proven discrimination, "the
burden then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied
an employment opportunity for lawful reasons." Id. at 362.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), clearly stated that
the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Id. at 253. Burdine, however, dealt
solely with Stage I and, therefore, can be distinguished from the majority of other cases that
place a substantial burden on the defendant in Stage II. See, e.g., EEOC v. Korn Indus.,
Inc., 662 F.2d 256, 260-62 (4th Cir. 1981); Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d
1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1980); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
605. See Belton, supra note 34, at 1216.
The following cases have used the term "clear and convincing evidence": Lee v. Wash-
ington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976);
Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1975); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495
F.2d 437, 444-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 840 (5th Cir.
1972).
Cases using the "preponderance of the evidence" standard include Sledge v. J.P. Ste-
vens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); United
Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F. Supp. 743, 770
(W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977).
606. 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
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ployee would never have been promoted" 0 7 would have to meet
this "clear and convincing" standard. Lee v. Washington County
Board of Educatione0 8 phrased the burden in a more general way,
stating that the employer must "show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the individual member of the class seeking relief would
not have been hired absent the discrimination." 609
Other courts have used the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard to place the burden on the employer in Stage II. The
Fourth Circuit, when discussing the defendant's burden in United
Transportation Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & Western Railway,10
stated that the employer should be given the opportunity to pre-
sent proof that any individual claimant is not eligible for the
award of back pay,"' but that this defense must be established by
a preponderance of the evidence. 1 2 In Sledge v. J.P. Stevens &
Co.613 the Fourth Circuit held that if the individual claimants can
show class membership during the remedial stage of the trial, the
burden then shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, "that factors other than the condemned discrimina-
tion caused the decision of which the back pay claimant com-
plains.'"81
Professor Belton has stated that courts have applied both the
clear and convincing evidence standard and the preponderance of
the evidence standard to determine whether, in a particular situa-
tion, the burden of persuasion has been met.6 5 Although the Su-
preme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine 16 concluded that the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff, the Court specifically limited its discussion to the liability
portion of the proceedings.1 7 Therefore, without being inconsistent
607. Id. at 445.
608. 625 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980).
609. Id. at 1239; see Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1980); Day v. Ma-
thews, 530 F.2d 1083, (D.C. Cir. 1976).
610. 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
611. Id. at 341. According to the court, a defendant could show ineligibility of a partic-
ular claimant by presenting evidence of a "lack of qualification, free and voluntary decision
to forego higher-paying work opportunities, lack of higher-paying work opportunities, and
the like." Id.
612. Id.
613. 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
614. Id. at 637. The court suggested that the defendant might try to prove the ab-
sence of job openings for better jobs or the plaintiff's lack of qualifications for existing va-
cancies. Id.
615. Belton, supra note 34, at 1216.
616. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
617. Id. at 253. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defen-
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with Burdine, one could conclude that after moving into Stage H,
the allocation of the burdens of proof has been reversed. The indi-
vidual plaintiffs need only show that they are members of the
class. If they meet this minimal burden of production, the defen-
dant has the burden of persuasion to present a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for his conduct.21  The defendant may meet
this burden by complying with the clear and convincing evidence
standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.21
3. Qualifications
A major issue in back pay proceedings is the question of which
party has the burden of proof concerning whether individual plain-
tiffs qualified for the positions they were seeking. Courts have rec-
ognized that the qualifications of an individual for a particular job
are highly relevant when determining eligibility for back pay
awards. If the claimant does not have the requisite qualifications
for a particular position, he should not benefit from a back pay
award arising from discriminatory conduct regarding that position.
Paralleling the decisions that required individual plaintiffs to
prove some entitlement to back pay in Stage II,62 some cases
placed the initial burden in Stage H on the individual claimant to
show qualifications for the job in question.' 1 Some courts, how-
dant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plain-
tiff." Id. (emphasis added). Burdine, however, did not concern a class action or a bifurcated
trial. In a bifurcated trial, Stage I determines the liability issue and, as the Supreme Court
stated in Burdine, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. In order to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case in Stage I, the defendant must meet only the burden of produc-
tion. Id. at 254-56. The language of the Supreme Court in Franks and Teamsters, however,
as well as the language used by other federal courts, indicates that the burdens are allocated
differently in Stage II. See supra notes 604-14 and accompanying text.
618. Several decisions have indicated that the individual claimant will have the same
opportunity in Stage II, as did the plaintiff class in Stage I, see supra text accompanying
notes 553-55, to assert that the alleged nondiscriminatory reason merely constituted a pre-
text for discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 362 n.50 (1977); EEOC v. Korn Indus., Inc., 662 F.2d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 1981);
Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979).
619. See supra notes 605-15 and accompanying text.
620. See supra notes 569-92 and accompanying text.
621. See, e.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 453 (7th Cir. 1976) (em-
ployee has initial burden of producing evidence indicating he was qualified for job), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 44445 (5th
Cir.) (discriminatee must show "general characteristics and qualifications" possessed by
higher paid white employees), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway I1), 494 F.2d 211, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1974) (claimant must show evi-
dence that qualified him for desired position).
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ever, placed the Stage 11 qualifications burden on the defendant.62 2
This inconsistency was not resolved until the Supreme Court rul-
ings in Franks and Teamsters. In the 1976 Franks opinion the
Court specifically stated that in the remedial portion of the pro-
ceedings'2 3 "the burden will be upon [the defendants] to prove
that individuals ... were not in fact victims" of a discriminatory
employment practice. 2' Evidence of an individual's lack of quali-
fication for the position sought would be relevant to meeting this
burden of proof.6 25 Similarly, in Teamsters the Court held that in
the remedial stage of a pattern or practice trial the burden would
be on the employer "to demonstrate that the individual applicant
was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.' "66 The
Court cited Franks for the proposition that the burden of proof on
the qualifications issue could not be placed on the individual
claimants, but rather shifted to the employer as part of its rebuttal
proof.6
27
Although Franks and Teamsters concerned seniority relief,
the approach to qualifications that these cases advocated has been
adopted in traditional class action back pay cases. The Fourth Cir-
cuit dealt squarely with this issue in Sledge v. J.P. Stevens &
Co.6 8 The court interpreted Teamsters to hold that in Stage H,
the individual plaintiff must only establish class membership and
provide basic information to help the court determine the amount
of economic loss. 62 9 If the claimant meets this light burden, the
employer then must try to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence "that factors other than the condemned discrimination
caused the decision of which the ... claimant complains, e.g., that
622. See, e.g., United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341
(4th Cir. 1975) (employer has opportunity to present proof that any particular class mem-
ber was not entitled to back pay because of lack of qualifications for position), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934 (1976); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th Cir.
1974) (burden on employer to show that employee would not be qualified for any other job);
English v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 12 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1975)
(proof that claimant was not qualified for a position must be presented as an affirmative
defense).
623. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976). The remedy in Franks,
seniority relief, would be granted when the individual class members sought employment in
those more desirable positions from which they had previously been denied access. Id.
624. Id.
625. Id. at 773 n.32.
626. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977).
627. Id. at 359, 362 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772, 773 n.32
(1976)); see supra text accompanying note 625.
628. 585 F.2d 625 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
629. Id. at 637.
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.. .there were no job openings.., for which he was qualified."'
The Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey fol-
lowed both the Franks and the Teamsters cases in Kyriazi v.
Western Electric Co.5 1s According to the court, the individual
claimant has the burden to show merely the dates of employment
or application and the positions held or sought. 3 2 Once the claim-
ant thus establishes class membership, the burden of proving that
the claimant was not in fact the victim of discriminatory conduct
shifts to the defendant.3M The court reasoned that significant
problems would result if employees were required to demonstrate
how a proven policy of discrimination affected them individually
and, therefore, placed the onerous burden of proving an absence of
discrimination on the defendant. ' The Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also followed Teamsters and
Franks in Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.ss5 The court
placed a heavy burden on the employer during the remedial phase
of the trial, ruling that "[t]he employer may. . . try to prove an
individual employee's lack of qualifications. . . measured against
non-discriminatory selection standards that were actually applied
by the company.
' s6 3
Thus, unless the defendant raises the issue of qualifications in
its Stage II rebuttal and meets its burden of proof by the prepon-
derance of the evidence or by presenting clear and convincing evi-
dence, the court will assume that individual claimants were quali-
fied for the positions that they sought. In other words, the clear
rule now is that the defendant bears the ultimate burden on the
qualifications issue. 6 7
630. Id. Since the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in Sledge and other cir-
cuits have not addressed directly the burden of proof question in the context of qualifica-
tion, Sledge remains the most persuasive authority on the issue.
The Fourth Circuit recently confronted a similar issue in EEOC v. Korn Indus., Inc.,
662 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1981). The court relied heavily on its analysis in Sledge and the
Supreme Court's analysis in Teamsters and stated that if the plaintiff can meet his light
burden, see supra text accompanying note 629, "the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that he had a nondiscriminatory reason for making the challenged employment
decision." 662 F.2d at 261. The court's failure to mention specifically the qualifications issue
is not significant in light of its references to Sledge and Teamsters.
631. 465 F. Supp. 1141 (D.N.J. 1979), af'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
632. Id. at 1144.
633. Id.
634. Id. The court's failure to make specific reference to the plaintiff's qualifications is
not significant in light of its references to Franks and Teamsters.
635. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1088 (BNA) (E.D. Pa. 1980).
636. Id. at 1089.
637. If the defendant meets this burden, the claimant will have an opportunity to
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4. The Prima Facie Case
Plaintiffs seeking to establish their entitlement to back pay in
Stage II can be classified into three groups. First, the incumbent
employees are those employees of the company engaging in the
discriminatory practices who have applied unsuccessfully for trans-
fer or promotion. Also included in this group are employees no
longer seeking transfer or promotion because of age, illness, or re-
tirement and employees who refuse transfers or promotions to tra-
ditionally white or male jobs because the transfer would cause
them to lose seniority. Second, the rejected applicants are those
plaintiffs who have applied for positions with the employer but
were unsuccessful because of discriminatory hiring practices. To be
classified as a rejected applicant, one must not hold any position
with the offending employer. Third, the nonapplicants, or "but
for" employees, are those employees who would have applied for
promotion or transfer but for the discriminatory practices of the
employer that would have made such application futile. Each of
these three types of plaintiffs present different problems, and each
is affected by the Supreme Court decision in Teamsters. This sub-
section of the Special Project focuses on the means by which a
plaintiff, depending on the group into which he falls, can prove a
prima facie case of entitlement to back pay in Stage H.
(a) Incumbent Employees
The incumbent employees are the plaintiffs most affected by
the Supreme Court ruling in Teamsters. In Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co. (Pettway II1)63 the Fifth Circuit placed an ini-
tial burden on the individual employee to establish class member-
ship and qualifications for the job desired ."3 Despite the lightened
burden which Pettway placed on incumbent employees, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Teamsters essentially rejected Pettway
III.640 Teamsters ruled that the only burden that may be placed on
the incumbent employees to establish a Stage II prima facie case
was a showing of unsuccessful application for a job.41 Teamsters
prove that the stated reason merely constituted a pretext for a discriminatory activity. See
EEOC v. Korn Indus., Inc., 662 F.2d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 1981); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,
585 F.2d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
638. 494 F.2d 211, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1974).
639. Id. at 259-60; see supra text accompanying notes 573-78.
640. See supra text accompanying notes 587-92.
641. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 363 (1977).
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echoed the Court's earlier decision in Franks,62 in which incum-
bent employees denied access to more desirable positions were
given no discernible burden to establish a Stage II prima facie
case." s In Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co.64 the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed the Teamsters approach and concluded that to establish a
prima facie case during Stage II, "[a]ll an individual plaintiff must
then establish ... is. . . his identity as one of the presumed dis-
criminatees-that he is black and that.., upon being hired was
assigned to one of the low-paying jobs."" 5 The incumbent plaintiff,
therefore, bears only the most minimal of burdens. The finding of
liability in Stage I together with the presumptive entitlement to
back pay have caused the courts to make the establishment of a
prima facie case in Stage II a relatively easy task for the individual
employee.
Courts should not differentiate between current applicants for
promotion and those plaintiffs who for legitimate reasons such as
age, illness, or retirement no longer seek to be promoted or trans-
ferred. In Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co." 6 the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged these individuals as legitimate claimants for back
pay. Consequently, the circuit court rejected the trial court's back
pay award because it did not take into consideration those employ-
ees who had left the defendant's employ before the beginning of
the test period on which the back pay award was based. 47 Courts
should have no more difficulty dealing with this class of incumbent
than they do dealing with the incumbent who is still employed. If
the retired employee worked during the period of discriminatory
conduct, no reason exists why his prima facie case should differ
from that of the incumbent who is still employed-they have suf-
642. See supra text accompanying note 586.
643. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).
644. 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
645. Id. at 637. The Fourth Circuit utilized this same approach in a recent case, EEOC
v. Korn Indus., Inc., 662 F.2d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Dickerson v. United States
Steel Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1088, 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (burden on em-
ployer to show employee has suffered no economic loss as a result of discriminatory con-
duct); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 (D.N.J. 1979) (sole burden on
individual plaintiffs was to show they had been employed by defendant during period of
discriminatory conduct), aff'd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
646. 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973).
647. "Leaving them out implies a presumption that they suffered no loss as a result of
discrimination, and we think that to the extent any presumption is to be applied, it must be
the opposite." Id. at 903. The Seventh Circuit also ruled that the back pay award did not
accurately take into account those who were ill during the test period. Id. See generally
infra notes 938-39 and accompanying text.
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fered similar harm. His retirement or resignation should affect the
size of the back pay award rather than the burdens of proof.
Those employees who have been offered transfers to better
jobs but who have rejected the offers because they would lose their
seniority under the employer's departmental seniority system pre-
sent a different issue, but one that is not difficult for the court to
resolve. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber CO.," 8 "Once it has been determined that blacks have been
discriminatorily assigned to a particular department within a
plant, departmental seniority cannot be utilized to freeze those
black employees into a discriminatory caste."' 9 Because the de-
partmental seniority system originated as part of a discriminatory
employment practice, the system was deemed violative of Title
VII.65 0 An employee who rejects such a transfer or promotion offer
because accepting it would mean a loss of accrued seniority cannot
be estopped from claiming back pay relief at a later date. 51 If the
plaintiff presents evidence of this type of transfer or promotion of-
fer, it will combine with the Stage I finding of a discriminatory
seniority system and will constitute the plaintiff's Stage H prima
facie case.
(b) Rejected Applicants
The Franks and Teamsters cases limit the burden on those
applicants who, because of the defendant's discriminatory conduct,
are unsuccessful in their attempts to gain employment. The plain-
tiffs in Franks were rejected nonemployee applicants. The Su-
preme Court dismissed the defendant's argument that since some
rejected applicants might not have been victims of discrimination,
insufficient evidence existed upon which to base seniority relief."
2
The Court stated that this lack of evidence was not a valid reason
to deny seniority relief to the class and ruled that when individual
claimants reapplied for the positions in question, the burden would
648. 491 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1974).
649. Id. at 1373; see Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 232 (4th Cir.
1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1974).
650. 491 F.2d at 1373. See generally Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 895 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
651. In Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 895 (W.D.N.C.
1975), employees had the option to transfer to better positions if they would agree to forfeit
all of their accrued seniority. One employee agreed to accept the transfer, but then changed
his decision after consulting with his attorney and receiving advice that the seniority loss
would be too great. Id. at 907.
652. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).
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shift to the employer to show that a particular applicant was not
entitled to seniority.53 Thus, in this seniority case the burden on
rejected applicants equalled the minimal burden placed on incum-
bents.6" Although the Court in Teamsters was concerned with in-
cumbent employees who were rejected for promotion, its language
applies equally well to rejected applicants:
The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any par-
ticular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory
policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy. The Government need
only show that an alleged individual discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for
a job and therefore was a potential victim of the proved discrimination."5
In view of Franks and Teamsters, rejected applicants apparently
will only have to meet the same light standard as that confronting
the incumbent employee s" in order to make a prima facie case.
The claimant's application for the position constitutes prima facie
evidence of his interest in that job. The burden then falls on the
defendant to rebut this prima facie showing.
(c) Nonapplicants
Teamsters constitutes the definitive case on the subject of
back pay for employees who failed to apply for positions for which
they were eligible.' The Court relied on its analysis in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody5s as support for its interpretation of the pur-
pose of Title VII." The Court, viewing Title VII broadly as a
"make whole" remedy designed to give the claimant the most com-
plete relief possible, determined that the statute provided a rem-
edy for even nonapplicants.60 Accordingly, the Court did not re-
quire a claimant to have submitted an application that he knew
would be rejected in order to be eligible for back pay under Title
VII" 1s The Court in Teamsters, however, did place a different bur-
den on this type of incumbent. The employer's practice standing
653. Id.
654. See id.
655. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977) (foot-
note omitted).
656. See supra notes 638-51 and accompanying text.
657. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 362-71 (1977).
658. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
659. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
660. 431 U.S. at 365.
661. Id. at 367; see Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 150-51 (5th Cir.
1978); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 231-32 (4th Cir. 1975); Sabala v.




alone, although evidence that those desiring a job may have been
deterred from applying for the promotion because of the certain
rejection of his application, is not sufficient to meet the claimant's
burden of proof. In order to establish a prima facie case each indi-
vidual nonapplicant "must show that he was a potential victim of
unlawful discrimination. '662 Thus, the Court required plaintiff to
present the basic information that would be required in a job ap-
plication e 8 and attempt to introduce evidence of interest in the
position despite the failure to apply." Because of these proof re-
quirements, the prima facie case for incumbent nonapplicants is
slightly more burdensome than for applicants. The court places the
burden of production upon incumbent nonapplicants because no
documented proof exists that they truly desired the position in
question. Accordingly, to carry the burden of proof, some evidence
of the employee's desire must be introduced. The burden of per-
suasion to rebut the nonapplicant's testimony in Stage II, however,
remains with the defendant.
IX. COMPUTATION OF BACK PAY AWARDS
A. Methods of Computation
The general formula for the computation of back pay gives the
claimant an amount equal to the earnings that he would have re-
ceived but for the unlawful discrimination,6 5 less "[i]nterim earn-
ings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person
or persons discriminated against." 6 6 In Pettway v. American Cast
662. 431 U.S. at 367. Contra EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 832 (2d Cir. 1976).
663. 431 U.S. at 369 n.53.
664. "[Tlhe ... Court may find evidence of an employee's informal inquiry, expres-
sion of interest, or even unexpressed desire credible and convincing. The question is a fac-
tual one for determination by the trial judge." Id. at 371 n.58; see also Claiborne v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1978) (court may consider qualifications, costs,
and benefits of transfer or promotion, potential sacrifice involved in loss of seniority).
665. The Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), recog-
nized that in enacting Title VII Congress sought to make persons whole for injuries suffered
as a result of unlawful employment discrimination and also that Congress provided for back
pay as a means of achieving that "make whole" purpose. Id. at 418-19. Furthermore, the
Court conducted a section-by-section analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, which included language to the effect that the purpose of Title VII " 'requires that
persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be,
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the
discrimination." Id. at 421 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972)); see also supra notes 49-
63 and accompanying text.
666. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Congress modeled the back pay provision in Title
VII on a similar provision in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), which
was designed to accomplish the purpose of the NLRA by making employees whole for loses
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Iron Pipe Co.66 7 the Fifth Circuit articulated two principles con-
cerning the computation of a back pay award: unrealistic exacti-
tude should not be required 6 8 and doubts about the actual amount
of a claimant's award should be resolved against the discriminating
employer.669 The court also found that the method of computation
of the award will vary depending on the complexity of the case.7 0
The method chosen to determine the amount of back pay will be a
function of the size of the class, the precision with which each
claimant's position absent the discrimination can be determined,
the actual effect of the discrimination, and the length of the time
period involved. 71 In most instances, the element having the great-
est influence on the selection of the method of computation will be
the size of the class subject to employment discrimination.
1. Non-Class Action
Courts generally have less difficulty computing the measure of
damages in cases concerning only an individual plaintiff than in
the more complex class action suits. The purpose of the back pay
award is to make the plaintiff whole for past injuries suffered as a
result of the unlawful discrimination.67 ' Thus, the back pay award,
before adjustment, pays the individual claimant the amount he
would have received but for the unlawful conduct. 73 Four common
situations exist in which individuals bring actions seeking back
pay: (1) the employer failed to hire the claimant for discriminatory
suffered because of unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27
(1952); Willet v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 636 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 569
F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978). See generally supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
667. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
668. Id. at 260. The court in Pettway reaffirmed the principle it had stated in Brennan
v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973), a suit brought under the Equal Pay Act.
The Brennan court discovered that the discriminatory wage structure of the employer cre-
ated extreme difficulties in fashioning a remedy and that, as a result, the trial court should
be required to compute only a just and reasonable amount of back wages. Id. at 242.
669. Pettway, 494 F.2d at 260-61. The Pettway court followed the approach it had
taken in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). In Johnson
the court found that doubts about entitlement to back pay in Title VII cases should follow
the NLRA model and be resolved against the employer. Id. at 1380.
670. Pettway, 494 F.2d at 261.
671. Id.
672. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); see supra note 665.
673. E.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1321
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co., 475 F. Supp. 344, 353 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 674 (1981).
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reasons;6 4 (2) the employer unlawfully paid the claimant less than
another employee for performing the same tasks; 5 (3) the em-
ployer discriminatorily passed over the claimant for promotion;67 6
or, (4) the employer wrongfully discharged the claimant. The
courts generally base awards in these cases on the earnings of the
employees occupying the position the claimant would possess but
for the discrimination.7 8 Courts, however, cannot always make de-
terminations of individual awards with mathematical precision be-
cause of the uncertainty inherent in promotions, salary increases,
subjectively determined wage rates, and numerous other variables
and special circumstances. Therefore, over time courts have uti-
lized ever widening discretion in the methods they use to calculate
the most fair and reasonable award possible.
In Brown v. Rollins, Inc.,679 an action brought by a black fe-
male alleging racial employment discrimination, the court could
not ascertain exactly the amount she would have received if her
employer had not discriminated against her. The claimant, whom
the employer unlawfully passed over for promotion to the position
of sales girl, received damages based not on the earnings of those
hired for the sales girl vacancy but, rather, on the earnings of the
sales manager. 680 Because of the turnover of sales girls during the
claimant's employ,68 1 the court apparently felt the sales manager's
earnings provided a more adequate basis from which to calculate
back pay.682 The gross amount of the award provided the claimant
with eighty percent of what the sales manager earned or should
have earned during the applicable period." s In justifying the re-
sult, the court stated that exactitude when computing back pay is
not required and that any uncertainty in the determination of the
674. E.g., Association Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport,
479 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1979), afl'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 647 F.2d 256
(2d Cir. 1981).
675. E.g., Fisher v. Dillard Univ., 499 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. La. 1980).
676. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); Hatton v.
Ford Motor Co., 508 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage &
Freight Co., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
677. E.g., Hatton v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Mich. 1981); EEOC v.
Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
678. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 674-77.
679. 397 F. Supp. 571 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
680. Id. at 579.
681. Within one year after the claimant expressed an interest in the position, the em-
ployer hired two white females with no greater qualifications to fill the position. Id. at 574-
76.
682. Id. at 578.
683. Id. at 579.
[Vol. 35:893994
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
award should be resolved against the employer.'"
EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc0 8 5 offers another example
of a court exercising a wide degree of discretion in computing a
back pay award. The court in Kallir, Phillips found that the plain-
tiff, who successfully sued on grounds of wrongful termination,
should receive back pay calculated to include estimates of salary
increases. 6" The defendant argued that it granted pay raises solely
on an individual basis and that, therefore, any award which in-
cluded salary increases would be too speculative.s The court,
however, responded that the injured party shall not be deprived of
an adequate award merely because an employer's conduct has pre-
vented an accurate computation of damages.8 8 The court decided
not to calculate back pay based on a comparison with an existing
employee because the claimant's rapid and repeated advances in
position and salary had resulted in her earning substantially more
than other similarly situated employees.as' Rather, the court chose
to estimate the frequency and amount of salary increases she
would have received but for the unlawful conduct and calculated
the gross amount of her back pay on that basis. 90
The courts' exercise of discretion in fashioning an individual
award has gradually expanded to include consideration of circum-
stances peculiar to the claimant. In Unger v. Consolidated Foods
Corp.,'91 an action brought by a female employee claiming unlaw-
ful discharge, the appellate court upheld the trial court's calcula-
tion of back pay based on the claimant's estimated average earn-
ings for the period, taking into consideration her previous sales
record, her subsequent sales efforts, and, most importantly, her in-
tervening physical disabilities. s  The claimant challenged the
award, insisting that the court should have used her successor's
sales record to estimate the award. 93 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
684. Id.
685. 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 920 (1977).
686. Id. at 923-24.
687. Id. at 923.
688. Id.
689. Id. at 924.
690. Id.
691. 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2288 (1982).
692. Id. at 918.
693. Id. The claimant's successor was not disabled and, therefore, generated more
sales than the claimant during the back pay period. Consequently, the use of her successor's
sales record as a benchmark to fashion relief would result in a larger back pay award than if
the court used the claimant's own sales efforts.
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the award finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's use
of an estimate of the claimant's earnings because of the highly
speculative and personal nature of her job.'" The court recognized
that because of the plaintiff's intervening physical infirmities, her
work record, rather than that of her successor, presented the more
accurate indicator of the true measure of damages.
6 95
2. Small Class Action
In small class action suits, courts have advocated an individ-
ual-by-individual approach to the calculation of back pay because,
without undue burden, they can make a relatively accurate deter-
mination of what each class member's position would have been
absent the discrimination.6 " The Fifth Circuit adopted the indi-
vidual approach in Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc.6 97 because the
facts of the case made computation of the award comparatively
easy." 8 The Bing court found an individual approach more desira-
ble than a class-wide award because all class members had been
denied the same type of job, only three members of the class
sought back pay on appeal, and variables such as the back pay pe-
riod and back pay rate could be easily defined.6 The court
deemed an appropriate measure of damages to equal the amount
the eligible claimant 700 would have made but for discrimination
(calculated as the difference between the claimant's earnings and
the earnings of an employee not subject to discrimination 01), less
interim earnings70 2 and a reduction for a period during which the
694. Id. at 919.
695. Id.
696. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261 (5th Cir. 1974).
697. 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973).
698. Id. at 452.
699. Id. at 452-53.
700. Only one member of the class of five black city truck drivers prevented from
transferring to more lucrative positions as road drivers received a back pay award. Id.
701. The court remanded this portion of the case to the district court for calculation
of the back pay award based on the difference between the earnings of a road driver and the
claimant's actual earnings as a city driver from the date the claimant was first qualified for
the job until the date of the trial. Id. at 453.
702. Id. at 453-54. The general measure of damages equals the amount the claimant
would have earned absent the discrimination less interim earnings or other amounts earn-
able with reasonable diligence. See supra text accompanying notes 665-66. Interim earnings,
in cases of unlawful discharge or failure to employ, are generally considered the amounts
earned in alternative employment. As in the instant case, however, interim earnings may
also include earnings from part-time jobs or moonlighting if the claimant would have been
unable to engage concurrently in both the part-time or moonlighting job and the job dis-
criminatorily denied him. Bing, 485 F.2d at 453-54.
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claimant would have been laid off.703 The Fifth Circuit cited the
Bing decision with approval in Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co.704 when it acknowledged its preference for the individual-
by-individual approach when computing back pay in smaller, less
complex class action suits. 0 5
3. Large Class Action
The courts have adopted a wide variety of methods to deter-
mine back pay awards in large employment discrimination class
action suits. Under these methods, courts treat the class members
as a group whenever the enormity and complexity of the claims
make individual evaluation impractical.70 e A class-wide approach
to the computation of back pay avoids the ambiguities and "the
quagmire of hypothetical judgments 7 0 7 that arises when calculat-
ing complicated individual awards. The selection of an appropriate
method is a decision for the trial court subject to correction if the
court of appeals finds the selection so unreasonable that it
amounts to an abuse of discretion.7 08 Four popular approaches to
class-wide computation of back pay are the averaging method, the
approximation method utilizing a test period, the representative
employee earnings formula, and the pro rata distribution method.
(a) Averaging Method
Courts utilizing the averaging method award back pay based
on the difference between each class member's actual earnings and
an average of the pay rates for employees in more highly skilled
jobs. In Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.,7 0 9 an action brought by
703. Bing, 485 F.2d at 453-55.
704. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
705. Id. at 261.
706. The courts generally agree that individual awards should be calculated in class
action suits whenever possible, reasoning that an individual award will justly compensate
the discriminatee without unduly penalizing the employer. See supra section VII(B); see,
e.g., Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local
396, 637 F.2d 506, 519 (8th Cir. 1980); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
707. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260 (5th Cir. 1974).
708. E.g., Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1056
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d
1251, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
709. 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), afl'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded on other grounds,
19821
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black employees and the United States alleging racially discrimina-
tory employment practices, the court awarded class members the
difference between their earnings at low opportunity jobs and a
figure representing the average of pay rates of employees in "high
opportunity skilled trades jobs."710 Ruling that the employer had
discriminatorily denied employees economic advancement by
blocking avenues to more highly skilled positions, the court sought
to calculate a back pay award sufficient to restore claimants to the
position they would have held but for the employer's discrimina-
tion.7111 After defining the class and ascertaining the length of the
back pay period, the court ordered defendants to "pay each of the
members of the affected class an amount equal to the average
earnings of skilled trades high opportunity jobs ... less the
amount each member... actually earned." 112
(b) Approximation Method Utilizing a Test Period
The approximation method utilizing a test period awards class
members the difference between the pay they receive after the im-
plementation of a Title VII decree and the pay they received while
their employer's discriminatory policies remained in effect. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the use of the test period approach in
Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co.,71 3 a suit brought by fifty-four fe-
male employees and former employees who charged defendant
with practicing intentional, sex-based employment discrimination.
The Bowe court chose to set the test period at a reasonable time
after a preliminary injunction opened all jobs to class members
2 1'
According to the court, it intended the delay to allow the class
members to exercise all their transfer and secondary department
options within the company prior to the beginning of the test pe-
riod. 15 The measure of damages equalled the difference between
431 U.S. 951 (1977).
710. Id. at 121. The court found that the company employed only a small number of
blacks in only a few jobs-janitors, building servicemen, utility servicemen, laborers, and
stockmen. Although a few whites were found in these "low opportunity jobs," virtually no
blacks were employed in the "high opportunity" positions. Id. at 91-92. The high opportu-
nity jobs consisted of skilled trades jobs such as brickmason, carpenter, electrician, mechan-
ic fitter, plumber, welder, cable splicer, and plant operator. Id. at 100. The court indicated
that the starting pay for the lowest grade high opportunity job (construction) equalled the
highest pay grade for low opportunity jobs. Id.
711. Id. at 119.
712. Id. at 120-121.
713. 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973).
714. Id. at 902-03.
715. Id. at 903.
998 [Vol. 35:893
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
the claimant's earnings during the test period and her earnings be-
tween the date of the decree and the enactment of Title
VII-during which Colgate, Palmolive had practiced its discrimi-
natory policies.716 The Seventh Circuit cautioned the trial court to
schedule the test period long enough after the imposition of the
injunction to ensure that the residual effects of the discrimination
would be eliminated. 17 In addition, the court insisted that the
back pay award include class members who were not employed
during the scheduled test period,7 18 and that appropriate adjust-
ments be made to adequately compensate these former em-
ployees.19
Three years after its decision in Bowe, the Seventh Circuit ap-
proved a variation of the "test period" approach in Stewart v.
General Motors Corp.7 20 The question in Stewart was what mea-
sure to use in awarding back pay for an employer's racially moti-
vated failure to promote black employees from hourly wage to sala-
ried positions.7 2 Although both the Stewart and Bowe decisions
called their methods "test period" approaches, the two methods
were quite dissimilar. The Stewart court suggested an analysis of a
control group of white hourly employees that was comparable to
the group of black employees which was denied advancement.7 '
This analysis would trace the employment history of the white
group during a test period to determine which members achieved
salaried ranks and to what extent they received salary increases. 8
According to the Seventh Circuit, the trial court then could formu-
late an estimate of the increment in salary that defendant had de-
nied the black employees during the relevant time period.2 The
716. Id. at 902. The court rejected a proposed computation of back pay using the aver-
age earning rate of all male employees because such a computation would reflect the as-
sumption that all females would have qualified for and would have chosen to perform the
heaviest jobs as often and to the same extent as males. The court found this assumption to
be inaccurate. Id. at 903.
717. Id. at 902.
718. The court wanted to ensure that those victims of the employer's discrimination
who were no longer employed by Colgate, Palmolive nevertheless were adequately compen-
sated for the injuries that they had suffered. Id. at 903. On its face, the test period method
compensated only those employees who were still working for the company and who could
exercise transfer and promotion opportunities.
719. Id. The court of appeals did not specify how the adjustments were to be made,
but left this determination up to the trial court on remand.
720. 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977).






court stated that the resulting figure would "serve as a benchmark
for computation of the actual award.' 72 5 This method presented a
retrospective use of the test period approach to compute damages.
The Stewart court, apparently fearful that a prospective exercise
of the test period would not compensate for the residual effects of
discrimination, compared the employment histories of white and
black employees prior to the institution of the action.7 2 Such an
approach differs dramatically from the Bowe attempt to gauge
damages by evaluating a class member's achievements after the
implementation of a Title VII decree.8 In effect, the Stewart cal-
culation more closely resembles the operation of the representative
employee earnings formula.
(c) Representative Employee Earnings Formula
The representative employee earnings formula compares the
claimants' earnings to the earnings of employees not subject to dis-
crimination. The representative earnings formula differs from the
averaging method in that the averaging method compares pay
rates of occupations while the representative earnings formula
compares the actual amounts earned by those provided employ-
ment and those discriminatorily treated. In United States v.
Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers International Union, Local 46 s the
court adopted a comparison method to determine the back pay due
black union permit holders discriminatorily denied work. The
court determined that eligible claimants should receive the differ-
ence between the average earnings of white union members and
permit holders, and the amount the claimant earned or, through
reasonable efforts, could have earned. 72 According to the court,
this comparison method provided a necessary balance: it avoided
granting an unjust windfall to claimants at the union's expense,
and, at the same time, it prevented excluding deserving claim-
ants-those unable to meet the objective award eligibility crite-
ria7380-from receiving compensatory benefits.8 1
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1973).
728. 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
729. Id. at 444-45.
730. In order to meet the "objective criteria," a claimant must prove "a sufficient in-
vestment of time and effort to show that he was ready, willing and available to take work on
referrals" from the union. Id. at 443. The court found specifically that a claimant who has
shaped a hiring hall for five or more days per month or shaped the hiring hall and/or
worked a total of eight days or more per month would meet the objective criteria. Id. The
1000 [Vol. 35:893
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In Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.7 3 2 an action brought by
black and Mexican-American truck drivers alleging discriminatory
employment practices, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the use of a simi-
lar form of the representative employee earnings formula. The trial
court in Sabala first selected a representative-or "reasonably pru-
dent"-member of the group of employees not subject to discrimi-
nation and compared his average monthly earnings over the entire
back pay period to those of a representative member of the plain-
tiff class.738 The court then calculated the gross earnings due a
class member by taking his earnings during the back pay period
and multiplying that figure by the ratio derived from the above
comparison. As a final step in the formula, the court reduced the
gross earnings by ten percent for necessary expenses that would
have been incurred had the discriminatee been promoted, and also
by the amount of any interim earnings.3 5
(d) Pro Rata Distribution Method
When using the pro rata approach, courts calculate the back
pay award for the entire class of discriminatorily treated claimants
and then distribute the award in pro rata shares.73 6 Courts calcu-
lating damages for a large number of employees unlawfully denied
promotion favor this method because it eliminates the need for an
actual determination of which qualified class members would have
court noted that a claimant need not meet these objective criteria for every month of a
period for which the claimant seeks a back pay award if he can prove that other circum-
stances, such as reports from other persons, observations in the hiring hall, or reports from
union representatives, led the claimant to believe job or referral opportunities were so scarce
that he would be better off seeking employment elsewhere. Id. at 443-44.
731. Id. at 443.
732. 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S.
951 (1977).
733. Id. at 1265.
734. As a fraction, the numerator would equal the average earnings of a "reasonably
prudent" employee not subject to discrimination, and the denominator would equal the av-
erage earnings of a "reasonably prudent" member of the class subject to discrimination.
735. Sabala, 516 F.2d at 1265.
736. Early recognition of this method of distribution for use in Title VII class actions
came in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 n.154 (5th Cir. 1974).
The court briefly described the distribution method as follows:
[Tihe total award for the entire class would be determined. At that point, individual
claims would be calculated on pro rata shares for those workers of similar ability and
seniority claiming the same position, possibly eliminating the necessity of deciding
which one of many employees would have obtained the position but for the
discrimination.
Id. at 263 n.154.
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been promoted but for the discrimination.7 17
The Fifth Circuit strongly recommended use of the pro rata
method in United States v. United States Steel Corp.,7 38 after the
class members had successfully shown that the steel manufacturer
had discriminatorily denied them access to promotion vacancies
for racial reasons .7 9 Using this method, the court determined that
the amount of the total award for the class should equal the largest
loss suffered by a qualified class member multiplied by the number
of job vacancies.740 The court calculated the largest loss as the dif-
ference between the earnings of the employee filling the vacancy
and the qualified class member with the lowest yearly earnings.741
To compute individual awards, the court then employed a linear
progression formula with the result that the class member who had
received the lowest earnings obtained the largest portion of the
back pay award. 42
In Hameed v. International Association of Bridge, Structural
& Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 4 an action in which the
defendant union unlawfully denied black employees access to an
apprenticeship program, the Seventh Circuit adopted an alterna-
tive pro rata distribution approach. The Hameed court estimated
the number of blacks that would have filled the existing appren-
ticeship vacancies in a given year by assuming that under a nondis-
criminatory selection process the union would have admitted
blacks in roughly the same proportion as whites. 44 Comparing the
number of black and white qualified applicants and the actual
737. See Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
738. 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
739. Id. at 1055-56.
740. Id. at 1056.
741. Id.
742. Id. The court suggested the following example:
[I]f during a given period white A, with less plant seniority, occupied a job at which he
earned $15,000, but blacks B, C, D, E, and F, with respective earnings in lower jobs of
$10,000, $11,000, $12,000, $13,000, and $14,000, each were equally capable and substan-
tially equal in superior plant seniority, than [sic] their pro rats recoveries for the pe-
riod could be computed as follows: 5z + 4x + 3x + 2x + x - $5000 [$5000 represent-
ing the largest loss suffered by a group member and, therefore, the amount of the class
wide recovery]. The variable, x, comes to roughly $333. Thus, B, whose hypothetical
loss is five times greater than F's, recovers about $1,665; C recovers $1,332; D takes
$999; E recovers $666; while F, who suffers the least economic injury, recovers $333.
Id.
743. 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980).
744. Id. at 520.
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number of apprentices taken, the court determined the number of
blacks unlawfully denied admission.7 " The court then chose that
same number of white apprentices, computed their aggregate earn-
ings during the back pay period, and subtracted from the aggregate
figure the income of the same number of randomly selected black
class members. '  The court concluded that this amount consti-
tuted the entire award for the class for the year in question and
distributed it in pro rata shares to all the class members.7 4 The
Hameed method appears to be a more flexible approach than the
one suggested in United States Steel because the court can readily
adapt it to fit any number of job vacancies and class members. The
United States Steel approach, on the contrary, is best suited for
cases in which only one job opening was improperly filled 7" and
can become very complex when the case concerns more than one
vacancy.7 49 The Hameed court also simplified the computation
process by making no mention of distribution based on earn-
ings-apparently each member of the class under the Hameed ap-
745. Id.
746. Id. at 521.
747. Id. The court's formula appears as follows:
Black Applicants ( Apprentice positions _ Number of blacks
Total Applicants available and filled admitted that year)
Number of blacks discriminatorily
denied admission to the program )
As an example, the court worked through the formula using 1969 figures. In 1969, 10 blacks
and 40 whites applied to the apprenticeship program. The union, however, used only white
applicants to fill the 15 available positions. Using the formula, the court reached the follow-
ing result:
Lo 15) -0 =3oso
The court then chose three white applicants selected to the program and compared their
earnings to those of three randomly selected members of the class. The difference in earn-
ings between the two groups represented the class-wide relief for that particular year. Id. at
520-21.
748. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1055-56 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976).
749. Id. at 1056. The distribution approach suggested in United States Steel utilizes a
linear progression formula-a formula not easily adaptable to a situation involving more
than one job vacancy and numerous job applicants. Id.; see supra note 742. The formula
suggested in Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Work-
ers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1980), is adaptable to any number of openings
and applicants because it does not attempt to make allowances for salary differentials
among the members of the class discriminatorily denied promotion. See supra notes 744-47
and accompanying text.
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proach receives an equal share of the award.5 0
(e) Individual-by-Individual Computation
Although many, if not most, courts utilize a class-wide ap-
proach to compute back pay in large, complex class action suits,7 5 1
the class-wide method has not received universal acceptance. For
example, in Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.,7 52 a sex discrimina-
tion class action brought by approximately ten thousand class
members, the court rejected as inappropriate any class-wide meth-
ods of calculating back pay. The court found that male and female
employees with comparable skills entering the workforce at West-
ern Electric would have dramatically different employment histo-
ries because discrimination could have manifested itself in a vari-
ety of different ways.753  Recognizing that any class-wide
computation approach would not yield an exact measure of dam-
ages, the court insisted on the adoption of an individual-by-indi-
vidual approach.7 5 ' This approach, the court reasoned, would pro-
vide the best means for making the injured claimants whole.55
Although the court recognized that even this individual considera-
tion did not ensure precision, it stated that this method of compu-
tation is "no more imprecise than lumping claimants into groups
and extracting averages, or otherwise depersonalizing victims of
discrimination by running them through a mathematical
blender.17 5 The court further acknowledged the employer's objec-
tion to the use of any class-wide formula to calculate back pay and
concluded that, in light of the objection, due process considera-
tions may require that any award fashioned against the employer
be on the merits of each individual's case. The court then se-
lected three special masters to reconstruct the individual work his-
tories of all ten thousand class members, make evaluations based
750. Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 520 (8th Cir. 1980).
751. See supra text accompanying note 706.
752. 465 F. Supp. 1141 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
753. Id. at 1145-46. The court hypothesized that during a ten-year period, a woman
might have been passed over for promotion, denied entry into training programs, and, be-
cause she was thereby locked into low job categories, laid off first notwithstanding her se-
niority. A male during the same period would have started at a higher pay grade, been
promoted several times, and avoided layoffs because of his promotions. Id.






on background, education, work potential, and abilities of all the
claimants, and award back pay accordingly. 758
B. Elements Includable
When it considered the remedial provisions of Title VII, Con-
gress in all likelihood recognized that most job applicants, in
choosing among job alternatives, consider the entire compensation
package. 75 9 Thus, in order to achieve its "make whole" purpose,
the back pay award must compensate discriminatees not only for
lost earnings but also for such items as lost salary supplements,
fringe benefits, and sick pay.8 In accordance with Congress' man-
date that the award place victims of discrimination in the position
they would have occupied but for the unlawful conduct,7 61 courts
have held that the denial of full employment benefits frustrates
the "make whole" purpose of the remedial provisions of the em-
ployment discrimination laws, and at least one commentator has
indicated that such denial circumvents Congress' legislative in-
tent.76 s Thus, when calculating the total amount of a back pay
award, courts have found claimants entitled to more than straight
salary and have compensated them for lost salary supplements and
fringe benefits, and have also awarded prejudgment interest for the
unlawful withholding of their earnings.76
1. Salary Supplements
Courts have often included supplements to the straight salary
of discriminatees when calculating back pay awards. In order to
make claimants whole for their economic losses, courts have in-
cluded estimates of overtime pay 765 estimates of tips,7 allowances
758. Id. at 1147.
759. Comment, supra note 75, at 396.
760. Id.
761. See supra notes 665, 672 and accompanying text.
762. E.g., Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Va. 1977),
aff'd, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978).
763. See Comment, supra note 75.
764. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974); Wil-
lett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Va. 1977), affd, 569 F.2d 212
(4th Cir. 1978).
765. E.g., Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 463 F. Supp. 315, 316 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated & remanded on other
grounds, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981); Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 635
(W.D. Va. 1977), af'd, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978).
766. Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 (D. Colo. 1976).
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for shift differentials, '7  and retribution for "loss of job secur-
ity.'' OS Courts also will generally account for any across the board
pay increases.89 Some courts will even attempt to approximate sal-
ary increases, ° while other courts reject such compensation as en-
tirely too speculative.7 1
2. Fringe Benefits
Courts have included a wide array of fringe benefits in the
computation of back pay. Thus, courts have awarded monetary ad-
justments for vacation time,7  contributions to pension plans,7
and contributions to profit-sharing programs.7 74 Additional adjust-
ments have included increments for sick pay75 and sick leave.7 7 '
Some courts have further compensated claimants for contributions
to life insurance policies777 and medical insurance programs77' and
767. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974); Wil-
lett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 569 F.2d 212
(4th Cir. 1978).
768. Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 463 F. Supp. 315, 316 (N.D. Tex. 1978), afi'd in part,
remanded in part, 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 450
U.S. 1036 (1981).
769. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, va-
cated & remanded on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
770. EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd,
559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
771. Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 463 F. Supp. 315, 316 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing
the difficulty of ascertaining damages with any degree of exactitude, the court rejected in-
clusion of potential promotions in the award), afl'd in part, remanded in part, 626 F.2d 369
(5th Cir. 1980), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
772. E.g., Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1973).
773. E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 613 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 559
F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
774. E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 924
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
775. Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1973); see infra note
776.
776. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1975), afl'd in part, va-
cated & remanded on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). Although the Satty court refers
to "sick leave," id., and the court in Bowe mentions "sick pay," Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive
Co., 489 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1973), the courts apparently are referring to the same loss of
benefits.
777. E.g., Vant Hul v. City of Dell Rapids, 465 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.S.D. 1979);
Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 (D. Colo. 1976).
778. E.g., Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 951 (D.
Colo. 1979); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
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for certain medical expenses they have incurred. 9
3. Prejudgment Interest
Although Title VII does not mention the inclusion of prejudg-
ment interest in a back pay award, Congress designed the statute
to compensate individuals for tangible economic loss from unlawful
employment practices.78 0 As a result, awards of back pay have
tended to include prejudgment interest as part of the just compen-
sation due an injured party.8 Originally, courts rationalized grant-
ing interest by drawing an analogy to back pay awards in other
employment cases. 8 2 Recently, however, courts have justified in-
terest payments because of rampant inflation and long delays
caused by court congestion, lack of judicial personnel, and dilatory
tactics of counsel.7 3 These circumstances, combined with the de-
terrent and "make whole" purposes of the legislation and with the
recognition that the defendants have had the use of the money in
question 7 8 ' have lead the courts to grant varying amounts of inter-
est as a part of the back pay award.7 15 Nevertheless, the decision to
award prejudgment interest remains within the discretion of the
trial courts788 and grants of prejudgment interest have not received
universal acceptance. Some courts, exercising their discretion, have
simply found interest unwarranted.8 7 Courts traditionally have
found prejudgment interest unavailable in suits against the federal
779. E.g., cases cited supra note 778; Culp v. American General Transp. Corp., 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 460, 467 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
780. Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 381 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd,
541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1977).
781. Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494, 506 (D.N.D. 1976) (interest serves in
part to compensate for the present value of past due sums); EEOC v. Local 2P Lithogra-
phers & Photoengravers Int'l Union, 412 F. Supp. 530, 543 (D. Md. 1976) (interest is part of
just compensation for the tangible economic loss).
782. See, e.g., Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494, 506 (D.N.D. 1976) (analogy
made to an award of prejudgment interest in a Fair Labor Standards Act decision); Chs-
tang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 381 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Md. 1974), af'd, 541 F.2d 1040
(4th Cir. 1977) (analogy to NLRA cases).
783. Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 475 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Ind.
1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 674 (1981).
784. Id.
785. Courts have generally awarded interest at annual rates of between 6% and 8%.
See cases cited supra notes 780-83.
786. Taylor v. Philips Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 1979); Patterson v.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 475 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 736
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 674 (1981).
787. E.g., Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 919 (7th Cir. 1981), va-
cated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2288 (1982).
1982] 1007
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
government absent an express provision to the contrary in the rele-
vant statute.7 18 Consequently, since Title VII does not provide for
prejudgment interest in its remedial provisions, courts have de-
clined to award interest in Title VII actions brought against the
federal government. 89
C. Elements Deductible
After totaling the elements includable when computing the
gross back pay award, the trial court must then determine whether
facts exist that justify a decrease in the plaintiff's ultimate recov-
ery. The trial court possesses great discretion in identifying the el-




This discretion-which is frequently the sole justification for up-
holding a challenged deduction on appeal791-is founded on the in-
tent of the drafters of Title VII to vest the courts with broad reme-
dial authority thoroughly to compensate the victims of unlawful
employment discrimination. 9
Although the language of Title VII stipulates that "[i]nterim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence... shall
operate to reduce. .. back pay, '7 3 many of the elements deducti-
ble evolved exclusively from judicial attempts to fashion equitable
compensation. Because the courts fail to agree on which elements
are deductible from the back pay award, compensation provided
pursuant to Title VII can vary greatly from circuit to circuit. This
section of the Special Project identifies the various circumstances
788. E.g., Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Nitterright v. Claytor,
454 F. Supp. 130, 140 (D.D.C. 1978).
789. E.g., Blake v. Califano, 626 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
790. Senator Williams, discussing § 2000e-5(g), stated that "[t]he provisions of this
subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable power
to fashion the most complete relief possible." 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) (section-by-
section analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, submitted
by Sen. Williams). See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
791. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981); Hig-
gins v. Harding, 644 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1981); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d
394 (3d Cir. 1976).
792. See supra note 790. "[T]he Act... requires that persons aggrieved by the conse-
quences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a
position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination." 118
CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 7146, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, submitted by Sen. Williams); see also International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd,
559 F.2d 1203, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
793. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976); see infra notes 840-83 and accompanying text.
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that have prompted courts to decrease gross back pay awards to
successful employment discrimination plaintiffs. In addition, with
respect to those elements about which the circuits disagree, this
section proposes an approach to the question of deductibility
designed to accomplish the remedial purposes of the employment
discrimination laws94
1. Unemployment Compensation
Reduction of awards by the amount of unemployment com-
pensation received by plaintiffs is the most disputed deduction is-
sue in the computation of back pay. 95 Although many commenta-
tors cite persuasive Supreme Court pronouncements which tend to
suggest that the deduction is improper,7" a number of circuits con-
tinue to uphold the deduction as a valid exercise of trial court dis-
cretion.7 7 The ultimate determinations apparently rest on arbi-
794. The goals of Title VII are to eliminate employment discrimination and to make
whole its victims. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. In addition to cases under
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, this section of the Special Project occasionally refers to cases
brought under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-197 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980). Decisions interpreting the NLRA are particularly pertinent when consid-
ering Title VII cases because Congress modeled the Title VII back pay provisions after simi-
lar provisions in the NLRA. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405 (1975); supra
notes 52-58 and accompanying text. For a valuable discussion on the relationship between
the two acts, see Davidson, supra note 58. See also Youngdahl, Deducting Employment
Compensation From Back Pay: Erosion of a Rational Policy, 28 LABOR L.J. 587, 590 (1977);
Note, Of Storks and Foxes: Employment Testing and Back Pay, 34 MD. L. REv. 383, 392
n.44 (1974).
795. The term "unemployment compensation" refers to funds gathered by the states
through various forms of employer taxation and ultimately distributed to discharged work-
ers. While the discussion about deductions from back pay generally is applicable to all forms
of public assistance, the employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund
make it the most likely form of compensatory payments that should reduce the plaintiff's
award. Some commentators conclude that by the time a plaintiff wins a judgment, this indi-
rect distribution of employers' funds will have made the plaintiff at least partially whole at
the employer's expense. See Davidson, supra note 55, at 768-69; Comment, supra note 75, at
398. At least one commentator, however, has characterized the monies distributed under the
state compensatory programs not as direct employer contributions but merely as "public
funds derived from a tax levy and earmarked for specific social uses." Gray, Back Pay and
Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 8 ARB. J. 114, 114 (1953). Under this argument, reduc-
ing a plaintiff's back pay award by the amount of unemployment compensation received
creates a windfall for the discriminating employer who clearly was not an intended benefi-
ciary of the compensatory distribution. See Gross, Remedies in Discrimination Cases, 29
N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 129, 139 (1976); Youngdahl, supra note 794, at 587-90.
796. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 795 (referring to the holding in NLRB v.
Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951)); infra notes 799-803 and accompanying text.
797. See cases cited supra note 791; infra notes 811-18 and accompanying text. The
federal appellate courts give such broad deference to the trial courts' discretion in this area
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:893
trary characterizations of the unemployment payments as either
collateral benefits or direct employer-generated compensation.798
In NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co. 79 9 the Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld the authority of the NLRB to refuse to decrease a
back pay award by the amount of unemployment compensation re-
ceived by the plaintiff. Having previously concluded that the pay-
ments were not deductible as interim earnings, 0° the Court re-
jected the defendant's contention that since state unemployment
funds were derived from taxes paid by the employer, they repre-
sented a direct payment from the employer to the employee. 0 1
More importantly, the Court reasoned that the refusal to deduct
this "collateral benefit" would not overcompensate an aggrieved
employee.8 0 2 Since "no consideration has been given or should be
given to collateral losses in framing an order to reimburse employ-
ees for their lost earnings," the Court stated that, "manifestly no
consideration need be given to collateral benefits which employees
may have received.
'8 0 3
A minority of courts find the Gullett Gin rationale persuasive
in Title VII employment discrimination cases.80 For example, the
that circuits without a clearly defined rule concerning items properly deductible could up-
hold almost any trial court decision on this issue.
798. Payments made to an injured party by one other than the person who caused the
injury are said to be "collateral benefits," and the sources of such payments thus are termed
"collateral sources." Although these payments may compensate the victim for his injury,
collateral benefits, as a matter of common law, do not reduce a wrongful actor's financial
obligation to the injured party. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 920A(b)
(1979); 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages §§ 206-211 (1965).
799. 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
800. See Marshall Field & Co. v, Labor Bd., 318 U.S. 253 (1943).
801. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. at 364; see supra note 795. The Court rejected
the defendant's "direct payment" argument by pointing out that the unemployment com-
pensation program was intended to "carry out a policy of social betterment for the benefit
of the entire state" rather than to discharge any liability or obligation of the recipient's
former employer. 340 U.S. at 364.
802. 340 U.S. at 365.
803. Id. (emphasis in original). A collateral loss occurs, for example, when, during the
period he is without wages, a striking employee is unable to make his payments on goods
purchased on credit, with the result that he must forfeit his equity when the seller repos-
sesses the goods. See Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967). The
collateral source rule, which prevents reduction of a plaintiff's damage award in a civil ac-
tion by other compensatory payments such as insurance, is well grounded in tort law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(b) (1979).
804. Several courts also have adopted the rationale in cases brought under the ADEA.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Schulz v.
Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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Fourth Circuit recently called the reasoning of Gullett Gin "partic-
ularly convincing" when it refused to deduct unemployment pay-
ments from the back pay granted a plaintiff in a sex discrimination
case.805 Any other result, the court claimed, would "undercut to
some degree the corrective force of a Title VII back pay award."80
Other courts decline to deduct unemployment benefits from gross
back pay because the awards are intended to promote a social pol-
icy beyond simply requiring the employer to "make whole" the vic-
tim of its discrimination-the awards also serve to deter employers
from committing future acts of discrimination. 0 7 Seeking to pro-
mote this goal of deterring discrimination, these courts are unwill-
ing to permit discriminating employers to benefit from a windfall
reduction in their back pay liability.808 Furthermore, at least one
court refused to deduct the unemployment payments because a
state statute required the successful plaintiff to repay the unem-
ployment benefits from the proceeds of the back pay award. 9 In
other cases, the trial court's refusal to deduct unemployment pay-
ments has been justified as simply a legitimate exercise of the trial
court's broad discretion.810
Despite these arguments, a majority of courts favor reducing
back pay awards by the amount of unemployment compensation
benefits received by the plaintiff. These courts often impose the
deduction without explanation s and their action has been upheld
805. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981). The court earlier had
implied in dicta that the payments were not deductible. Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376
F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967).
806. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 196 (4th Cir. 1981). The court also ex-
pressed support for the "independent social purpose" justification for refusing to deduct the
payments.
807. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
808. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 196 (4th Cir. 1981); Abron v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1977); Inda v. United Air Lines, 405 F. Supp.
426 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971).
809. See Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo.
1979); Colorado Employment Security Act, COLo. REv. STAT. § 8-73-110(2) (1973).
810. See, e.g., Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956 (E.D.
Pa. 1980). Although the Ninth Circuit in Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1981), recently upheld a trial court's discretionary refusal to deduct unemployment pay-
ments on these grounds, dicta in the opinion suggests that the circuit might reject a similar
refusal based solely on the collateral source rationale. The court stated, "In most cases,
application of the collateral source rule is not necessary to assure a full recovery for the
injured party; rather, it allows a 'windfall' to be enjoyed by the injured party rather than by
the wrongdoer." Id. at 700.
811. See, e.g., Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 559 F.2d
1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
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on appeal as a valid exercise of discretion. 12 The courts offering a
justification for the deduction usually claim that it ensures that
the plaintiff will not be made "more than whole." 813 In one notable
exception, however, a California court adopted a different ap-
proach when it required a successful plaintiff to repay to the state
the unemployment benefits she had received prior to judgment,
even though no state statute specifically required that she do 80.814
Courts deducting the unemployment payments from back pay
awards have offered justifications that are unpersuasive. Since the
Supreme Court rejected the "double recovery" argument concern-
ing back pay awards for victims of unfair labor practices in Gullett
Gin,81 5 the decision regarding unemployment benefits in Title VII
actions ultimately must rest on equitable grounds. Courts, there-
fore, must determine which party should benefit from the states'
attempts to ease the burdens imposed on discharged employees.
Courts should choose to enhance the deterrent goal of the anti-
discrimination legislation by refusing to diminish the back pay lia-
bility of former employers by the amount of unemployment com-
pensation. Especially in situations in which the discriminatorily
discharged plaintiff worked for a low wage, the deduction of unem-
ployment benefits from the back pay award would cause a near-
total elimination of the employer's financial obligation to the em-
ployee, and would not further Title VII's goal of eliminating dis-
crimination.81 6 Instead, the employer would have little incentive to
346 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
812. See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir. 1981); Osta-
powicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522
F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, vacated & remanded on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136
(1977).
813. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980); see also
EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591 (2d Cir. 1976) ("we are
not in the business of redistributing the wealth beyond the goal of making the victim of
discrimination whole"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
814. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing As'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979). A
California statute required successful claimants who received back pay awards under orders
from the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bbard to return to the state unem-
ployment benefits received prior to judgment. Even though no similar statute compelled
repayment by a successful Title VII plaintiff, the court reduced the plaintiff's net back pay
award accordingly because of the "limited nature of the public fisc and the demands placed
upon it by increasing unemployment." Id. at 1319. Inherent in this argument is the assump-
tion that victims of unlawful employment discrimination should not be made "more than
whole." See supra note 813 and accompanying text.
815. See supra notes 799-803 and accompanying text.
816. See supra note 794.
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comply with the fair treatment provisions of the Act.81 ' If any
party should benefit from a "windfall" provided by unemployment
compensation, it ought to be the innocent victim of unlawful em-
ployment discrimination.8 18
2. Moonlighting Income
Despite Title VII's direction that interim earnings be de-
ducted from back pay awards,81 trial courts generally will not de-
duct amounts earned in a part-time job that the plaintiff could
have held concurrently with the position he was discriminatorily
denied. 20 The Fifth Circuit in Horton v. Lawrence County Board
of Education8 2 1 stated succinctly the purpose behind the rule:
While it is true that payment of back wages must be diminished by earnings
received during the interim period (the period between the discrimination
and judgment), the whole purpose of equitable restoration would be frus-
trated by deducting compensation obtained from a second unrelated job
which a litigant could have held even if he had not suffered from illegal
discrimination.'"
A good general rule regarding interim wages might be to deduct
the plaintiff's interim earnings if the performance of either the in-
terim job or the originally denied position would preclude perform-
ance of the other. 2 3 Obviously, if the plaintiff held both jobs con-
currently before his unlawful discharge from one position, then he
has proven that their dual performance was possible.8" The num-
ber of hours worked in the interim position, however, apparently is
not conclusive on this issue because at least one court has refused
817. An employer could also avoid even the costs of litigating his liability by admitting
his guilt. In this situation the discriminatory practice would result in little-if
any-financial responsibility for the employer.
818. This argument assumes that the jurisdiction has no law requiring a successful
Title VII plaintiff to repay unemployment benefits received prior to judgment. See supra
text accompanying note 809. This statutory repayment requirement may be the best scheme
by which to prevent any party from becoming unjustly enriched while still adhering to the
standards enunciated in NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
819. See supra text accompanying note 793.
820. See, e.g., Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Thornton v.
East Tex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 360 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1966); Schwartz v. State, 494 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Fla. 1980);
Butta v. Anne Arundel County, 473 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1979). These courts do not require
the plaintiff actually to have held the part-time job concurrently with the job from which he
was discharged; rather, they refuse to deduct moonlighting income if the jobs could have
been held concurrently.
821. 449 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1971).
822. Id. at 795.
823. See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1973).
824. See Somers v. Aldine Indep. School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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to deduct interim wages earned at a full-time job.8 5
3. Plaintiff's History of Absenteeism
Some courts reduce a back pay award based on the plaintiff's
record of absenteeism. This deduction finds sound precedent in
cases interpreting the remedial provisions of the NLRA.828 The ac-
tual computation of the deduction presents a question of fact for
the trial court and, thus, rarely is disturbed on appeal.827 Courts
usually calculate the percentage of time the plaintiff missed work
before the back pay period and then reduce the gross award by the
same percentage.82 8 The employee's entire work history, however,
need not receive equal weight in the formula. The Seventh Circuit,
for example, recently concluded that a trial court had not abused
its discretion by weighing a plaintiff's most recent rate of absentee-
ism more heavily than his absence rate during earlier employment
periods.82 9 Any deduction for absenteeism, however, would be im-
proper when the gross award for a nonsalaried worker is computed




Generally, courts deduct from the gross back pay award any
amount-other than already-earned wages-rendered to the em-
ployee at the time of his discharge. One court reasoned that be-
cause severance pay went directly from the employer to the em-
ployee, it must be deducted from the back pay award, and should
not be considered as within the collateral source rule.3 1 The pay-
825. Falls Stamping & Welding Co. v. International Union, United Auto., Aircraft &
Agricultural Implement Workers, 485 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Since whether the
holding of one job would preclude the plaintiff from working at another constitutes a ques-
tion of fact, the court required proof that even a full-time job could not have been held
concurrently with the discriminatorily denied position. The court cited as relevant to the
determination the hours plaintiff worked at each job and whether the plaintiff had held
more than one job prior to the defendant's discrimination. Id. at 1103.
826. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1974); M. HILL & A.
SINICRopI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 68 n.122 (1981).
827. Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
828. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161 (7th Cir. 1981).
829. Id. at 161 n.15.
830. See NLRB v. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1974). Without this
rule a plaintiff would not be "made whole" since his absenteeism would have reduced his
back pay award twice-once in determining the gross award and again as a separate
deduction.
831. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980). See supra note 803 and
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ments are deductible only if they were occasioned by the plaintiff's
termination. ss If the plaintiff would have received the money had
he remained in the defendant's employ, the court should not de-
duct the severance pay from the back pay award.833 The trial
court's discretion to deduct severance pay is apparently not af-
fected by the later reinstatement of the discriminatorily discharged
plaintiff.$"
5. Miscellaneous Deductions
In a few cases courts have reduced the gross back pay awards
by deducting the amount the defendants would have withheld
from plaintiffs' earnings had the plaintiffs, not been discharged. Al-
though courts sometimes fail to explain the reasons for their mis-
cellaneous deductions,835 these deductions usually include local
and federal taxes traditionally withheld from the employees'
wages.8s One court reduced the award by the amount already re-
ceived by the plaintiff in an out-of-court arbitration award.3 7
Other items, however, including union strike benefits8" and ex-
penses the plaintiff would have incurred had he not been dis-
charged,839 are sometimes found not deductible.
accompanying text for a discussion of the collateral source rule.
832. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977).
833. Id.
834. In EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
the court stated that when the employee is later reinstated, "a credit for severance pay is
clearly necessary to prevent an inequitable double recovery by the discriminatee." Id. at
1318; cf. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (back pay
award reduced by severance pay received even though plaintiff not reinstated).
835. See Jackson v. City of Akron, 411 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1976). In an action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 the court simply stated that it had reduced the back pay by
"all deductions defendants were required to make." Id. at 690.
836. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979) (the
"make whole" nature of the back pay remedy justified a deduction for local, state, and fed-
eral income taxes and social security tax); NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d
103 (7th Cir. 1974) (award reduced by all federal and state taxes employer would have
withheld).
837. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973). The
court concluded that accepting the arbitration award constituted a pro tanto satisfaction of
the plaintiff's damage claim. Id. at 574.
838. Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 219-20 (4th Cir. 1967). The court
specifically noted that the strike benefits were not compensation for the time the strikers
spent on union picket lines; the benefits, therefore, were not deductible interim earnings.
839. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979). In
Lee Way Motor Freight the defendant argued that the plaintiffs would have incurred ex-
penses equal to 20% of their salary had they been promoted to the position of "road
driver." The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to reduce the back pay award by
20% based on a lack of evidence introduced at trial and the arbitrary nature of the defen-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:893
D. Mitigation of Damages: Interim Earnings and Amounts
Earnable Through Reasonable Diligence
Although courts in their discretion generally deduct many
items from back pay awards, Title VII only requires one such de-
duction: the court must reduce the award by the plaintiff's entire
earnings during the back pay period and by all amounts deemed to
have been earnable through the exercise of reasonable diligence." °
The rule clearly seeks to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining a
windfall recovery exceeding his actual financial damages. Although
in furtherance of this aim courts generally will deduct any mone-
tary benefit conferred on the plaintiff by interim employers," 1
some cases suggest that, in fairness to the discriminatee, the back
pay award should compensate him for expenses incurred in seeking
interim positions."2 This section of the Special Project examines
the problems inherent in the factual determination of whether a
court is justified in decreasing or eliminating the gross back pay
award when a successful plaintiff mitigated, or could have miti-
gated, his damages. s The cases discussed in the section primarily
dant's calculation. But see Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975)
(10% deduction allowed for expenses discriminatees would have incurred if promoted), va-
cated & remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); supra text accompanying note
735.
840. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). See generally Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,
588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); St.
Clair v. Local 515, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969); Falls Stamping &
Welding Co. v. International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Work-
ers, 485 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
841. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980); Di Salvo
v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F.
Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971). An exception exists for earnings from jobs the plaintiff could
have held concurrently with the job he was discriminatorily denied. See supra notes 819-25
and accompanying text.
842. NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 574-75 (5th Cir. 1966)
(court reduced interim earnings by amount paid as union hiring hall fees since fees were
"compulsory expense" to find work); Morris v. Board of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188, 215 n.37
(D. Del. 1975) (court upheld recovery of $25 claim for "miscellaneous expenses incurred in
seeking other employment").
843. Most Title VII decisions suggest that the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable
diligence to acquire interim employment merely reduces the portion of the back pay award
corresponding to that period of the plaintiff's failure. See, e.g., Jones v. Glitsch, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 990 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn.
1973). When a plaintiff's interim earnings have approximately equalled the back pay award,
the court may release the defendant from any back pay liability. Oliver v. Moberly, Mo.
School Dist., 427 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mo. 1977). Interim earnings that, during a given time
period, exceed the pay the plaintiff would have received during that time but for the dis-
crimination, should not reduce the award for those periods in which the plaintiff unsuccess-
fully exercised reasonable diligence to obtain interim employment. See Golay & Co. v.
1016
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concern claims under either Title VII or the NLRA." 4
1. Burden of Proof
Once a plaintiff proves his entitlement to back pay the defen-
dant must assert and prove that the plaintiff failed to exercise rea-
sonable diligence when pursuing interim employment.ss Thus, the
defendant bears the burden of proof when attempting to reduce
the plaintiff's gross back pay award on these grounds. 6 Since ap-
pellate courts cannot overturn a back pay award unless the trial
court's determination is clearly erroneous, absent the defendant's
clear proof on the record of the plaintiff's lack of diligence, no
grounds for reversal or mitigation will be available even though the
facts may suggest that reduction of the back pay award may have
been appropriate.uM
The defendant must prove two facts to meet its burden of
proof: (1) suitable positions existed for which the plaintiff was
qualified and which the plaintiff could have discovered had he ex-
ercised reasonable diligence; and (2) the plaintiff failed to exercise
NLRB, 447 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1971) (in NLRA cases interim earnings are offset against
back pay liability on a quarterly basis), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972); Somers v. Aldine
Indep. School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (plaintiff acquiring higher paying job
ends back pay period but excess earnings do not decrease defendant's back pay liability
incurred before the job was acquired).
844. While Title VII reduces the back pay award by "[i]nterim earnings or amounts
earnable through reasonable diligence," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), courts reduce back
pay awards in NLRA cases only if the plaintiff is guilty of a willful loss of earnings or a
clearly unjustifiable refusal to take desirable new employment. See, e.g., Heinrich Motors,
Inc., v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170
(2d Cir. 1965); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affld,
559 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
845. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978);
Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees & Motion Picture Mach.
Operators, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387 (7th
Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc.,
311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963).
846. This requirement greatly aids the plaintiff because the defendant must prove the
existence of facts that are peculiarly within the control of the plaintiff. Refuting a plaintiff's
assertions that his job seeking efforts were reasonable is an extremely difficult burden for a
defendant. See infra notes 851-83 and accompanying text. The defendant's task is nearly
impossible when its discriminatory conduct precluded plaintiff from obtaining interim work.
Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees & Motion Picture Mach.
Operators, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff could not obtain interim employment
because defendant discriminatorily denied him union membership).
847. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1974);
Sparks v. Griffin, 460 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1972).
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reasonable diligence to find these positions." 8 A presumption of
reasonable diligence exists in favor of the plaintiff. Discussing this
presumption, the district court in EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross,
Inc. "9 stated that the defendant "must show that the course of
conduct plaintiff actually followed was so deficient as to constitute
an unreasonable failure to seek employment. The range of reasona-
ble conduct is broad and the injured plaintiff must be given the
benefit of every doubt in assessing her conduct."850
2. Reasonable Diligence
Mitigation of back pay awards turns on the court's determina-
tion of whether the plaintiff's efforts to obtain interim employment
were reasonable. If the court deems the efforts reasonable then the
back pay award will not be reduced.85 1 If, however, the court finds
the efforts were not reasonable, then the court may reduce the
award or eliminate it entirely.8 52 The exercise of reasonable dili-
gence when seeking interim employment constitutes a question of
fact, and courts resolve most close questions of fact in favor of the
plaintiff.8
5 3
When the question of reasonable diligence arises in class ac-
tion discrimination suits, the courts must consider the facts and
circumstances surrounding each individual plaintiff to determine
whether reasonable efforts were made to secure interim employ-
ment. Although a comparison of the mitigation efforts of various
class members might help the court determine the appropriate re-
duction for an individual plaintiff found not to have exercised rea-
sonable diligence,8 " generally the court does not engage in a com-
parison of the efforts of class members. For example, the Fourth
848. Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); Sparks v. Grif-
fin, 460 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1972); Hegler v. Board of Educ., 447 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1971);
EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
849. 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affld, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 920 (1977).
850. Id. at 925.
851. See supra note 843 and accompanying text.
852. Id.
853. See supra notes 846-50 and accompanying text.
854. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
855. Id. at 936-37; Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1322-25
(D.C. Cir. 1972), remanded, 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Falls Stamping & Welding Co. v.
International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers, 485 F.
Supp. 1097, 1102-04 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp.
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Circuit refused to infer a lack of reasonable diligence when one
plaintiff earned $294 during the back pay period and another
plaintiff with similar skills and experience earned $5,381.40. 85'
Courts have examined a variety of factual circumstances to de-
termine whether a discriminatorily discharged plaintiff has made a
reasonable effort to secure interim employment.85 7 Of course, a
plaintiff fails to act reasonably if he never makes an effort to find
employment. 58 In an attempt to establish a standard, courts have
suggested that a reasonable effort might include checking want
ads, registering with unemployment agencies, and discussing po-
tential job openings with friends and acquaintances.859 The innu-
merable ways in which the claimant may demonstrate reasonable
efforts, however, limit the utility of specific standards. One court,
for example, found that a plaintiff acted reasonably when she uti-
lized the same job search technique she had used to find the job
from which she was discriminatorily discharged.86 0 Another court
concluded that a mere word-of-mouth search sufficed for a plaintiff
with excellent contacts within her trade.81 In other circumstances,
courts have discounted the efforts of plaintiffs who failed to follow
up job leads862 or who simply registered with unemployment agen-
655 (W.D. Va. 1977); McBroom v. Western Elec. Co., 429 F. Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
856. NLRB v. Pugh & Barr, Inc., 231 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1956); cf. NLRB v. Arduini
Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 422-23 (lst Cir. 1968) (plaintiff earning 70% of previous pay dur-
ing back pay period deemed to have exercised reasonable diligence regardless of actual effort
expended to find interim work).
857. Congress' use of the term "reasonable" prohibits courts from holding plaintiffs to
a "best efforts" standard in seeking interim employment. See Jackson v. City of Akron, 411
F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1976); supra text accompanying note 850.
The plaintiff may be able to demonstrate that he has initiated reasonable efforts to
secure interim employment even after an extended period in which he made no substantial
efforts. In Jackson the plaintiff made no effort to seek interim employment until two years
after his discharge. The court denied back pay only for the two years corresponding to the
time in which he made no reasonable mitigation efforts and permitted the award to begin
accumulating on the day plaintiff actually began seeking work. 411 F. Supp. at 690.
858. See NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf.
Heinrich Motors, Inc., v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 145, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (plaintiff who seeks to
establish own business during interim period need not make money to demonstrate reasona-
ble efforts); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1966)
(extremely low earnings during back pay period does not establish prima facie case that
plaintiff willfully incurred a loss of earnings).
859. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1975); Helbling
v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
860. Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 950 (D. Colo.
1979) (unannounced calls on potential employers sufficient).
861. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(plaintiff was vice-president of local trade association).
862. See, e.g., NLRB v. Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394 F.2d 420, 423-24 (1st Cir. 1968).
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cies that did not deal in the type of work plaintiff sought.8 s Con-
versely, since the courts are not impressed by efforts the plaintiff
should have known would be fruitless, they will not find the plain-
tiff's efforts unreasonable simply because he did not pursue "dead
ends."'
Courts, in some instances, have found plaintiff's refusal of an
employment offer to be entirely reasonable. For example, courts
generally will not reduce a plaintiff's award solely because he re-
fused to accept defendant's offer of reemployment or transfer with-
out corresponding seniority or back pay.u 5 The court reached a
similar result when the plaintiff refused an offer of reemployment
that would have subjected him to the same discriminatory treat-
ment that had originally prompted him to leave the defendant's
employ.8a6 Likewise, reduction of the award does not occur when a
863. NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court in
Madison Courier found that registration with an unemployment agency was not, in itself,
sufficient when the registration was a "mere formality which no one realistically expected to
be fruitful." Id. at 403.
864. See Walston v. School Bd., 566 F.2d 1201, 1206 (4th Cir. 1977) (a discriminatorily
discharged teacher "will not be held to make the futile gesture of applying for a position for
which she had previously been told that she was unqualified"); Vaughn v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (plaintiff need not bid on job for which she
was unlawfully disqualified); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Union,
Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (not unreasonable for union laborers to look
elsewhere for work when union labor halls proved fruitless).
Courts will not permit defendants to avoid liability because a Olaintiff failed to seek
work with other employers in the industry who enforced discriminatory rules similar to
those of the defendant. Accordingly, a defendant cannot successfully argue that a plaintiff's
back pay award should be reduced because the offending employer merely conformed to an
industry-wide discriminatory practice. In Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426
(N.D. Cal. 1975), stewardesses, discriminatorily released because they got married, sought
interim jobs only as stewardesses despite the industry-wide "no marriage" policy for female
flight attendants. The court found plaintiffs' efforts reasonable and refused to reduce defen-
dant's back pay liability simply because the defendant's conduct was consistent with the
rest of the industry. Id. at 434.
865. See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973), in which the court stressed that "reasonable diligence" could
not be "equated with a compulsion to accept [such an] offer." Id. at 1047. In Hairston v.
McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975), the Fourth Circuit stated that the
plaintiff's refusal of a promotion from the defendant would bar a back pay award only if the
refusal were "free and voluntary." Since the offered promotion required the plaintiff to for-
feit his company seniority, the refusal was based on the plaintiff's "reasonable reluctance to
expose himself to another aspect of an employer's discriminatory employment policy." Id. at
232. But see Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 42 Sup. CT. BULL. (CCH) B4055 (June 28, 1982)
(unconditional job offer without retroactive seniority tolls the accrual of back pay); Stallings
v. Container Corp. of Am., 75 F.R.D. 511, 522-23 (D. Del. 1977) (plaintiff should have ac-
cepted promotion even though acceptance would have required him to forfeit his accumu-
lated seniority).
866. Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1114-15 (D. Md. 1977).
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plaintiff tires of discriminatory treatment and quits his job with
the defendant.8 6 7 This logic has been expanded to preclude reduc-
tion of the award even when the plaintiff quits interim jobs, pro-
vided the court is satisfied that the plaintiff's reasons for quitting
are not inconsistent with a reasonable effort to mitigate
damages."' 8
3. Limiting the Scope of the Search for Interim Employment
As the term "reasonable diligence" suggests, a plaintiff need
not conduct the most comprehensive of all possible searches for
interim work. Nevertheless, courts frequently must consider
whether a plaintiff consciously limited his search to such an extent
that a reduction in his back pay award is justified. Clearly, certain
geographic limitations on the job search are reasonable; 6 9 simi-
larly, a plaintiff may move to another city in an effort to find em-
ployment if the court concludes that the plaintiff's motives were
legitimate.7 0 In addition, one court has held that a plaintiff may
reasonably limit his search to jobs paying a certain minimum
salary.
8 7 1
The question whether the plaintiff must "lower his sights"
"There is no requirement of a return to abusive conditions. The responsibility of an em-
ployee who has left work because of discriminatory conditions is to make diligent efforts to
seek employment where discriminatory conditions do not exist." Id. at 114.
867. See Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The
court will not force the plaintiff to "contribute... his labor to an employer who has treated
him unfairly and who persists in that unfair treatment, or to take less than a whole remedy
for injuries suffered." Id. at 1230; see also Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 392 F. Supp. 254 (W.D.
Mo. 1974) (award not reduced because plaintiff quit assembly line job and took lower paying
job in computer field similar to job he was discriminatorily denied by defendant).
868. See Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Mo. 1972). In Lowry
the court upheld an award even though the plaintiff had quit several interim jobs. Plaintiff's
reasons for quitting (lack of training for first job, insufficient pay in second job, and un-
healthy working conditions of third job) were not inconsistent with a reasonable effort to
mitigate damages. Id. at 218-19.
869. NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (NLRA
does not require discrimination victim to accept employment an unreasonable distance from
his home); Hegler v. Board of Educ., 447 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff need not
look outside state for interim employment when spouse worked in original city); Florence
Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 219-23 (4th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff need not move family
100 miles to accept interim employment).
870. See Stone v. D.A. & S. Oil Well Servicing, Inc., 624 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1980).
The plaintiff in Stone quit a part-time interim job and moved to another city to seek full-
time work similar to that which she was discriminatorily denied by the defendant. The
Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence and noted, "Title VII
should not be used to lock partially employed persons, fearful of losing back pay awards,
into long-term unproductive geographical commitments." Id.
871. NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575 (5th Cir. 1966).
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-accept interim work of a different or less-desirable nature than
that which he was discriminatorily denied-presents a more diffi-
cult problem. Courts and commentators agree that in cases
brought under the NLRA, a plaintiff should, after the expiration of
a reasonable time, lower the sights of his job search.7 2 This conclu-
sion stems from the Act's dual policy of promoting both produc-
tion and employment . 73 Despite this general rule, however, a
plaintiff need only. accept work "consonant with his skills, back-
ground and experience" and not "substantially more onerous" than
his previous employment.
8 7'
Courts deciding Title VII cases have not agreed whether "rea-
sonable diligence" requires a plaintiff to lower his sights when
seeking interim employment. At least one court flatly rejected the
NLRA line of authority on this issueS875-a conclusion that appears
justified in light of the different policies promoted by the acts. 76
Those courts that apply the lower sights doctrine in Title VII cases
limit the plaintiff's duty to accepting only those jobs that are rea-
sonably appropriate for his experience and qualifications.
8 77
Many courts, however, refuse to enforce the lower sights doc-
872. See, e.g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Golay &
Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972); NLRB v.
Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957); NLRB
v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955); Note, Discriminatorily Discharged
Employees Must Seek Work Outside Their Trade to Mitigate Back Pay Damages, 43
FORDHAM L. REv. 889, 892-93 (1975).
873. NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200 (1941); see also Note, supra note 872, at 893. The author
suggests that the requirement of lowering one's sights is reasonable since the frequently
granted remedy of back pay and reinstatement would make the less desirable work only
temporary. Id. at 896.
874. See, e.g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505 F.2d 391, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
875. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing As'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979). The
court found that reliance on NLRA authority should be limited to "provide guidance in
uncharted areas of Title VII construction .... [I]t is clear that there is adequate Title VII
authority construing the mitigation provision of section 706(g) to make resort to National
Labor Relations Act precedents unnecessary." Id. at 1317 n.39.
876. See infra note 883.
877. See, e.g., Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956 (E.D.
Pa. 1980). One commentator noted some difficult problems with the requirement that a
plaintiff with little experience or distasteful previous employment lower his sights:
[A]n employee would be forced to seek work of almost any type at any pay, particularly
if he had no past work experience or all his past employments were "distasteful." Fur-
thermore, the employee is faced with the dilemma ... of not knowing at what point
acceptance of lower paying work will be considered necessary to mitigate adequately in
order to avoid a willful loss of earnings.
Note, supra note 872, at 895; see Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp.
956, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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trine because of a particular plaintiff's special qualifications or pro-
fessional reputation.8 7 Thus, one court did not reduce the back
pay of a fashion designer with more than seventeen years of expe-
rience who sought work only within her trade.8 79 Another court re-
jected a similar contention that a discriminatorily demoted high
school principal should have accepted work as a teacher.880 In an
unusual case, one court even reduced the plaintiff's back pay
award because she too quickly accepted an interim job that paid
less than one she could have acquired in her original line of
work.
881
Although the lower sights doctrine is not readily reduced to an
all-encompassing rule, a few general principles have emerged. A
professional should not be forced by the doctrine either to damage
his reputation by accepting undesirable work or to risk a reduction
in his back pay award.8 2 Furthermore, courts should recognize
that even menial, unskilled, or inexperienced workers have some
value in their professional reputation and therefore should not be
forced to accept undesirable interim employment. The broad reme-
dial policies supporting Title VII's back pay provision suggest that
great deference should be accorded the plaintiff's job search pro-
vided that the court concludes the plaintiff is reasonably qualified
878. See cases cited infra notes 879-80. Other courts avoid reducing back pay by sim-
ply stating that a plaintiff's duty is only to seek "substantially similar employment." See,
e.g., Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Comment, En-
forcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. RE V. 430,
467 (1965).
879. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see also
EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (plaintiff's skill was in
limited area of pharmaceutical advertising), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 920 (1977).
880. Williams v. Albemarle City Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1974). The
Fourth Circuit stressed that accepting a teaching position would have been "regarded as an
acquiescence.., in his racially discriminatory demotion," and stated that when a profes-
sional seeks interim employment,
[c]omparability in status is often of far more importance-especially as it relates to
opportunities for advancement or for other employment-than comparability in salary.
Accordingly, a discharged or demoted employee is not required in mitigation of dam-
ages, to accept alternate employment of an "inferior kind", or of a more "menial na-
ture", or employment outside his usual type or for which he is not sufficiently qualified
by experience, or employment the inferiority of which might injuriously affect the em-
ployee's future career or reputation in his profession.
Id. at 1243.
881. Grindstaff v. Burger King, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (plain-
tiff, who had managed one of defendant's restaurants, accepted job with clothing company
even though higher paying jobs in the fast food industry were available).
882. See supra note 880.
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for the employment he seeks.8 s A deferential presumption in favor
of the plaintiff should control the court's case-by-case determina-
tion of whether the plaintiff conducted his job search with "reason-
able diligence."
E. Time Limitations on Back Pay
Determining the limits of the "back pay period" may be one of
the more difficult tasks a court must face in an employment dis-
crimination case. This determination is crucial because it sets the
dates on which the defendant's back pay liability begins and ceases
to accrue. The court must first decide the date on which the com-
plained-of discriminatory practice began;su the employer generally
will be subject to liability from that date, provided it falls within
the two-year statutory period prior to the plaintiff's filing of a
complaint with the EEOC.8 85 The courts do not agree whether the
back pay period terminates once the plaintiff prevails in an action
or only when the discrimination is actually remedied by the defen-
dant's adherence to a court order granting relief.886 A variety of
frequently arising scenarios further complicate the limitation pe-
riod issue,88 and several circumstances justify a refusal to award
back pay for certain time spans during an otherwise proper back
pay period.888
This section of the Special Project first discusses the rules,
both past and present, applicable to the proper date of commence-
ment of a back pay period. Second, it examines the circumstances
that may prompt a court to refuse to award back pay for a portion
of an otherwise allowable period. Last, it discusses the variety of
events that may signal the end of back pay periods and considers
whether the periods should run through the date of judgment or
until the court-ordered remedy actually is enforced.
883. The lower sights doctrine is appropriate for use in cases brought under the NLRA
since Congress passed that Act to promote the policies of production and employment. Title
VII, however, was designed to end employment discrimination and make its victims whole.
See supra notes 60-63. Given this dual purpose, a discriminating employer should not be
allowed to benefit from its victim's decision to seek only similar interim employment.
884. 2 A. LARsON & L. LARsOsN, supra note 268, § 55.37(a), at 11-52; see Davidson,
supra note 55, at 760.
885. See infra notes 898-913 and accompanying text.
886. See infra notes 940-44 and accompanying text.
887. See infra notes 914-32 and accompanying text.
888. See infra notes 933-39 and accompanying text.
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1. Commencement of the Back Pay Period
Title VII, in its original form, contained no limitation regard-
ing the commencement of a back pay period. This absence of a
limitation provision generated two problems: whether a defendant
would be liable for back pay covering a period prior to the Act's
effective date, and whether any limit should be imposed on the
beginning date of the back pay- period. The courts uniformly re-
solved the first question-the effective date of the Act is the earli-
est possible date upon which a Title VII back pay award may begin
to accrue.889 Courts justified the rule by stating that prior to the
effective date of the Act, employers had no notice that their dis-
criminatory activity violated the law.890 Even in cases alleging dis-
crimination violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 891-a statute in ef-
fect long before the July 2, 1965, effective date of Title VII and the
provisions of which employers could reasonably have been assumed
to be aware-the courts have refused to order back pay for viola-
tions occurring before Title VII's effective date.92
The courts also forged a rule in response to the Act's failure to
limit the earliest possible commencement date of the award period.
This rule limited the start of the award period by applying the
"most analogous statute of limitations of the state where the action
was filed. ' 89 Consequently, once the court characterized the na-
ture of the action, it would invoke the applicable statutory period
in the forum state to determine the earliest date the plaintiff's
back pay award could begin to accrue.8" Title VII back pay peri-
889. See, e.g., Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975); Gamble
v. Birmingham S. R.R., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1975); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d
1372 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974);
Ingrain v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Payna v.
Weirton Steel Co., 397 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. W. Va. 1975); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978); 2 A. LAnSON & L. LARsoN, supra note 268, § 55.37(a), at 11-52.
890. Payne v. Weirton Steel Co., 397 F. Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. W. Va. 1975); 2 A. LAR-
soN & L. LA SoN, supra note 268, § 55.37(a), at 11-52.
891. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
892. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir.
1974). In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), the court
considered "the whole area of employment discrimination" and said that in spite of the
existence of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, not until Title VIl's effective date did employers actually
become aware of their accountability for discrimination. Id. at 1378.
893. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 1975).
894. See, e.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d
1364 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973);
Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp., 368 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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ods, therefore, were limited by analogy to state statutes granting
recovery for "injuries to persons or property,"8"5 wages owed or
damages, 898 and violations of federal statutes.9 7
Congress resolved the commencement of the back pay period
problem in 1972 when it amended Title VII's remedial provisions
and specified that a back pay period may begin no sooner than two
years prior to the filing of a claim with the EEOC.8 98 Although
some congressmen initially proposed an even shorter limitation pe-
riod designed to favor employers,8 9  the supporters of the version
ultimately adopted sought to encourage courts to grant back pay
awards in more cases.900 Their intent to increase the use of back
pay awards appears consistent with the policies behind the original
enactment of Title VII.90 1
Since the amendment became effective while many cases were
still pending, courts hearing those cases were forced to decide
whether to apply the new limitation retroactively or to continue to
use the traditional limitation analysis.90 Neither alternative won
universal approval. The courts applying the two-year limitation pe-
riod retroactively suggested that the amendment indicated Con-
gress' belief that such a period was reasonable.0 Other forums re-
895. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 315 (6th Cir. 1975).
896. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 924 (5th Cir. 1973); Taylor v.
Armco Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp. 885, 912 (S.D. Tex. 1973)i
897. Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp., 368 F. Supp. 137, 140-41 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
898. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat.
107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(g) (1976)); see, e.g., Crawford v. Western Elec. Co.,
614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918
(10th Cir. 1979); Fannie v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
The statute is clear on its face. The back pay period can begin no sooner than two years
prior to the actual filing of the claim. The plaintiff cannot benefit from a longer award
period by arguing that the applicable limitation is two years prior to plaintiff's initial con-
tact with an EEOC officer. Nitterright v. Claytor, 454 F. Supp. 130 (D.D.C. 1978). If the
plaintiffs are victims of a continuing discriminatory pattern or practice, however, the period
may begin two years prior to the filing of the original claim complaining of that pattern or
practice, even if the original claim involved different plaintiffs. United States v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 933-34 (10th Cir. 1979).
899. The House considered limiting the period to two years prior to the date the
plaintiff actually filed the case in court. See H.R. 6760, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(e) (1971); 61
CORNELL L. REv., supra note 76, at 464 n.23 (1976).
900. See 61 CORNmL L. REv., supra note 76, at 464. Despite the expansive intent of
the amendment, the imposition of the two-year limitation on the starting date of the award
period clearly prevents a successful plaintiff from being made whole by the defendant for
any discrimination that occurred prior to the two-year period. See Stastny v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314, 321 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
901. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
902. See supra notes 893-97 and accompanying text.
903. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D.D.C. 1974), modi-
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jected this rationale as unpersuasive.9" Since, however, the
number of active cases filed prior to 1972 is constantly diminish-
ing, this issue is one of decreasing importance.
The two-year limit currently in effect under Title VII does not
apply to a successful back pay claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.905
That employment discrimination statute contains no express back
pay limitation period and courts, therefore, have determined the
beginning date of section 1981 back pay awards by utilizing the
same analysis proposed in pre-1972 Title VII cases. °6 When a
plaintiff wins a case pleading both a Title VII and a section 1981
claim, the court generally applies the longer of the two limitation
periods if it determines that the periods differ. 07 That period, of
course, will never be less than two years prior to the ffling of plain-
tiff's claim with the EEOC.08 Although this limitation method ar-
guably encourages plaintiffs to shop for state forums providing the
longest recovery period, no evidence suggests that either Congress
or the courts are taking steps to impose a uniform limitation on
back pay periods for the two actions.
The two-year limitation imposed by the 1972 amendment es-
tablishes the earliest date a back pay period may begin. If the dis-
criminatory act occurred less than two years prior to when the
plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC, then the period begins the
date the defendant's discrimination first affected the plaintiff. 09
Determining this date is largely a matter of common sense. If the
defendant denied the plaintiff a position the plaintiff could have
filled immediately but for the discrimination, the back pay period
flied, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); see also Stallings v.
Container Corp. of Am., 75 F.R.D. 511, 522 (D. Del. 1977); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra
note 268, § 55.37(a), at 11-54 (explanation of two-year limit).
904. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579,
590 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
474 F.2d 906, 922 (5th Cir. 1973); Payne v. Weirton, 397 F. Supp. 192, 194 (N.D. W. Va.
1975).
905. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Allen v. Amalgamated
Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977). But see
Sand, Back Pay Problems Under Title VII, 27 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 151, 152 n.3
(1974) (§ 1981 back pay liability is "arguably" subject to Title VII two-year limit).
906. See supra notes 893-97 and accompanying text.
907. Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d 876, 881 n.6 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 315 (6th Cir.
1975); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918, 926 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
908. See supra note 898 and accompanying text.
909. See supra notes 884-85 and accompanying text.
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begins on the date of the plaintiff's application 10 A similar result
is appropriate in cases of a discriminatory refusal to promote the
plaintiff.""' If, however, the plaintiff failed to qualify for the posi-
tion on the date of his application, then the back pay period will
not begin until the date he became qualified. 12 If the position de-
nied was not immediately available, the back pay period begins on
the date plaintiff would have been hired absent defendant's
discrimination.913
2. Termination of the Back Pay Period
Determining the termination date of a back pay period
presents more difficult problems than ascertaining the commence-
ment date. Initially, courts often must consider whether a plain-
tiff's actions (or failures to act) justify the cessation of the defen-
dant's back pay liability. Further, the question often arises
whether the award should continue to accrue until the defendant's
discrimination is remedied or whether liability should cease on the
date of final judgment.
(a) Reasons for Termination
No single rule exists for determining the termination date of a
back pay period; one court has stated that the decision ultimately
must be based on "considerations of fairness and practicality."
914
As this statement suggests, consistent with other areas of Title VII
law, the trial court enjoys wide discretionary authority to end the
award period whenever it deems appropriate." 5 Some courts, in
their discretion, have ended the back pay period on the date the
action was filed because the plaintiff sought only back pay without
reinstatement.916 One court ended the award period after deter-
910. Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1301 (8th Cir. 1978).
911. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976).
912. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 453 (5th Cir. 1973); Milton v. Bell
Laboratories, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D.N.J. 1977).
913. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
475 F. Supp. 344, 355 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
674 (1981).
914. United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 46, 328 F. Supp.
429, 443 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
915. See supra notes 790-92 and accompanying text; Thornton v. East Tex. Motor
Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 1974); Comment, supra note 75, at 391 n.66.
916. See Henry v. Link, 417 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D.N.D. 1976). But see Tidwell v. Amer-
ican Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436-37 (D. Utah 1971) (finding no indication that Congress
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mining that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pursued her claim
with the EEOC to ensure that it was being processed as expedi-
tiously as possible. 17
Defendants often argue that certain changes in the plaintiff's
employment situation during the award period warrant ending the
back pay period. In one case the court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that the back pay period should end when plaintiff quit her
job after being denied a deserved promotion. 18 The back pay pe-
riod may continue even though the plaintiff obtains interim em-
ployment,919 although courts generally terminate the period when
the plaintiff acquires a higher paying job and his interim earnings
exceed damages. 2 0 Unless the plaintiff agrees to the contrary,' 1
the back pay period usually continues when the defendant offers to
reemploy the plaintiff but refuses to offer retroactive back pay or
seniority. 22 Even if the defendant offers full reinstatement the pe-
riod may continue to run if the plaintiff has, in the interim, con-
tractually obligated himself to work for another employer.'2 3 Fi-
nally, one court has held that the defendant's offer of part-time
intended to distinguish between plaintiffs seeking reinstatement and plaintiffs seeking other
damages).
917. Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1977). Contra
Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (ending period
for this reason frustrates purposes of Title VII).
918. See Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (period does not end simply because plaintiff "left defendant's employ as a result of
disagreements with the man who was hired for the position she was discriminatorily de-
nied"); Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221, 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (plaintiff
not required to accept or retain a position materially different from the position she was
discriminatorily denied).
919. This rule is necessary to avoid discouraging plaintiffs from mitigating their dam-
ages. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 1981); cf. Goodwin v. City of
Pittsburgh, 480 F. Supp. 627, 636 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (period ended on plaintiff's re-
employment).
920. Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978); Butta v.
Anne Arundel County, 473 F. Supp. 83, 89 (D. Md. 1979); Somers v. Aldine Indep. School
Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900, 903 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Milton v. Bell Laboratories, Inc., 428 F. Supp.
502, 515 (D.N.J. 1977); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684, 690-91 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973).
921. See Jackson v. Veri Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D. La. 1969),
in which the court ended the back pay period on the date the plaintiff accepted reemploy-
ment with the defendant "without regard to her grievance against defendant." Id.
922. See supra note 865 and accompanying text; Comacho v. Colorado Elec. Technical
College, Inc., 590 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1979); United Transp. Union Local 974 v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). But see Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 42 Sup. CT. BuLL. (CCH) B4055 (June 28, 1982); but cf. Stallings v.
Container Corp. of Am., 75 F.R.D. 511, 522 (D. Del. 1977) (court reduced back pay for em-
ployee who refused a promotion because of seniority forfeiture requirement).
923. Williams v. Albemarle City Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1974).
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work will not end the period when the same full-time work is regu-
larly available.92'
Defendants also argue -often successfully -that a court
should terminate the back pay period on the date a discriminato-
rily discharged employee would have been dismissed even absent
the defendant's discrimination.9 25 Adopting the nondiscriminatory
termination argument, courts have ended award periods at the
time at which they determine the plaintiff would have been physi-
cally incapable of performing his duties. 26 Other relevant nondis-
criminatory termination dates include the date a plaintiff would
have retired 2 7 or the date on which plaintiff's job would have
ceased to exist.
92 8
As a third tactic, defendants assert that the back pay period
ought to end because the plaintiff has voluntarily removed himself
from the labor market. This argument has succeeded when the
plaintiff enrolled as a full-time college student after his discrimina-
tory discharge. 29 In such a situation the Tenth Circuit stated,
"[W]hen an employee opts to attend school, curtailing present
earning capacity in order to reap greater future earnings, a back
pay award for the period while attending school ... would be like
receiving a double benefit." 0 Cases in which the plaintiffs en-
rolled in training courses have received similar treatment. 3 1 The
plaintiff's move to another city, however, has been deemed not to
imply that the plaintiff has removed himself from the employment
924. Stone v. D.A. & S. Oil Well Servicing, Inc., 624 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1980).
925. Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (back pay period should continue to run so long as "it can be assumed [plaintiff]
would have held the job to which she was entitled").
926. Jones v. Gltsch, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 990, 995 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell
Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 949 (D. Colo. 1979); Mitchell v. Board of
Trustees of Pickens County School Dist. "A", 415 F. Supp. 512, 519 (D.S.C. 1976).
927. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
928. Florsheim Shoe Store Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1240, 1247 (2d
Cir. 1977) (remaining part-time workers phased out); Helbling v. Unclaimed Salvage &
Freight Co., 489 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (date store closed); Edwards v. School
Bd., 483 F. Supp. 620, 628 (W.D. Vs. 1980) (plaintiff would not have been rehired because of
excessive absence from work); White v. Ed Miller & Sots, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 148, 153 (D.
Neb. 1978) (defendant released all other workers in plaintiff's capacity).
929. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
930. Id. at 268.
931. In NLRB v. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff was
deemed to have removed himself from the labor market when he entered a paid full-time
training program. But see EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 1981). In
Ford Motor Co. the plaintiffs, who would have accepted an untainted offer of reemployment,




market. On the contrary, courts generally refuse to end the back
pay period if they believe the plaintiff's move was related to his
continued search for interim employment. 2
(b) Periods Excludable From the Back Pay Period
Although a back pay period may not have been terminated for
one of the reasons discussed above, certain circumstances will
prompt courts to eliminate portions of time from a period when
back pay otherwise would have accrued. The circumstance that
most frequently arises concerns female plaintiffs who become preg-
nant during the back pay period. As a general rule, courts do not
award back pay for the period during which the plaintiff could not
have worked because of her pregnancy.9 33 The reduction also may
take into account time required for post-natal recovery.9" Other
excludable periods correspond to the times when the defendant
would not have had work available for the plaintiff.93 5 The defen-
dant, however, bears a heavy burden of proof when it proceeds
under this theory,9" 6 and its strongest case usually can be made
when the discharged plaintiff was an irregular or seasonal
worker.9 3 7 Periods when the plaintiff was ill and could not have
worked often are excluded when calculating back pay awards 3 8
Although this illness exclusion seems defensible, one commentator
persuasively argues the rule is fair only when applied on a case-by-
case basis.9 39
932. See supra note 870 and accompanying text; Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce,
568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 437 (D.
Utah 1971); Davidson, supra note 55, at 762.
933. See Walston v. School Bd., 566 F.2d 1201, 1206 (4th Cir. 1977); Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 393 (7th Cir. 1975); Grindstaff v. Burger King, Inc., 494 F.
Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426, 434
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D.
Kan. 1971).
934. Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (D. Kan.
1971).
935. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1980).
936. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 972 (1966).
937. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 134, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1980).
938. See, e.g., id. at 138; Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
939. See Davidson, supra note 55, at 762. The writer suggests,
This should not be a hard and fast rule. For example, it would seem unfair to exclude
periods of ill health caused by injuries received during substitute employment. Of
course, absence from work would cause no loss of earnings in many salaried positions.
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(c) Termination as a Result of Judicial Remedy
If no reason exists to terminate the back pay period before
trial, ° the court must determine on what date the awarded back
pay ceases to accrue. Many courts terminate the period on the day
of the final judgment in the particular case," 1 although the opin-
ions in these cases present no compelling rationale for this rule.
Termination of the defendant's back pay liability only when the
discrimination actually has been remedied represents a more de-
fensible position. By using this formula, the award would continue
to accrue until the plaintiff receives all the back pay to which he is
entitled and is permitted to exercise his employment opportunities
to the court's satisfaction." 2 Delaying termination of the back pay
period until the discrimination has been remedied is the superior
approach because it more nearly achieves the "make whole" pur-
poses of the Act"" and encourages defendants to undertake rapidly
the required remedial measures."'
X. SETrLEMENTS
Once the court has found the employer liable for discrimina-
tory employment practices, the defendant employer has two alter-
natives. On the one hand, it may litigate the damage issue in the
belief that the plaintiff has prayed for excessive damages. The Spe-
In such cases, the back pay award should not be affected either.
Id.
940. See supra notes 909-32 and accompanying text.
941. See, e.g., Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1978);
Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 454 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
919 (1977); Sabala v. Western Gillette Inc., 516 F.2d 1251, 1266 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated &
remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir. 1974).
942. See, e.g., United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 932 (10th
Cir. 1979); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d
1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918,
926 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 475 F. Supp. 344, 355
(N.D. Ind. 1979), afld, 659 F.2d 736 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 674 (1981); Vaughn v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 281, 291 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd, 620 F.2d 655 (8th
Cir. 1980); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. Supp. 390, 411 (W.D. La. 1977);
Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1007 (1978); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (D.D.C. 1974), modi-
fied, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
943. See supra note 792 and accompanying text.
944. EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
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cial Project thus far has discussed the issues that arise when. the
employer challenges a claim for back pay. The employer, however,
has a second option-settlement.'" This option is attractive to
both employers and claimants because it eliminates the expense
and uncertainty of continued litigation. The employer's decision to
settle, however, raises a myriad of problems that it must consider
and resolve to ensure that the settlement will have binding effect
on all class members."" This part of the Special Project highlights
some of the issues that the employer encounters when it decides to
settle. This part begins with an analysis of the procedures em-
ployed by courts for the settlement of class actions as outlined in
rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and concludes
with a commentary about the impact that industry-wide consent
decrees have had on employment discrimination litigation.
A. Settlement Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
1. Procedure of Rule 23(e)
Rule 23(e)"W attempts "to discourage the use of the class ac-
tion device to secure an unjust private settlement, and to protect
the absent class members against prejudice from discontinu-
ance." To accomplish these purposes rule 23(e) requires that all
class members be given notice of the proposed settlement and that
the court review and approve the compromise before allowing dis-
continuance of the class action."' Before allowing the defendant to
send notice, however, courts usually conduct preliminary hearings
to decide whether the proposed settlement merits the considera-
tion of the entire class. 50 Although a court's decision to inform
class members of the proffered agreement suggests the acceptabil-
ity of the offer, this decision "is not a finding that the settlement is
945. Sometimes the plaintiff will initiate the settlement negotiations, but this part of
the Special Project focuses on employer-initiated settlements.
946. An absentee class member may collaterally attack any settlement affecting his
rights to which res judicata does not apply. Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 68 F.R.D.
686, 689 (N.D. Ga. 1975), afr'd on other grounds, 529 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1976); 3 H. Nzw-
BRG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5560 (1977).
947. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members
of the class in such manner as the court directs." FAn. I. Crv. P. 23(e).
948. 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 946, § 4910, at 402.
949. See supra note 947.
950. C. SuLLIvAN, M. ZnnmR & I. RicHARDS, supra note 33, § 6.9, at 432 n.6; MANUA,
supra note 384, § 1.46, at 52-53; 68 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 1146, 1148 (1974).
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fair, reasonable, and adequate."951 Instead, the decision to send no-
tice indicates the court's belief that the question of the offer's fair-
ness deserves a full-scale hearing.
9 52
2. Notice of Proposed Settlement
To prevent the deprivation of rights that may result from the
absence of notice,'9 53 rule 23(e) requires that notice of a proposed
settlement "be given to all members of the class in such manner as
the court directs."95' Thus, if a district court fails to enforce the
notice requirement, its approval of the settlement not only
prejudices the rights of absent class members but also constitutes
an abuse of discretion.95 5 Neither the Constitution nor rule 23(e),
however, specifies the type of notice that must be given.956 Conse-
quently, whether the court gives notice by mail, publication, or
other means, 57 the constitutional adequacy of the notice remains
the crucial issue. " According to the standard set by one circuit
court, "To comply with the spirit of [rule 23(e)], it is necessary
that the notice be given in a form and manner that does not sys-
tematically leave an identifiable group without notice." 9 5 9 The no-
tice also should indicate the class member's right to object to the
proposed settlement"0 and the steps that he must follow to put his
objection before the court." 1 In some cases the notice must state
that an absent class member has a right to opt out of a rule 23
(b)(2) class action and pursue his own relief; otherwise the doctrine
of res judicata would not prevent his bringing a separate suit for
951. MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.46, at 54-55. For an outline of the inquiries a court
should make at this preliminary hearing, see 3 H. NEWBERo, supra note 946, § 5570a, at 472;
MANuAL, supra note 384, § 1.46, at 53.
952. MANuAL, supra note 384, § 1.46, at 55.
953. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); 7A C. WRoHT & A. MILER, supra note 372, § 1797, at
234; MANuAL, supra note 384, § 1.45, at 52.
954. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see supra note 947.
955. Sertic v. Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga & Ashtabula Counties Carpenters Dist. Coun-
cil, 459 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1972).
956. See, e.g., Rota v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 64 F.R.D. 699, 707
(N.D. Ill. 1974); MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.45, at 51.
957. See supra note 356.
958. Sometimes the notice includes proof-of-claim forms. See supra part VI. In such
instances, due process requires that the notice be the best practicable. See Greenfield v.
Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1973).
959. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976)
(footnote omitted).
960. Id.
961. Developments, supra note 366, at 1567 n.172.
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relief at a later time. 9 Clearly, the notice, whatever its form, must
adequately and intelligibly inform the absentee of his membership
in the class and his right to object to the settlement offer.
3. Approval of the Court
Soon after the absentees receive notice of the proposed settle-
ment the court will hold a hearing to determine whether the settle-
ment is fair, reasonable, and just.9"8 At this hearing the court ei-
ther will presume the fairness of the settlement"' or will place the
burden of proving the fairness of the offer on its proponent."5 No
matter which approach the court adopts, the final decision will de-
pend on a weighing of the various equities. The court, for example,
will examine the terms of the settlement agreement, paying partic-
ular attention to the eligibility of absent class members to partici-
pate in the award,"' the consideration exchanged for settlement,,"
and other clauses that may favor only certain claimants.9" The
court also will consider the strength of the class' case,"' the defen-
dant's ability to pay,970 and the complexity, length, and expense of
further litigation. 7 1 Moreover, the court will review the objections
962. Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981); see also John-
son v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1979) (due process requires notice
before individual monetary claims of absent class members may be barred); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 877 & n.80 (5th Cir. 1975) (notice may be
necessary to have res judicata effect), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). This right to opt
out is not absolute, but may arise under a rule 23(d)(2) order requiring notice to (b)(2) class
members. Penson, 634 F.2d at 993-95.
963. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975); C. SULLIVAN, M. Z7Amux & &. RicHims,
supra note 33, § 6.9, at 432-33.
964. See Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 587-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975).
965. Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), a/i'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975); 3 H. NEWBERo, supra note 946, § 5600b;
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 372, § 1797, at 229-30 & 230 n.39.
966. Sand, supra note 905, at 159.
967. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 851-64 (5th Cir.
1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 946, § 5610c; C. SutL-
vAN, M. ZiM R & R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, § 6.9, at 433.
968. MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.46, at 62-66.
969. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974); 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 946, §§ 5610a-5610b; MANUAL, supra note 384, §
1.46, at 56.
970. MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.46, at 56.
971. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974); 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 946, § 5610g; MANUAL, supra note 384, § 1.46, at
56.
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of absent class members, which may range from the form and
amount of the settlement to the amount and method of payment
of attorneys' fees.972  Although the judge need not inquire into the
merits of each objecting party's claim, 8 the inquiry "must be suf-
ficient to enable the trial court to set forth on the record a rea-
soned response" to the objections.7
Probably the most significant inquiry the court will make dur-
ing this balancing process is an examination of the adequacy of
representation that absentee class members have received during
the settlement negotiations. The court's decision on this issue will
be of particular importance to the employer because due process
requires adequate representation of absent class members before
the settlement will have binding effect on them.7 5 Consequently,
the employer should insist that the court find and resolve any con-
flicts between the class representative and the absentee class mem-
bers or between class counsel and the class. Because the court will
be particularly sensitive to the possibility of collusion between the
employer and the class representative,97 6 the employer should
avoid making a settlement offer that affords some premium to the
representative.9 " Moreover, the court will look for evidence of con-
flicts of interest among class members.9 7 8 The court will also con-
sider the relationship between class counsel and the entire class; in
particular, the court will require the attorney to have some experi-
972. 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 946, § 5660e.
973. Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 573
F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
974. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1976).
While the named plaintiff may object to the settlement, see, e.g., Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528
F.2d 1169, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Air Line Stewards &
Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), he does not have an absolute veto right since his objec-
tions may not adequately represent the interests of the class, Flinn, 528 F.2d at 1174 & n.19.
975. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-42 (1940).
976. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 372, § 1797, at 230.
977. See, e.g., Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1176 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976); Edwards, supra note 208, at 805-06.
978. Circumstances evidencing an employee's inability to adequately represent the
class include (1) employees affected by different employment practices, see, e.g., Mason v.
Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Anderson v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 321 (N.D. Cal. 1973); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D.
Colo. 1971); (2) employees at different geographical locations, see, e.g., Pizano v. J.C. Pen-
ney Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1975); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 734 (N.D. Ga. 1974); and (3) insufficient nexus among
applicants, present employees, and former employees, see, e.g., Moore v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Campbell v. Ai Thrasher Lum-
ber Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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ence and competence in handling employment discrimination
cases. 97' The court also will hold the attorney responsible to each
individual class member and will not allow him unilaterally to sac-
rifice the interests of any class member when negotiating the set-
tlement °80 Furthermore, the court will scrutinize the terms of the
agreement that deal with the payment of attorneys' fees because a
conflict of interest naturally inheres when the attorney simultane-
ously negotiates for his fees and for the settlement fund." 1 Al-
though discovering and resolving these problems of inadequate
representation places a great burden on the employer, the advan-
tages of res judicata should justify the employer's efforts.
B. Impact of Industry-Wide Consent Decrees
Along with the threat of "pattern and practice" suits, the
EEOC has brandished one other weapon in the fight against dis-
criminatory employment practices-consent decrees. 82 Like settle-
ment agreements, consent decrees function as both conciliatory de-
vices and vehicles of judicial and private economy. 83 Yet, consent
decrees differ from ordinary settlements in that they have "the im-
primatur of court approval" from their inception.9" Because of
this difference, consent decrees offer rather unique advantages for
the respective parties. For the EEOC, court approval makes con-
tempt sanctions available to aid in the enforcement of various
parts of the decree. 85 For the defendant, the consent decree avoids
any collateral estoppel effect that an adverse decision might
have.9
8 6
Despite these advantages, however, industry-wide consent de-
crees present several problems for both discriminatees and nonmi-
979. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975), va-
cated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
980. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976).
981. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020-22 (3d Cir. 1977); see 51 TEMI.
L.Q. 799 (1978).
982. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZImLuR & R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, § 14.3, at 848 & nn.2-3.
983. 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 268, § 56.00, at 11-81 (1981); C. SULLIVN,
M. ZIMmzR & R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, § 14.3, at 848-49.
984. 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 268, at 11-80; see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZimIE
& R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, § 14.3, at 856-58.
985. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, § 14.3, at 848 & n.6.
986. Id. at 849. By settling, the defendant suspends adjudication on the merits of the
back pay issue. Such suspension gives the defendant the opportunity to challenge less meri-




nority workers. Because the EEOC has no pecuniary stake in the
outcome of the settlement, back pay awards for discriminatees may
result in less than compensatory relief. 7 In addition, consent de-
crees often require that victims of discrimination expressly release
their right to sue the employer for past discriminatory practices
even though those discriminatees may wish to seek other forms of
relief not available under the decree. 88 Moreover, since consent
decrees have a binding effect on all employees within the affected
class,"' and since the right of private parties to participate in
EEOC-initiated negotiations is unclear, 9 0 many discriminatees
must accept a settlement to which they had no opportunity to
voice objections. Moreover, nonminority workers may find that the
consent decree has a reverse discriminatory impact.91 For exam-
ple, reverse discrimination claims may arise when qualified nonmi-
nority workers do not receive scheduled promotions solely because
of affirmative action requirements in the consent decree. 9
Another issue that consent decrees raise is the role that courts
should play in approving the decrees. Since settlements and con-
sent decrees have many similarities, courts, as in class action set-
tlements, should require that the agreement be fair to all inter-
ested parties:993 Courts also should take steps to ensure that
affected employees understand the conciliation agreement and its
987. See United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir.
1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 853 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
988. Releases of claims arising from past discrimination are allowable, but prospective
releases are violative of public policy. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517
F.2d 826, 853-60 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
989. In pattern and practice suits brought by the EEOC, an affected employee does
not become bound unless he voluntarily chooses to become a party. United States v. Alle-
gheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 877 n.80 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976). In a private class action, class members can be bound if they receive notice of the
settlement. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974). Of
course, if the employee has settled previously, and if he now seeks the benefits to be derived
from the EEOC pattern and practice suit, a court will not allow double recovery to the
extent that his claim can be individualized. Allegheny, 517 F.2d at 876-77.
990. Courts have the discretion to permit private parties to intervene in pattern and
practice suits, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 841, 845-46
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), but if a court does not allow intervention,
then private parties have no right to participate in the negotiation of the decree. Id. at 875.
991. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 33, § 14.3, at 855.
992. Id.
993. Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 587




effects on their claims for back pay. 94 Moreover, although courts
generally encourage settlement, they should not dismiss private ac-
tions simply because of a pending settlement between the em-
ployer and the EEOC.9m5 By following these guidelines, the courts
will protect the interests of all affected parties and will guarantee
adequate judicial review of industry-wide consent decrees.
XI. CONCLUSION
This Special Project has discussed the most important and
controversial issues concerning back pay awards in employment
discrimination cases. It has considered the difficult legal and fac-
tual problems that the parties and the courts must confront at
each step of the back pay process, beginning with the court's deter-
mination of whether back pay is an appropriate remedy for proven
acts of discrimination and continuing to the computation of
awards for the individual claimants. As the courts face these com-
plex issues and as they apply the discrimination laws to new fact
situations, they must, at each step, bear in mind the broad pur-
poses that the back pay awards were designed to accomplish. As
the legislative history indicates, and as the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, Congress adopted Title VII with a view toward making
the victims of discrimination whole and of discouraging future acts
of discrimination in employment. Only by giving the remedial pro-
visions of the legislation the expansive interpretation Congress in-
tended can the courts accomplish the overall objective of eliminat-
ing employment discrimination in the United States.
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